

an angle of 35 degrees, and the carrier aircraft of the Tarzon bomb at an angle of 0 degrees. Aircraft

of the first groups were instructed not to change course until the Tarzon bomb was dropped and the target was hit, then to leave the object with a turn to the right. The bomb load of each link was to be dropped in 17-20 seconds. At 45 kilometers from Andong, American aircraft were met by 40 Soviet fighters. The first group was attacked by "migs" at an altitude of 6500 meters, the second (35 kilometers from Andong) - at an altitude of 6500-7000 meters. The enemy was scattered, his battle order

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violated. As a result, the Tarzon bomb exploded 150 meters from the railway bridge without harming it; several bombs fell near the bridge. A total of 250 bombs were dropped with a total weight of 260 tons. The enemy lost 10 bombers (according to American data - 2)⁵⁴. The losses of American fighters amounted to 2 aircraft (according to American data, several F-86s were damaged, since in the turmoil of air combat, F-80s and F-84s fired at any high-speed air target, be it MIG-15 or F-86)⁵⁵. An important task of the 64th Air Corps in the spring of 1951 was to prevent the bombing of new airfields under construction in North Korea since February of this

year. It was supposed to base Korean-Chinese jet aircraft on them in order to expand the range of the MiGs. Already in April, American air reconnaissance unraveled the plan of the Soviet command. The US Air Force began systematic bombing of airfields under construction. However, the damage caused was quickly eliminated by the Chinese and Koreans. Brigadier General J. Briggs, commander of the builders of the temporary bomber command, decided to strike at new airfields only immediately before they were put into operation. The tactic was to carry out systematic reconnaissance of objects under construction, and, when they were ready, to launch bombing attacks with a small detachment of forces. In the future, with the bombing and assault strikes, it was planned to repair work⁵⁶. On April 17, bombardments of airfields being prepared for the reception of Soviet, North Korean and Chinese aircraft began. But the success of this plan of the enemy depended on the outcome of the fight against Soviet fighters. I must say that by this time the pilots of the MiGs had gained experience and improved their skills. Combat duty in Andong continued to be carried out by the 324th Fighter Air Division, led by Colonel Kozhedub. Soviet pilots used a battle formation consisting of 16 MiG-15s, in which

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rum, acting in fours and pairs, brilliantly mastered the art of mutual cover from the attacks of the "sabers". In air battles on April 16 and 18, having disrupted the Americans from completing the task, the MiGs did not suffer losses.

In order to more successfully fight Soviet fighters, the American command deployed another squadron of F-86s to the Suwon airfield and applied new tactics. "Sabers" began to act in sixes. When the four "Migs" were separated for an attack, 4 F-86s went to intercept a pair that was gaining altitude, and 2 F-86s attacked a pair that was approaching a target. The idea of the maneuver was to split the MiGs' battle formation and destroy them one by one. At first, this tactic worked. Already on April 22, 36 MiG-15s, which were going to intercept 12 F-86s that were finishing patrols in their zone, were met by fresh forces consisting of 12 Sabers, which engaged in battle with Soviet aircraft and shot down, according to American data, 4 "moment"⁵⁷. (This is doubtful, since the Americans often considered the MIG-15s shot down, which received many holes, but the exceptional survivability of the MiGs - up to 50-100 holes! - allowed them to quickly return to service.)

The remoteness of Andong, where the MIG-15s were based, from the airfields being built in the DPRK did not allow Soviet fighters to effectively counteract the systematic bombing of these objects. This allowed American strategic and tactical aviation, in essence, to disrupt the construction of airfields and bring them into readiness to receive aircraft. Only for the period from 17 to 23 April, 9 airfields were bombed, which were completely disabled. On May 9, a massive raid was carried out on the Sinuijzhu airfield, where North Korean aircraft were based: 38 Yak 9, Il-10 and La-5, as well as large warehouses of fuel and military materials. The airfield and warehouses were badly damaged, a significant number of aircraft were destroyed on the ground⁵⁸. 18 MIG-15s taking off from Andong were unable to effectively counteract the

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6 air wings of tactical naval aviation, numbering up to 318 aircraft.⁵⁹ The spring of 1951 showed that Soviet

fighters acted quite effectively, covering the bridges across the Yala, but due to the limited flight range they could not counteract the American aircraft, which inflicted bombing and assault attacks on airfields and communications in the central and eastern regions of North Korea. But in the "alley of moments" Soviet fighters became an increasingly formidable adversary for American aviation.

Thus, in an effort to prevent enemy air raids on North Korean airfields in areas inaccessible to moments, Soviet fighters began to expand their combat zone. Using hanging tanks, which increased its radius to 190 kilometers, they began to enter the areas adjacent to Pyongyang and Chinnampo. Using the advantages of "migs" in operations at high altitudes, Soviet pilots occupied an echelon with an excess of "sabers" or escort fighters over the battle order, stood in a circle of 16-20 aircraft and,

coming from the direction of the sun, they attacked the enemy in pairs, after which they again gained altitude. The Americans called this technique "yo-yo" (devil jumping on an elastic band). US Air Force reconnaissance in the skies of Korea highly qualified pilots", noted What "V it was assumed that appeared the crews of the MiGs were completed by Soviet pilots⁶⁰ .

The tactical innovations used by the pilots of the 64th Corps forced the US Air Force command to find new ways of operating for their aircraft. On July 10, 1951, in Kaesong (DPRK), located at 38 ° north latitude, negotiations began on a truce between North and South Korea. By this time the front had stabilized along the 38th parallel. There was a lull in the air war. Meanwhile, near Andong, on Chinese territory, another airfield, Miaogou, was put into operation. This allowed the 64th Corps to increase

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the number of fighters for combat duty at the airfield or in the air. (Later, two more Chinese airfields, Dapu and Dagushan, were used.) The number of fighters capable of simultaneously participating in combat operations increased from 2 to 4 regiments⁶¹. In addition, parts of the 64th Air Corps were re-equipped with the latest modification of the MIG-15 - the MIG-15bis. The Americans believed that up to 445 aircraft of the MIR2 type were deployed in the Andong area in the summer of 1951 . However, this assessment was far from reality. The number of MiGs at that time did not exceed 190 aircraft, and the number of combat-ready aircraft was even less⁶³. And with this composition, they were supposed to confront the American Air Force in Korea, which numbered up to 1,500 aircraft of various types of strategic, tactical and naval aviation, including Sabers of equal combat qualities (89 aircraft).

In connection with the new equipment that entered service with the 64th IAC, the command of the US Air Force in the summer of 51 forbade the use of the B-29 in the "MIG alley". Air raids on targets in Northwest Korea were carried out mainly by F-80 and F-84 tactical fighters under the cover of F-86. But this did not save the Americans from trouble. So, for example, on July 29 and in August (on the 9th, 18th, 19th and 24th), MiGs, without engaging in battle with the Sabers patrolling in the area where the fighter-bombers operated, attacked the F-80 and F -84, and, inflicting damage on them (albeit insignificant), disrupted the task of attacking and bombing airfields and communication centers. On August 23, negotiations in Kaesong broke off. From September 1, the aviation of the 64th Corps launched active operations against the US Air Force, which from August 18 carried out massive raids on North Korea's communication centers. Soviet pilots changed tactics again. They formed a circle from which suddenly several planes (4-16) in a deployed formation attacked one of the Sabers, diverting other F-86s to the rescue of a comrade, and at that time other MiGs, acting in a column of links, attacked

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or aircraft designed to strike objects⁶⁴. This tactic gave good results: on September 19, in an air battle, the MiGs destroyed 3 Sabers and 3 bomber fighters. General Wayland, who became commander of the US Air Force in the Far East on June 10, demanded that the high command strengthen the F-86 grouping in Korea, but was refused. Then Wayland was forced to stop bombing objects in the zone actions of "migs", concentrating the forces of fighter bombers on strikes against targets between the Cheongchon River and Pyongyang.⁶⁵ This was a success for Soviet aviation. But new surprises awaited the Americans. At the end of September, air reconnaissance noted the construction of three airfields in the Samchham, Taechon, Namsi triangle. not far from each other, these construction sites were well covered by anti-aircraft artillery and were within the reach of the MIG-15 from the Andong and Miaogou airfields. The completion of the construction of airfields did not bode well for the Americans

good. When operating from such an airfield hub, Soviet fighter aircraft would significantly expand the limits of the "alley of moments." To prevent this, General Wayland decided to again use B-29

aircraft to bombard airfields. Since the summer of 1951, B-29 strategic bombers ("Super-Fortress" - "flying fortress", abbreviated as "superforts") began to master night bombing using the Shoran navigation system, but were not yet ready for effective operations at night. So Wayland decided to use them during daylight hours. October of this year was the month of the most intense air battles. Almost daily, groups of 8-9 "superforts" under the cover of fighters bombed construction sites in the Namsi, Taechon and railway 225

nodes. Air battles went on with varying success. So, on October 16, the bombers participating in ~~fighter~~ were shot down and damaged by 9 MiGs - a record score for 1951. But soon combat happiness passed to Soviet aviation. On October 23, despite the impressive cover - 34 F-86s, 55 F-84s, 3 out of 8 B-29s were shot down, and the next day, when up to 34 US aircraft and 40 MiGs participated in the battle during the bombing of the bridge in Suncheon, American losses amounted to 1 F-84 and 1 B-29. On October 26, Wayland banned the use of "superforts" during daylight hours, but the very next day, following the previously approved plan, 8 B-29s bombarded the railway bridge at Sinuiju⁶⁶.

Data on the last October battles differ. General G. A. Lobov, who at that time commanded one of the divisions of the 64th Air Corps (later its commander), calls October 30 the last day of air battles. According to his recollections, on that day, 44 of the 56 MiG-15s in combat readiness were met by a group of American aircraft consisting of 21 B-29s and 200 escort fighters. The enemy lost 12 B-29s and 4 F-84s in air combat. According to American data, the last daytime US strategic air raid took place on October 27th. The object was the railway bridge at Sinuizhu. Participated: from the Soviet side about 95 (!) MiGs, from the American side - 8 B-29s, 16 Australian Air Force "meteors" and 32 F-84s. The B-29s were seriously damaged, and no Soviet losses were reported⁶⁸. Be that as it may, in October the Soviet fighters were successful. They gained air supremacy in the northwestern part of North Korea and forced the Americans to abandon daytime strategic aviation operations and increase the F-86 grouping by deploying the 51st F-86E wing to Korea until the end of the war. American aviation lost 15 aircraft in a month, damaged or destroyed 34 MiGs⁶⁹. The authors of the official work "US Air Force in Korea", published

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The US Air Force Historical Service (Washington, 1983) writes that then, at the end of October 1951, "many pessimists said that the outdated" super-fortresses "can no longer be used in Korea. Inspired by success, the communists will transfer their aircraft across the Yalu to the airfields of Sinuiju and Wiju ... Thus, the US Air Force in the Far East failed to prevent the construction of airfields in Namsi, Taechon and Samchham ..."⁷⁰ The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General Vandenburg, giving a press conference after an inspection tour of the Far East, came to a gloomy conclusion: "In just two weeks, communist China has become one of the leading powers in the world in terms of air power"⁷¹. He did not mention only the role of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, and he hardly knew about its activities in the Korean War.

The last two months of 1951 were marked by a decline in aviation activity on both sides. Switching to the use of its strategic aviation at night, the American command faced a number of unresolved problems. The experience in aimed bombing at night was clearly not enough for the Americans. It is known that during the years of World War II, American strategic aviation operated, as a rule, during the day, and British - at night. Now she needed to master the night raids on North Korean targets and ensure a sufficiently high accuracy of bombing. There was some practice in using the Shoran ground navigation system for this purpose⁷². The development of this method of bombing by strategic bombers began in the summer of 1951. Estimated circular probable

deviation (KVO) was about 160 meters. However, this largely depended on the accuracy of the maps and the quality of the on-board equipment on the aircraft. For the first time, bombing on the Shoran system was carried out on October 13 during a raid on the Samchkhair airfield. However, the results were disappointing: out of 278 bombs, only 24 exploded within the target, and then on the very edge

takeoff
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but-landing strip (runway)⁷³. This kind of bombardment continued in November and December. But the effectiveness was low: there was not enough experience. Before the sorties, the crews of the B-29 carried out only 8 training bombings using the Shoran instead of the prescribed 3574. In addition, it turned out that the coordinates of the main targets of strikes - the Namsi, Taechon, Samchham airfields do not coincide with their position on the maps. The bombing error was up to 400 meters. The enemy's camouflage measures were also misleading. On the runway, similarities of "craters" from the ground were laid out, creating the impression of funnels from bombs. The air defense system was also a big hindrance. 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, controlled by gun-guided stations (SON), searchlight stations prevented the B-29 from taking an advantageous position for dropping bombs, especially since the access routes to the target were limited by another Shoran station. Soviet intelligence quickly identified these routes. The most effective air defense systems were concentrated here. The inaccuracy of bombing was compensated for by the Americans by the intensity of the raids and the increase in the power of the bombs. In November, Superforts carried out 26 raids on Namsi airfield, dropping 170 tons of bombs, 160 tons were dropped on Taechon airfield in 23 raids, 80-85 tons of bombs hit Samchham and Uchu airfields, each of which was subjected to 12 night air strikes⁷⁵.

The transition of American strategic aviation to night operations certainly complicated the combat missions of units of the 64th Air Corps. Night fighters La-9 (piston) had low speed and could not effectively fight the enemy.

The command of the corps urgently took measures to repel the night raids of the "superforts". In night battles, the MIG-15 began to be used, although they did not have on-board radar sights and devices. However, their high speed made it possible to approach the B-29 faster, which, in the conditions of a small light field created by

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ground searchlight stations, was of great importance. In addition, the MIG-15, compared to the La-9, had more powerful weapons, which made it possible to destroy B 29 from the first attack. This was very important, since the enemy quickly left the beams of searchlights and there was no time for a second attack.

remained.

After several "fortresses" were shot down at night,

Americans have taken a number of new measures to ensure their safety. The bombers were painted black from below. Simultaneously with the B-29, the enemy began to use the B-26 ("invader") light bombers, the purpose of which was to suppress searchlight stations from low altitudes. However, to protect the projectorists, the corps command immediately armed their crews with heavy anti-aircraft machine guns. To oppose "migs", the Americans began to use all-weather F-94 fighters equipped with radar search and aiming devices. However, this was not enough. Then B-29s began to appear at night in the searchlight fields only in cloudy weather.

In order to increase the impact on communications, the enemy completely switched light bombers to night operations, mainly for road transport of troops and cargo. This tactic of the Americans was very rational. Separate sections of roads were assigned to certain crews. As they explored the terrain, they lowered their flight altitude and acted more efficiently, since it was rarely possible to hit small targets from high altitudes.

The Korean People's Army simply could not cover at least the most important roads with searchlight fields and anti-aircraft artillery. This required a large amount of forces and means, which she did not have. The use of fighters that did not have locators at low altitude, and even in mountainous areas, was excluded.

However, a solution was soon found. Corps command created several battle groups, consisting of a platoon

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searchlights and a battery of 37mm cannons. Each such group (they were called "nomads") received their own sections of roads and changed positions daily. The enemy, not knowing where he would meet the fire this time, was forced to raise the flight altitudes, which immediately reduced his combat capabilities, especially in the use of napalm. As a result, the B-26's main weapon lost some of its effectiveness, and machine-gun fire generally became useless.

Spotlights also played a significant role. The crews of the bombers began to be afraid not so much of anti-aircraft fire as blinding by searchlight beams, which at low altitudes led to a loss of spatial orientation, a collision with rocks and hills. However, the 64th Corps could not solve the problem of combating night bombers radically. The lack of the necessary forces and means did not allow to successfully fight the enemy at night, although the measures taken somewhat reduced the effectiveness of his night raids⁷⁶. 1951 ended. Despite many difficulties, the 64th Corps, on the whole, successfully completed the SBOI task. In the daytime, 307 group air battles were conducted with the

participation of 43 percent of all crews flying on combat missions. According to the headquarters of the corps, 562 enemy aircraft were shot down.

It was the highest result of the year for the entire Korean War. In 16 single air battles, 2 B-26 aircraft were destroyed at night. Hull losses amounted to 71 MIG-15s. 32 pilots were killed⁷⁷. But the main thing was not even the number of downed aircraft - it was more important that the presence of MiGs in the air and

the fire of anti-aircraft artillery to American bombers and tactical fighters effectively carry out tasks, upset their battle formations, and reduced the accuracy of bombing and assault strikes. The Americans also recognized this. In April 1952, the United States Navy Proceedings magazine wrote in the article "Lessons from air combat in Korea":

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"MIG-15 is actually a lethal weapon for our current types of strategic aviation bombers. It is clear that our air force made a serious miscalculation in taking the B-50 instead of developing jet bombers in the first place. Increasing the number of escort fighter groups solved the problem posed by the MIG-15. The experience of the Korean War has shown that the production of speed bombers by jet fighters is practically useless: enemy interceptor aircraft dive through the battle formations of escort fighters forced to fly at low speed,

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bombers..."

In October 1951, another magazine, the United States News and World Report, noted: "The bombers began to face stronger and more accurate anti-aircraft artillery fire and ever-increasing opposition from fighter aircraft" ⁷⁹.

In the battles of 1951, the MIG-15 showed its extraordinary survivability and high weapon efficiency, especially in firing at bombers. Here is how the aviation engineering service of the 64th Fighter Air Corps assessed the combat qualities of this aircraft in the report of the corps commander to the headquarters of the Soviet Army Air Force in September of this year:

"The MIG-15 aircraft showed high combat qualities, reliability in

air combat ^{And} simplicity in operation.

work

With

American aircraft,

armed with heavy machine guns, MIG 15 aircraft

resistant to destruction

And

fire

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flight. The engine continues to work flawlessly in case of serious damage to its units. Individual aircraft

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battles got up to return 30-50 bullet holes

^{And} safely to their airfield. 1000 km / h at the same time flying at speeds up

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destruction of the tail and

with limited rudder travel

altitude, the aircraft remained stable And controllability V

flight. Holes V rear fuel tank V fuel system And

when shooting through the wiring harnesses of a fire in the air, there is no fire on on airplane V

the aircraft in Iz cause. In total, one case of air combat was recorded. operation of 22 damaged engines failed engine air

imbalance 3 and V due to V

only

jamming of the nozzle rotor. By the reason for the destruction of the turbine blades. In other cases, And

turbine holes when the disk of damage to the blades was shot through, the engine

And worked without interruption. jet pipe fire

V combustion chambers And Not

called. more vulnerable spot on aircraft are thrust

elevator and rudder controls. 10 cases of ejection of pilots in cases it was carried out due to failure to control

aircraft. The second weak point is the upper sphere of the cockpit, if damaged, the pilots of bullet hits

V in most cases, they are injured by glass fragments of a lantern "** from

And 0.

Apparently, the high survivability of the MIG-15 more than once misled American pilots when they believed that they had destroyed the aircraft by flashing it with several bursts of heavy machine guns. recorded many hits and gave grounds to consider the aircraft shot down, and he returned to the base and, after repairs, after a few days was again in the air. The armament of the MIG was films

guns (1x37 mm and 2x23 mm). The fire confrontation with the B-29 has always been in favor of the MIG-15 for several reasons. Its guns had a significantly greater range and destructive firing power than the large-caliber B-29 machine guns. In addition, the "fortresses" had very poor survivability. The counting and decisive mechanisms and the machine-gun installations of the bomber themselves did not provide aiming 232

and effective fire on fighters attacking at high closing speeds (150-160 m/s). The attack itself lasted only three or four seconds.

The foregoing does not mean that Soviet fighter pilots have fully mastered the technology and art of air combat that they had. Summing up the results in the fall of 1951, the corps command noted numerous shortcomings, which indicated that the combat skills of many pilots were still far from perfect. In the report of the corps commander, Major General of Aviation Belov to the Air Force Headquarters in September of this year, it was noted that many pilots have not yet mastered the knowledge of the enemy's tactics, have not got rid of the template in the use of their own tactics, sometimes get carried away in combat with enemy fighters to the detriment of the main task - the destruction of bombers, they begin to fire from such distances that do not allow

hit the target. It was also said about the omissions on the part of flight managers of various degrees. Thus, the lack of experience in controlling the actions of jet aircraft from the ground led to the fact that after the takeoff of a subunit or unit, some crews could not find the enemy and take part in the battle. The unit commanders, as was clear from the report, had not yet mastered the ability to properly organize an attack, which reduced combat results; interaction between groups and crews in the air was not always organized clearly enough. Many shortcomings were noted in the work of reconnaissance, which gave out information about the enemy belatedly, in a number of cases incorrectly assessed the composition of enemy aviation groups, which did not allow a correct assessment of the balance of forces. Other shortcomings in combat work were also pointed out. Such a practical approach to the combat activities of the personnel of the corps indicated that the command of the formation did not close its eyes to the shortcomings, saw them and sought to eliminate them in order to increase the effectiveness of the corps units in the fight against the enemy. And act

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Consequently, with the acquisition of experience in subsequent years until the end of the Korean War, Soviet aviators and anti-aircraft gunners significantly improved their combat skills. 1951 was the most intense year in the air war that unfolded in the skies of North Korea. Not by the number of forces involved and the intensity of the fighting. Forces were constantly built up, there were periods of intense action. But this year was the most productive for the pilots of the 64th Corps. For the first time, jet and piston aircraft collided in air battles, and for the first time, aircraft of equal quality in guidance - MIG-15 and F-86 - measured their strength. It was in the 51st that the tactics of modern air combat were developed, technical characteristics were tested in practice

aircraft, electronic equipment, radio reconnaissance and electronic warfare techniques were practiced, the capabilities of anti-aircraft artillery and radio engineering troops were identified, the pilot's life support system was checked, the problems of ejection, emergency rescue service were solved, and much more. At the beginning of 1952, the air situation became more complicated. In

South Korea, a new, 51st wing F-86E appeared at the Suwon airfield. The grouping of "sabers" increased dramatically - from 89 to 165 aircraft, of which about 125-130 fighters constantly participated in hostilities⁸¹. The transition of the enemy to night operations of strategic aviation and light bombers acutely posed new tasks for the 64th Corps. The airfield network in North Korea has expanded, and, consequently, the area of responsibility of the corps. Now the MIG-15s flew with external tanks, which increased their range to 199 kilometers⁸². In addition, in the first half of this year, not three, but two

air divisions: in January - February - 324 and 303 IAD, in March - June - 97 and 190 IAD⁸³. Back in the fall of last year, the Joint Sino-Korean Air Force (JVA) entered into hostilities - we had to interact with it, transfer the accumulated experience. unite

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The Chinese Air Force was commanded by the Chinese General Liu Zhen. The North Korean Air Force was led by General Wang Len.

At the request of the leaders of the OVA, the preparation of their units for air combat and cover at first was carried out by Soviet pilots. And soon two divisions, commanded by Fang Zang and Xi Buan, who were armed with MIG-15 aircraft, entered into hostilities. In this regard, one of the primary tasks of the corps was the gradual introduction of Chinese and

Korean pilots from the OVA formations into combat operations.

In cooperation with the crews of the 64th Corps, they began to participate in air battles against enemy aircraft. Later, as the OVA pilots gained combat experience, they began to act independently, since the language barrier made it difficult for Soviet pilots and OVA aviators to interact in air battles with the enemy. At the same time, the issues of combining combat efforts, determining areas for the joint operational use of forces were agreed

always in advance. Thus, the crews of the 64th Corps took over the reflection of large groups of fighter-bombers flying under the strong cover of the F-86, and the OVA pilots were involved only when it was necessary to step up efforts. Basically, they fought against small groups, acting up to the front line. Soviet fighters were raised to cut off the F-86s when they were pursuing Korean and Chinese pilots. Soviet pilots continued to perform more complex tasks even when

when the aircraft fleet of the United Air Army at the forward airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Dapu and Dagushan exceeded the number of "migs" in the 64th air corps. In 1952, after the B-29 switched to night operations, which reduced their use, the F-80 and F-84 fighter bombers became the main strike force of the US Air Force during the daytime. It's still

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made it more difficult for Soviet aviation to carry out tasks, since, in comparison with the "superforts", tactical fighters had an approximately fourfold numerical superiority over the forces of the 64th Corps⁸⁴. When repulsing air raids, the fight against the F 86E - "barrier" fighters was carried out mainly in small groups (link, squadron), echeloned at altitudes from 8000 to 14000 meters. This allowed the MiGs to tie up large groups of Sabers on a broad front with comparatively small forces and create sufficiently favorable conditions for their strike groups to fight tactical fighters and bombers.

Often a technique was used, called the "box" by the Americans. It consisted in the fact that a group of "MiGs" attacked the F-86s who arrived in the patrol area from a pre-occupied waiting area in the northern section of the "Migs Alley", and when the Sabers began to retreat towards the sea, they were intercepted by another "southern" group, concentrated in advance, as if in an "ambush", in the Anchzhu region. Large groups of MiGs (30-60 aircraft) were used by air units allocated for tactical aviation

operations (F-84, F-80, Meteor type, B-26, carrier-based attack aircraft). The tactics of the MIG-15 in the fight against enemy attack aircraft was to ensure that from a height of about 13 thousand meters (above the level of the unmasking contrail) to rapidly attack the enemy and, hitting, at low altitude, leave for their base. The tactics adopted by the "instant" made it very difficult for the "sabers" to fight against Soviet fighters. For an earlier warning of the appearance of "migs" over North Korean territory, the Americans installed a radar station on Chhodo Island in the Yellow Sea and widely used it⁸⁵. B-29 strategic bombers, despite the fact that they completely switched to operations at night, faced new countermeasures for them - the Soviet ground-based air defense system. Powerful searchlights blinded the crews, in their light field²³⁶

MiGs, adapted for flying at night, attacked, albeit with small forces, slow-moving bulky machines; anti-aircraft artillery, equipped with gun-guidance stations, fired aimed fire. The air defense was dispersed along the arc of the Shoran stations known to the command of the 64th Corps. This led to the fact that the "superforts" met opposition from air defense systems long before approaching the object. It was not easy to carry out the task in such an environment, and the results of the bombing attacks were by no means always effective. Therefore, for strikes against objects, the Americans chose the most difficult weather conditions. A typical example of this kind is the raid of 4 B 29 on the railway bridge near Mount Kvoksan on June 10, 1952.

"Superforts",

following the arc "Shoran", were suddenly illuminated by 24 searchlights. 12 "MiGs" appeared in the light field - two B-29s were destroyed; the third, having received heavy damage, made an emergency landing; the fourth, using electronic interference, was able to escape from fighter attacks⁸⁶. But combat happiness is changeable. On June 23, taking advantage of low clouds and a storm front in the Andong area, 124 F-80 and F-84 tactical fighters, 35 carrier-based attack aircraft under the cover of 84 F-86 and 35 F-9F naval fighters within an hour (from 16 to 17.00) struck a

powerful bombing and assault strike on one of the most important objects covered by the 64th Corps, the Supkhun hydroelectric power station, located 60 kilometers north of Andong. The blow was essentially unpunished. ⁴⁴

anti-aircraft (85-mm and 37-mm) guns were able to knock out only 2 aircraft. Aviation of the 64th Corps did not operate: over the Andong airfield and to the south was the epicenter of a thunderstorm front, which excluded the take-off of aircraft. But the raid on the Supkhun hydroelectric power station was still the exception, not the rule. As the Americans admitted, they were not able to establish air superiority in the "alley of moments" for any length of time. "Sabers" appeared in this zone only if necessary.

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cover attacking aircraft. The objects of the main strikes, as a rule, were chosen outside the zone of operations of the 64th corps. The command of the US Air Force in the Far East noted an increase in the grouping of fighter jet aircraft in Manchuria (this was mainly due to units of the OVA. - qualitative improvement of the system

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control and warning, the emergence of new radars: in the fall of 1952, there were 25 early warning radars and 11 guidance stations. Guidance from the ground allowed the MiGs to reach the 2-5 km zone where the Sabers were located within a radius of up to 120-130 kilometers from Andong⁸⁸. Of course, by American standards, the ground equipment of fighter aircraft in Korea did not meet the standards adopted by the US Air Force, but it testified that, and inferior in many aspects to the Americans (living conditions, outdated equipment, etc.), pilots 64th corps were a formidable force for the enemy. "But," noted American observers, "they used their air power only for the selfless defense of North Korea and Manchuria, and never for strikes against enemy ground targets." American pilots spoke respectfully of Soviet pilots, many of whom showed high pilot

skill and professionalism in air combat. Colonel John Mitchell, who became the 52nd commander of the 51st F-86E air wing in June, said: "We divide the MIG-15 pilots into two categories - "khoncho", that is, high-class professionals, and "students"... meeting with the "khoncho" we know that we must apply all our art and mobilize all the possibilities of technology in order to successfully cope with such a bird"⁹⁰. By the way, American pilots, when meeting with MiGs, often noted that the pilot's appearance was by no means East Asian. The MIG-15, with its first-class flight performance for that time, forced the command of the US Air Force in the Far East to repeatedly turn to their superiors with a demand to improve

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F-86, to make it adequate, and even superior to the MIG-15 aircraft. The US has worked hard on this problem. As a result, already in June 1952, the 51st Air Wing, and in September, the 4th Air Wing, received a new F-86F fighter. It differed from its predecessor F kg), 86E thrust

elevated

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improved wing design, improved technical characteristics. The maximum speed increased to 1200 km/h, the practical ceiling was up to 15-17 thousand meters, maneuverability, speed in level flight, rate of climb increased⁹¹. In 1952, the F-86F received 2 squadrons (in the 4th and 51st wings).

The activity of the MiGs, which, as already indicated, was low in the first half of 1952, increased from August, which was explained by the fact that more and more OVA units and formations were put into operation. This did not go unnoticed by the enemy: the Americans noted a large number of inexperienced pilots who appeared in the skies of North Korea. However, by the end of the year, the situation began to change. The pilots of the US Air Force reported after completing the tasks that the actions of the "MiGs" were distinguished by coherence, good interaction between pairs and links. In many cases, Saber crews had to spend a lot of time maneuvering in dogfights in order to gain a favorable position. As a result, the time limit was exhausted and it was necessary to leave for the base without hitting the enemy.⁹² The crews of the 64th Corps and the OVA more often began to use unconventional tactics, tied up the Americans in air combat and forced them to hastily retreat towards the

sea and eject over the sea, since already there was no fuel left.

The combat skill of the MiG pilots especially increased with the beginning of 1953. They professionally used the entire range of heights in dogfights and boldly engaged in aerial combat, even when they could avoid it, being outnumbered⁹³. The MIG-15s that flew out on a "free hunt" had fuselages painted blue on the bottom and golden on top. Gaining a height of 13-14 thou-

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sands of meters, where they were not given out by the contrail, they became invisible and suddenly attacked the air enemy from above. But the Americans did not stand

still. Many of them mastered the new machine - the F-86F and showed the high art of air combat. The number of aces grew, and everyone who shot down 5 or more aircraft of the OVA or the 64th Corps was considered to be one. There was also a new tactic of "screening" when covering tactical aviation aircraft. "Sabers" formed a "train", which consisted of 6 links: each link of 4 aircraft followed the previous one at a distance of 2 kilometers. Such a battle formation made it possible for most of the "train" fighters to engage in combat with the enemy and reduced the danger for the flight to be attacked "in an instant" in isolation from their aircraft. At the same time, he allowed the link to maintain maneuverability and freedom of action for the attack⁹⁴. As General G. Barkus, who commanded the 53rd US 5th Air Army until May, noted, the US Air Force had "unconditional air supremacy over North Korea between the front line and the Cheongchon River and superiority

between the Cheongcheon and Yalu

Indeed, rivers"95 . efficiency fighter Soviet
action in 1952 compared with 1951 decreased. This was due to a number of reasons. "Superforts" made raids only at night, when the MIG-15s could not provide them with massive opposition. Air battles took place mainly during the day and for the most part CF-86E and F-86F, approximately equal in quality to MIGs. It took a lot of time and effort to train OVA pilots and cover them during combat missions. In 1953, the situation became even more complicated. Two more wings were re-equipped with F 86F aircraft: the 18th and 81st. The "Sabers" of these wings were used as tactical fighters to destroy ground targets, but they could also effectively conduct air battles. At the same time, the American command stepped up the operations of strategic and tactical bombers at night in areas where during the day they could meet strong countermeasures.

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action. In addition, the predominance of difficult weather conditions in the winter of 53 ruled out the use of OVA units due to their insufficient flight combat skills. This was offset by the intensity of the flights of the formations of the 64th Corps. Therefore, the tension of the fighting of the corps until the conclusion of the armistice on July 27, 1953 was very high. The average monthly number of sorties in 1953 increased by 33 per cent in comparison with the previous year .

Enemy fighters, who also learned a lot during the war, entered the battle only under favorable tactical conditions for them or with a clear superiority in forces. At the same time, the American command, despite its numerical

superiority, was unable to solve the problem of providing tactical aviation operations in the area of responsibility of the 64th Corps by air battles, and in the last year, with the advent of the F-86F aircraft, it began to use the tactics of "free hunting" in the area Andong airfield, in order to call the "MiGs" to battle in a clearly unfavorable situation for them. In order to impose on the 64th Corps their conditions for an air war, the Americans scattered provocative content and made statements on the radio. So, starting from March 14, 1953, the crews of the aircraft of the 5th Air Army

scattered leaflets on all objects that were subjected to their bombing and assault strikes. The leaflets contained one question: "Where is the Communist Air Force?" Radio Seoul was heavily exaggerating the topic of the weakness of the Korean-Chinese Air Force. The crowning achievement of this propaganda provocation was the so-called Mullah project. On the night of April 26, two B-29s dropped more than 1 million leaflets over populated areas along the Yalu River. Leaflets written in Chinese, Korean and Russian called on MIG-15 pilots to fly their aircraft to South Korea, to the Kimp'o airfield. Further

it was said that each pilot who flew over would receive political asylum and a reward in the amount of 50 thousand dollars. To the one who

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will be the first to fly, in addition they will give another 50 thousand dollars. On May 10 and 18, another half a million leaflets were scattered in the same area. US Command Radio broadcast leaflet content in Korean, Chinese and Russian.

languages.

None flew. Already after the war, in September 1953, an officer of the KPA Air Force, Lieutenant Ro Kum Suk, fled the DPRK on a MIG-15bis aircraft, but, as it turned out, he had never heard of any rewards for this⁹⁷. The last months of the "air war" in Korea were marked by a decrease

in the activity of air battles. At the same time, more and more pilots of the OVA of the Sino-Korean armed forces and fewer aviators of the 64th Corps participated in them. For the Americans, these months were the heyday of the aces of the 5th Air Force. Their number grew and by the end of 1953 amounted to 39 people⁹⁸. Air battles continued until the last day of the war.

July 27, 1953 in Panmenzhong was signed
truce. Giving

an overview of the combat activities of the MIG-15 crews during the war years, the commander of the 64th corps S.V. enemy aircraft. Own losses were: pilots - 34, aircraft - 71. The overall ratio of losses was 7.9: 1 in favor of the 64th corps. In 1952, the effectiveness of the corps decreased. 394 enemy aircraft were shot down. Own losses - 51 pilots and 172 aircraft. The overall ratio of downed aircraft is 2.2:1. For 7 months of 1953, 139 American aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and 25 pilots and 76 MIG 15bis fighters were lost, which was 1.9:1 in favor of the 64th Corps⁹⁹. At the same time, a characteristic feature of the 53rd year was that the proportion of such a method of action as patrolling in the air increased, since with the increased use of F-86F fighters by the enemy, duty

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at airfields did not provide timely interception of enemy fighters in difficult weather conditions.

In total, during the war, corps fighters destroyed 1097 enemy aircraft, losing pilots and 319 aircraft, 212 US aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery¹⁰⁰. According to updated data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Soviet aviation formations in Korea lost 120 pilots and 335 aircraft. The total losses of Soviet military personnel in this war are 299 people¹⁰¹. American data on the results of the air war in Korea differ significantly from the Soviet ones. This is not surprising, as

how the Soviet report refers only to air battles in which aircraft of the 64th Corps participated, while the Americans report on the results of the combat activities of their aviation along the entire front, including operations on ground targets, the fight against the Korean-Chinese front-line aviation, as well as air battles and with Soviet air units, and with OVA formations. According to American information, the US Air Force and Navy, as well as the

aviation of US allied countries, destroyed 976 enemy aircraft. Their losses amounted to 1986 aircraft, of which 1041 aircraft were due to enemy actions and 945 due to reasons beyond the control of the enemy. Losses in people amounted to 1,729 people, including 1,144 killed, 306 wounded, 30 missing, and 249 captured .

In air battles between MIG-15s and US Air Force fighters, according to American data, 792 enemy aircraft were destroyed¹⁰³. Such a discrepancy in the reports of the parties on losses is obviously due to the fact that the high survivability of Soviet jet fighters made it possible to save these aircraft in many cases when the enemy considered them shot down. In addition, this number includes MIG-15s flown by less experienced Korean and Chinese pilots, especially before 1953. For many years in the USSR, the participation of Soviet pilots in the Korean War was covered with a veil of secrecy. Only in the 1980s did reports of this begin to appear.

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lyatsya in print, mentioned in some documents. "Stalin's falcons", taking off from the airfields of Manchuria to fight American bombers and fighters, were desperate guys who went through the harsh school of the Patriotic War and showed themselves to be excellent air fighters in the skies of Korea. They courageously, in extremely unfavorable conditions for themselves, fought with the American aces. Both were worthy opponents. Many Soviet pilots were awarded orders, 35 became Heroes of the Soviet Union. And if American ace No. 1 Captain McConnell shot down 16 enemy planes, two Soviet pilots surpassed him: Captain N. Sutyagin shot down 21, Colonel E. Pepelyaev - 20 enemy planes¹⁰⁴ . Meanwhile, under the infernal rumble of American bombing of cities and villages in the DPRK and the whirlwind of air battles between American aircraft and Soviet fighters in the "alley of moments", negotiations continued. By October 1952, the parties agreed on three of the

four points. Firstly, it was decided to establish a demarcation line according to the front line at the time of the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a truce. The parties agreed to withdraw their troops from this line by 2 kilometers, that is, to create a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone. Secondly, two special commissions were created to monitor compliance with the terms of the truce. Thirdly, within 3 months it was

agreed to convene a political conference for a peaceful solution of the Korean question and the problem of the withdrawal of all foreign troops. With regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war, the parties agreed on a 2-month period for its implementation, but could not agree on a mechanism for resolving this issue: whether the principle of voluntary return of prisoners should be respected or not¹⁰⁵. On December 3, 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the non-violent repatriation of prisoners of war. But only on July 27, 1953, a ceasefire agreement was signed. The war ended in July.

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The irretrievable losses of the parties amounted to: 400,000 South Korean troops, 54,000 Americans, 17,000 other "UN troops"; losses of the PRC and the DPRK - from 2 to 4 million military personnel and civilians; the losses of the USSR - 299 people¹⁰⁶.

The end of the Korean War was largely facilitated by the death of I.V. Stalin in March 1953 and the coming to power in the United States of President D. Eisenhower in January 1953. Significant American losses in Korea (157,350 killed and wounded) caused widespread dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the Truman administration. D. Eisenhower's promise to end the war turned out to be the decisive factor that ensured his victory in the presidential election in 1952. The new American leadership, analyzing the experience of the war in Korea, was forced to admit the failure of the "containment" strategy. Indeed, the US military machine on the Korean Peninsula did not collide with the "main enemy" - the USSR, but with the armed forces of the DPRK and the PRC, and after three years of war, it ended up on the same line from which the US started the war. American military theorists regarded this fact as an absolute failure of the United States. The Korean War went down in history as one of the most difficult and bloody local wars of the 20th century. In terms of human losses, it ranks third after two world wars - about 4 million Koreans died during the fighting, and 84 percent of

them were civilians. The whole of North Korea lay in ruins, and there were great destructions in the south. It is no coincidence that the Western press called everything that happened in Korea in those years a "great limited war."

From the events of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the US ruling circles realized that the Soviet Union, its allies, the leftist forces in the world supporting the USSR, were a very serious adversary. It is known that, despite all the measures taken by the Soviet leadership to hide the participation of Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft gunners in the Korean War, America

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The Ricans were well aware of this. But official Washington remained silent throughout the three years of the war. Why? Many years later, Paul Nitze, head of the US State Department policy planning staff during the Korean War, said that

he prepared a secret document, which analyzed all the pros and cons of disclosing the participation of the USSR in the war. As a result, the US government came to the conclusion that Soviet participation in the war was kept secret from the public. This was dictated by the fear that an outraged public would demand retaliatory action, which threatened with unpredictable consequences. Both superpowers did not want and were afraid of the escalation of the conflict, fraught with nuclear war.

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CHAPTER IV

USSR: ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE 1.

"Massive retaliation" strategy

In Korea, the war was still going on, cities were burning, people were dying, but on the political field the ice of the Cold War had already begun to melt. Three circumstances contributed to this: the election of D. Eisenhower as President of the United States in the fall of 1952, the death of Stalin in March 1953, and the futility of continuing the Korean adventure. There were hopes for a warming international climate. In the summer of 1953, the war ended on the Korean Peninsula. In 1954, the French intervention in Vietnam ended, and in 1955, a state treaty between the four powers - the USSR, the USA, England and France - was signed in Vienna with Austria. The country became independent, democratic, neutral. The occupying troops of the great powers were withdrawn from it. Even earlier W. Cher

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Chill, who was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1951 to 1954, suggested resuming "top meetings." After the appearance of the atomic bomb in the USSR, he no longer called for war against the Soviet Union, but, on the contrary, advocated the convocation of the leaders of the four great powers.

The United States was also

inclined to this. The failures of the Americans in their attempt to "roll back communism" on the Korean Peninsula also affected the position of official Washington. The Korean War also had a great impact on the domestic situation in the United States. Having brought considerable profits to a rather narrow circle of monopolists, it aggravated inflationary processes in the country and led to a significant deficit in the state budget. Significant losses (157,530 killed and wounded) caused widespread discontent with the foreign policy of the Truman administration. D. Eisenhower's promise to end the war in Korea proved to be the decisive factor that ensured his victory in the 1952 presidential election. The new American leadership, analyzing the experience of the war in Korea, was forced to admit the failure of the strategy of "rolling back communism." Indeed, the US military machine on the Korean Peninsula did not collide with the "main enemy" - the USSR, but with the armed forces of the DPRK and the PRC, and after three years of war, it ended up on the same line from which the war began. American military theorists regarded this fact as

absolute failure of the United States. In

addition, changes in the Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin and the execution of Beria, the clear desire of the new leaders of the Soviet Union to take measures to soften the international situation created favorable conditions for the resumption of negotiations between the great powers of East and West. Such a meeting took place in July 1955 in Geneva. The Soviet delegation was headed by the Prime Minister of the USSR N. A. Bulganin and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU N. S. Khrushchev. The United States was represented by President D. Eisenhower, England - who replaced Churchill as prime minister

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nistr A. Eden, France - Prime Minister E. Faure. For the first time since 1945, the heads of government of the great powers met together to discuss the most important issues of war and peace. Soviet government

proposed implement a disarmament program that provides for the reduction of both conventional and nuclear weapons. It was supposed to limit the size of the armed forces for the USSR, the USA and China to 1-1.5 million people, and for England and France to 650 thousand. Of course, in those years there was no control mechanism, and in the conditions of mutual distrust this problem was of great difficulty: the national means of control of the parties were still far from perfect to ensure reliable monitoring of the progress of the disarmament of the partner under the agreement. In order to somehow overcome this obstacle, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an international body with the right to demand from the government documentation on the level of military spending, to have posts on an agreed basis in ports, railway junctions and air bases, staffed by personnel from interested states. However, representatives of the West considered this project not effective enough. President Eisenhower put forward the "open skies" plan. The plan provided for the observation of military equipment of other countries from the air by means of photo and electronic control. The adoption of such a plan for the United States, which had already mastered the tactics of aerial electronic and photographic reconnaissance and in the summer of 1955 had a new U-2 military reconnaissance aircraft almost ready for commissioning, inaccessible to air defense systems, "open skies" significantly increased the level of reliability of their arms control. But for the USSR, which, in the arms race that unfolded in those years, sought to catch up with the United States as soon as possible and, if possible, get ahead, "open skies" meant revealing to American and other Western experts the main secrets of the programs

creating their own strategic weapons. And this was in the context of the Cold War, when bloc confrontation dominated politics

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traditional mentality, and negotiations on the normalization of relations and disarmament were of secondary importance, often only propagandistic. Therefore, Khrushchev, knowing full well

that in the Soviet Union all work on the creation of strategic weapons was carried out in the depths of the country, in areas to which access was closed to everyone who did not participate in these programs, rejected the "open skies" plan. It was not possible to agree on arms control in Geneva. But, despite the differences, an atmosphere of

dialogue between the USSR and the Western powers was nevertheless created, and this already in many respects contributed to the warming of the international atmosphere. In 1955-early 1956, there seemed to be some improvement in the international situation. At the signing of the state treaty on Austria, US Secretary of State John F. Dulles and USSR Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov stood side by side on the balcony of the Belvedere Palace in Vienna. Dulles greeted the cheering crowd with a handkerchief. Molotov raised his clenched hands above his head. In April 1956, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived on a visit to England. During the visit, Khrushchev never tired of repeating that the era of rockets had come, and he called planes and ships "flying and floating coffins." When the wife of British Prime Minister A. Eden asked Khrushchev: "What missiles do you have? How far can they fly?" He replied: "Our missiles can not only reach your British Isles, but they will fly farther." And this was said when the R-5M missile (range - 1200 kilometers) had not yet been adopted in the USSR. Nevertheless, the words of the Soviet leader made the right impression and further aroused the West's curiosity about Soviet missile weapons. However, despite some easing of international tension, relations between the USSR and the USA, between the Soviet Union and the Western world as a whole were extremely uneven. Short-term warming streaks interspersed with acute international crises, 253

sometimes putting humanity on the brink of nuclear war. Confrontational thinking prevailed in the military-political circles of both sides, based on the opposing military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any crisis that arose was accompanied by threats to use force against another country or a show of force. Extreme mistrust between the ruling circles of the USSR and Western countries did not allow the development and

application in practice of effective measures of control over various options for disarmament, and the development of confidence building measures.

Moreover, given the growth of the defense capability of the USSR, the presence of atomic weapons and their carriers, the US military-political leadership believed that they would be able to create strategic forces superior to the Soviet Union due to the "advantage" in nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to strike targets. . The United States tried to find a new path that would lead to the creation of superiority over the military power of the countries of the Soviet bloc, primarily in strategic aviation. Forces destined for

impact on groupings of troops in theaters of operations, was assigned a secondary role.

The American ruling elite intended to achieve superiority in strategic forces by adopting hydrogen weapons, which are more powerful than nuclear weapons, and by equipping theater forces with tactical nuclear weapons. As noted by the well-known American political scientist G. Kissinger, "the coming to power of the Eisenhower government in 1953 was marked by the adoption of a new defensive policy, which placed much greater emphasis on nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical" ¹. Thus, since the beginning of the 1950s, the United States, although it lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons, but, having superiority in their number and means of delivery and continuing to some extent remain

inaccessible to a retaliatory strike, developed a new strategy. This stratum

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The strategy that went down in history under the name of the strategy of massive retaliation "was adopted in the United States shortly after the election of D. Eisenhower as president of the country. It provided for the conduct of an exclusively general, and no other, nuclear war against the USSR and other socialist countries. The main means of war is the American ruling circles was seen as a powerful strategic aircraft capable of delivering nuclear strikes deep behind the Soviet Union, and it was assumed that the belligerent powers or their coalitions possessing nuclear weapons would use all available means, without any restrictions, including nuclear weapons. " ...Our strategic doctrine, wrote H. Kissinger, almost did not recognize any intermediate states between total war and total peace. It considered a general war as the only solution to the problem "2. A general nuclear war was conceived as a unilateral and impunity act on the part of the United States, and, unlike the strategic concepts of the first post-war years, waging a war against the USSR without the use of nuclear weapons was excluded. It was assumed through massive strikes with widespread use nuclear weapons carried out

by strategic aviation forces, destroy the military industrial facilities and administrative and political centers of the enemy, decisively undermine the economy, disrupt the administration of the country, break the enemy's will to resist and thus achieve the strategic goals of the war. The final defeat was entrusted to all available forces and "Massive retaliation" as the official strategy of the United States was announced in a speech by US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

York on January 12, 1954. He stated that henceforth the United States would rely primarily on

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power of massive retaliation, the ability to retaliate, instantly, by means on its "great destructive and in areas of its own choice³. In December of the same year, this strategy became official for NATO under the name of the "shield and sword" strategy. The main provisions of this coalition strategy were developed the Pentagon back in the 40s and approved by the NATO Council in 1952. The

decisive role of the smashing "sword" was assigned, as before, to American bomber aircraft. However, unlike 1952, in 1953-1954, the Pentagon proceeded in its military strategic principles from the application of not only strategic, but also tactical and operational

tactical nuclear weapons. The European NATO states were assigned the role of a "shield", a kind of supplement to the US armed forces in the European theater of operations. These forces were supposed to: provoke

the concept of armed socialist countries so that forces they can be destroyed by NATO nuclear strikes; seize the territory of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe;

prepare And organize counterrevolutionary speeches in the socialist countries .

The adoption of US military-strategic concepts by NATO was based on the inclusion of the FRG in this military bloc. This promised both a significant increase in its strike force and a significant strengthening of conventional armed forces, in particular ground forces in the Central European theater of operations. It turned out that the peoples of the countries of Western Europe, and above all the FRG, would wage wars fraught with the greatest losses, defending the interests of the United States. Measures were taken to more reliably tie the Western European countries of NATO to Washington's nuclear chariot, to make them accomplices in the nuclear war being prepared by the Pentagon against the USSR and its allies. At the session of the NATO Council in April 1953,

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the issue of equipping NATO armed forces with nuclear weapons was raised.

"In order to neutralize the possibility of a negative attitude of the allies towards the American plans for atomic strikes," US Secretary of State John Dulles said at a secret meeting in January 1954, "some information should be exchanged with Western Europeans on this issue and some of them should be allowed to acquire several atomic bombs " 5 In connection with such attitudes, the American Congress revised in 1954 the McMahon Act of 1946, according to

which prohibited the dissemination of information about nuclear weapons. Under the new provision, delivery vehicles for nuclear devices could be placed at the disposal of US allies in the bloc. In general, in those years, as evidenced by the two-

volume collection "US Foreign Policy, 1952-1954", containing declassified documents, the issue of the use of atomic weapons against the Korean, Vietnamese and Chinese peoples was repeatedly raised at meetings of the National Security Council. Thus, on March 31, 1953, President Eisenhower suggested that the need "to expand the war beyond the borders of Korea and launch the atomic bomb" could not be ruled out. On December 3, 1953, State Department spokesman Bowie noted that "since the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff include all communists as the enemy, it will be necessary to subject the Soviet and Chinese armed forces and military installations in the Far East to an atomic attack. This means atomic bombings of essentially all cities in China."

On January 8, 1954, President Eisenhower declared: "If we can simultaneously carry out an atomic attack on all the forward bases of the Communist air forces, the enemy will be bled from the very beginning of hostilities. This is also our plan for Europe. " There were many publications in the

American press of those years, similar to the article in Colliers magazine, about which

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mentioned above. Their goal was to accustom the American people and the public of the Western world to the idea of the inevitability of an atomic war, in which the United States and the countries supporting it would undoubtedly be the winner.

Since the main emphasis in achieving victory in a general nuclear war was placed on "air power" - a huge fleet of jet strategic bombers was created. With the adoption of the new strategy, they were given the palm in the arms program. Almost half of all funds of the US Department of Defense were allocated for the development of the Air Force. The budget was distributed as follows: about 46 percent for the Air Force, about 28 percent for the Navy, and about 23 percent for the army. With regard to appropriations for the purchase of new equipment, this difference is even more noticeable: the Air Force received about 60 percent of the allocated funds, the Navy - about 30, and the army - only about 10 percent. Budget allocations for the development and construction of the Air Force grew every year. If at the beginning of the 1950s they

did not exceed 8-9 billion dollars, then in 1954 they amounted to 11.5 billion, and in 1956 - 15.8 billion dollars, while appropriations for the army remained approximately the same.

level (about 7.8 billion dollars). During 1950-1955, the number of strategic bombers in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was increased to 1,500 aircraft, of which about 1,000 were in

combat units. Such

an intensive commissioning of new types of strategic bombers was largely facilitated by the artificially raised panic in the US press about the US lagging behind the USSR in the construction of strategic bombers. The reason for this was an air parade in Moscow in July 1955, at which the American experts present saw the first Soviet strategic bombers with their own eyes. A. Dulles, who headed the US Central Intelligence Agency at that time, later wrote: 258

"IN In 1954, there was evidence that the USSR was producing heavy long-range intercontinental bombers comparable to our B-52s. At first, all data, including the 1955 parade, cited

that the Russians are accepting the weapons system as the main element of their offensive forces are planning to release heavy bombers at a pace that allows All this has led to a "lag

To assumptions our country about bombers"

It must be said that already at the May Day air parade in 1954, a new Soviet jet heavy bomber with 4 jet engines was first demonstrated. It became known as M-4. It was the brainchild of the design bureau of V. M. Myasishchev. The creators of the aircraft prepared it as an intercontinental bomber. However, although in range it could reach the American continent, its capabilities were not enough to return to its bases. Refueling in the air in the USSR in those years had not yet been mastered. Therefore, the question of whether to consider the M-4 an intercontinental bomber is problematic. The designers believed that after a nuclear strike on the continental United States, their bomber could land in a neutral country (for example, in Mexico). But the Soviet government rejected this method of using the M-4, reasonably pointing out to its creators that in the event of a world war, neutral countries were unlikely to be near the United States⁸.

Apparently, foreign experts who watched the 1954 parade in Moscow also regarded it this way. The new bomber was marked by them as a long-range aircraft, but there was no sensation. An air parade in Moscow in the summer of 1955 had a completely different effect, where a new Tupolev turboprop long-range bomber, the TU-95, was shown, capable of inflicting

nuclear strikes on the United States and return to their bases.
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A. Gorelik and M. Rush, the experts of the leading research institution in the United States, the RAND Corporation, state: "The Soviet air parade in July 1955 was probably

one of the most successful military demonstrations in peacetime. It largely influenced the Western assessment of the strategic balance.⁹ This fact in itself testified to the unreliability of the

"massive retaliation" strategy. He once again recalled that in the 20th century, with the rapid development of scientific and technological progress in many industrialized countries hope for a long-term monopoly of any type of weapon (such as the Pentagon, for example, strategic bombers) is absurd. Meanwhile, in fact, there was no lag behind the United States, which by that time had more than 1,500 strategic bombers. The organizers of the noisy campaign about lagging behind the US.

"The bombing gap never became a reality," said US intelligence chief Allen Dulles. Indeed, the Pentagon needed this invention in order to frighten the average American taxpayer, to force him to meekly give money for building up, for the arms race. The program for the construction of strategic aviation in the United States by that time had already reached a significant scale. Since the beginning of the 1950s,

the main SAC aircraft has been the 6-engine turbojet B-47 Stratojet medium strategic bomber, the first samples of which had a maximum speed of 960 km / h, a service ceiling of 12,500 meters and a flight range of 8,000 kilometers. This bomber was considered at that time the highest achievement of aircraft construction, and the US SAC command placed great hopes on it for defense, anti-aircraft overcoming, counting on its maximum speed and flight altitude. By the beginning of 1955, almost all units and divisions of the SAC, which had previously been armed with B-29 and B-50 aircraft, were re-equipped with B-47 aircraft. In the mid-50s, strategic air 260

Soviet

The US military command had only 375 B-36s and already 1200 B-47s. However, the flight range of this aircraft did not make it possible, when it was based on airfields in the continental United States, to reach Soviet targets deep in the rear. Therefore, since 1954, obsolete B-36 heavy bombers began to be replaced by B-52 jet heavy bombers with a range of 16,000 kilometers (later - 18,000 kilometers) and a speed of 960 km / h. In order to speed up the program for their construction, the fiction that the USSR was "overtaking" the United States in strategic aviation was inflated. This allowed the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex to secure huge funding for the new program. In 1959, there were already 500 B-52s in service. But the question of the inaccessibility of the hinterland of the Soviet Union always haunted American strategists. They tried to solve this problem, on the one hand, by mastering the refueling of bombers in

air, and on the other - the creation of advanced - closer to the borders of the USSR - bases. For

single and multiple refueling in a bomber aircraft, special equipment was installed fleet of tanker in the air, and as part of the strategic aviation command, a aircraft was created (by the 60s - up to 1000 aircraft) based on S-97 and Boeing 707 transport aircraft ", which received the names KS-97 and KS-135, respectively. In England, converted Valiant bombers were used for this purpose. Since the fleet of tanker aircraft available in the SAC, due to its small number, could not simultaneously refuel all the bombers in the air, the SAC decided to keep part of the B-47 in constant combat readiness at its advanced air bases in England, Spain, Morocco, and Alaska and islands

of the Pacific. This system of dual advanced air bases received the code name "retaliatory actions" ("Reflex action") in the SAC. titled "from

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veto actions" the American military covered the aggressive essence of forward basing, the purpose of which was to ensure the success of the first, surprise nuclear strike on the USSR. other countries of the socialist camp, makes it possible to use it faster, simultaneously and massively. As part of the "massive retaliation" strategy, the so-called "nuclear aviation doctrine" was born, in which not only the principles of combat use were revised, but also the tactics of various types of actions Air Force and Missiles under the Use of Nuclear Weapons* This doctrine, published in Air Force in January 1956, stated that of all branches of the armed forces, the air force had the greatest

capability for decisive combat. that the Air Force is the main military means that ensures the seizure of the initiative and the achievement of decisive results in the war. The main place among the branches of aviation was assigned to strategic bombers as a force capable of inflicting irreparable or hard-to-repair damage on the enemy in a short time. Armed with atomic, hydrogen, and, if necessary, bacteriological and chemical bombs, strategic aviation was to become a force providing America, as its strategists expressed it, "national security", or rather, a weapon to intimidate and intimidate peoples, the main means of policy "from the position of strength." US military theorists placed such hopes on strategic aviation based on the ability of strategic bombers to

* In the United States, "aviation doctrine" refers to theoretical views on the special role and purpose of aviation in war. Soviet military science proceeded from the fact that the state has a single military doctrine common to all branches of the armed forces.

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time with a sufficient degree of probability to quickly reach any point on the territory of any country, regardless of its distance from the state border, act at any time of the day, relatively unexpectedly inflict powerful strikes, using new means of destruction of a large destructive

strength.

According to the American hawks, strategic aviation was to play a special role in the initial, decisive period of a nuclear war. The first strikes against the most vital centers of the enemy's military and economic potential were supposed to be carried out purely suddenly. The main principles of the use of strategic aviation were considered just sudden and massive actions. But unlike the 40s, when all hopes were pinned only on strategic aviation, now she had to act in combination and in cooperation with other types of aviation. The tasks solved by strategic aviation during this period were outlined at that time by the commander of the SAC, General Limay, formulating them as follows: the primary task is to win an air battle by destroying the country's vital facilities: first of all, nuclear-powered aviation base airfields, as well as nuclear industry enterprises; in the future - the most important industrial centers and communications; the second task is to systematically and completely destroy industrial facilities and other

sources of enemy power by conducting coordinated attacks against a large number of pre-designated targets; the third task is constant readiness to support the actions of the ground forces. (However, the Pentagon believed that strategic aviation, performing the first two tasks, should not be used, except in exceptional cases, in the interests of the ground forces.) The air operation according to the plan of the supreme

command was recognized as the most effective form of combat use of strategic aviation. In the operation of thought

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the participation of not only all or most of the forces of strategic bomber aviation, but also tactical and carrier-based aviation located in theaters of operations, and "the actions of all these air forces must be planned in advance both in time and in objects. Naturally, much attention was paid to advanced bases in the European countries of NATO, from which the carriers of nuclear weapons were to operate.

General Günther, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO in Europe, stated in 1954: "We

determined that our strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons, whether they are used by the enemy or not. Such a strategy unambiguously assumed that in the event of hostilities in Europe, nuclear weapons would be used from the very beginning. Meanwhile, in the West, it was known that the USSR had atomic and then (since 1953) hydrogen weapons, and the inevitability of a crushing retaliatory strike against US air bases in Europe frightened the leaders of the Western European powers. "Europe is densely populated," emphasized the American Professor Spanier, "its cities are located too close to each other, civil, military, tactical and strategic goals are mutually intertwined. A nuclear war on land would be a Catastrophe for Europe, probably meaning the end of European civilization"¹² .

Indeed, during NATO's "Carte Blanche" exercise conducted in 1955, 1.7 million people were "killed" and 3.5 million "injured" by mock nuclear strikes, and the number of "radiation-affected" people simply could not be predicted¹³. Such losses for small countries (for example, for Norway - 3.8 million people in 1955) would mean a catastrophe. But American strategists were mainly concerned about their military bases in Western Europe. The success of US strategic aviation depended on the survivability of forward bases, and they could easily be put out of action by the enemy. In addition, every year the vulnerability of American bombers to weapons from

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the Soviet air defense system, which was continuously improved and posed an increasing threat to them, especially when they were moving through vast expanses to objects in the depths of Soviet territory. It became theoretically more and more difficult to overcome an air defense system saturated with radar assets, equipped with supersonic fighters and an increasing number of anti-aircraft missiles. Moreover, the time it took to reach the objects of attack, measured in hours, allowed the attacked side to have time to take effective countermeasures and thus frustrate the plans of the aggressors. All this called into question the success of a sudden massive air attack. The inevitability of a devastating retaliatory strike seemed undeniable. That is why the military-political leadership of the United States now counted on the creation of other carriers of nuclear weapons: ballistic and cruise missiles. Long-range and medium-range missiles certainly outnumbered aircraft. Ballistic missiles - invulnerability, speed, range and the ability to carry a powerful nuclear charge. They could operate regardless of the weather and time of day; The air defense of the country on which the strikes were made could not counteract them. Cruise missiles, despite the fact that they approached the aircraft in speed and flight altitude, were also promising weapons: their cost compared to

by plane it was much lower, they did not depend on weather conditions; they were small in size, which made it difficult to detect them, especially when operating at low altitudes; could be launched from the ground, from a ship, from an aircraft - and due to all these qualities, in mass use, they were very difficult targets for enemy air defense. In addition, both types of missiles did not require such a scarce and expensive flight crew. Well, the lower accuracy of hitting a target was more than covered by the power of a nuclear charge and made it possible to operate on the most extensive objects: cities, airfields, training grounds, hydroelectric facilities, etc. 265

"To the extent," wrote the American military theorist G. Kahn, "as we move from aircraft to missiles as the basis of our strategic forces, war becomes more calculable than before ... The rocket is primarily a product of engineering success. Its the main parameters include data such as circular error probable, explosive power, reliability, target vulnerability, accuracy in target location. The total effect of these variables can be quite accurately expressed by a mathematical formula ... So military campaigns that, in their scope, are not have precedent in the past, become, in essence, a problem in applied mathematics"¹⁴ . The plans of the Pentagon provided for the creation in the near future of very powerful nuclear forces from intercontinental primarily and operationally tactical missiles, as well as strategic bombers. By that time, in the United States and other capitalist countries, work had already begun on the

creation of rocket weapons based on the well-known experience of fascist Germany. In 1954, the Ministry of the Air Force, the Ballistic Missile Division of the Research and Development Directorate at the Air Force Headquarters, the Von Neumann Committee and the Remo Foldridge Engineering Corporation began joint development of the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the contract for which was received by the company "Conveyor". In 1955, the creation of the Titan ICBM and

the Tor medium-range ballistic missile (by Martin Marietta and Douglas Aircraft, respectively) began. And in 1957, the Boeing company began developing the Minuteman ICBM, which, unlike previous ICBMs, did not work on liquid, but on solid fuel. The Directorate of Special Projects at the main headquarters of the Navy was engaged in the development of ballistic missiles "Polaris", designed for use from nuclear submarines.

The contract for this system was received by Lockheed Aircraft.

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Continued the development of missile weapons and the army (ground forces) of the United States.

The command of the army, which with the adoption of the strategy of "massive retaliation" was relegated to the background,

saw in rocket weapons a chance to equal the value of the Air Force and the Navy and made attempts in the mid-50s to take part in the development of medium-range guided missiles. In this regard, since 1955, W. von Braun, under the auspices of the Chrysler company, began to develop the Jupiter medium-range missile based on the Redstone, which was later transferred to the Air Force. So, first in strategic bombers, and then in missiles, US leaders saw the "absolute weapon" with which they were going to make the entire world community dependent on America's "national interests".

A ballistic missile, American missile experts wrote, "can fly past any currently known means of interception. It is capable of hitting any target . "

Simultaneously with work on ballistic missiles, a model of cruise missiles was being developed, which at that time was called projectile aircraft. Cruise missiles, created at the turn of the 40-50s - "Matador", "Regulus", "Navajo" - had a flight range of several hundred kilometers. They were supposed to significantly supplement the strikes of strategic aviation, and the Snark cruise missile (range - up to 10 thousand kilometers) could already operate directly from the USA through the territory of the USSR. However, the rockets of that time also had obvious shortcomings. One of them was their low technical reliability. So, even in 1963, the reliability of the Atlas and Titan rockets was 70 percent (that is, out of 100 launches, only 70 were successful). Another major drawback, especially of strategic missiles, continued, as in the war years, to be their low accuracy in hitting targets. Increased flight range tre 267

there were reliable control systems, and radio navigation, astroinertial and correlation control systems have found wide

applications because of their

noise immunity and other disadvantages. Autonomous inertial control systems installed on board the aircraft were not affected by interference, but with an increase in the flight range, the circular probable deviation (CEP) increased during their use, that is, the accuracy of hitting the target decreased. (For cruise missiles, the KVO reached 0.5 percent of the range until the mid-1960s.) This, in particular, was one of the reasons for the decommissioning of the Snark cruise missile. Inertial control systems were widely used on long and medium-range ballistic missiles, since their powerful nuclear charge ensured hitting the target even with a significant deviation, as well as on cruise missiles with a range of about 1000 kilometers (Matador - 960 kilometers) and with a CEP of about 3 kilometers. Thus, this generation of missiles, like the V-weapon, could only operate on sufficiently large targets with a predetermined

known coordinates. However, when compared with ballistic missiles of the same range, cruise missiles had a number of advantages. They cost much less, were put into operation faster and provided significant flight ranges with less weight. And the fact that air defense systems could resist cruise missiles was not considered a major drawback in those years. It was believed that with the massive use of cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and skillful tactics (as was the case at the beginning with the V-1), even a small number of cruise missiles that overcame enemy air defenses would be able to complete the task. In 1954, the Matador and Regulus operational-tactical cruise missiles entered service with the US Air Force and Navy. Already at the exercises of the armed forces of the USA and NATO in 1953-1956 (Carte Blanche, Whipsow, Temp, Dividend, Corona, etc.), methods of their combat use were widely worked out.

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In 1957, B-47 bombers were equipped with the Rascal air-to-ground cruise missile with a range of 160 kilometers and a speed of 1,700 km/h. Work was being completed on the creation of the Hound Dog cruise missile, which possessed supersonic speed, was equipped with a thermonuclear warhead and had a flight range of 800-1000 kilometers. It was intended to arm the B-52 bombers. The new aviation and missile technology that came into service with the Air Force and other branches of the armed forces inspired Pentagon generals to look for new ways of global war against the socialist bloc. The aviation "nuclear sword" turned into a "rocket sword".

But, as events showed, it was a double-edged weapon: the Soviet Union did not stand still either.

2. Rockets take the stage

The Soviet Union, having accepted the military-strategic challenge of the United States, and later NATO, from the beginning of the Cold War, decided to oppose their might with the military might of the socialist countries. In response to Washington's policy "from a position of strength," Moscow began to pursue its own policy of power. New types of military equipment began to enter the army and navy in ever-increasing quantities. The creation of the NATO bloc led to the fact that the Soviet Union, which reduced its armed forces from 11,365 thousand to 2,874 thousand in 1945-1948, began to increase them again in 1949-1960. In 1952-1953, the full motorization and mechanization of the Soviet Army was completed, aviation was re-equipped with jet aircraft, and the fleet was improved. The troops received new samples of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, radar equipment, and automatic weapons. Large Soviet forces stationed in the countries of Eastern Europe, in the event of war, could quickly seize significant territories west of the Elbe and reach the English Channel.

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Rocket weapons also developed. Directly to the creation of a rocket with a range of up to 1200 kilometers (R-5), domestic designers began only after successful tests of the R-1 missiles in 1951. Tests conducted from December 30, 1954 to February 7, 1955, confirmed that the rocket basically met the specified requirements¹⁷.

Here it is appropriate to recall the episode cited by Academician AD Sakharov in his memoirs. At a meeting of the New Year, 1955, in high military-industrial and military circles, Sakharov, speaking of the successful tests of the R-5, remarked: "Let these shells be as successful as they are today (apparently, it was about launching on December 30, 1954. — explode over training grounds, but never over cities. "After his toast, as Sakharov recalls, there was silence at the table, as if I had said something indecent." Deputy Defense Minister Mitrofan Nedelin discharged an awkward pause. He told a joke: "My wife is lying in bed, and the husband in front of the icon prays: "Lord! Strengthen and direct." She says: "You pray that you strengthen, and I myself can direct." So let's drink to strengthen!"¹⁸. However, the R-5 rocket was developed only with a non-nuclear warhead. In connection with the successes of nuclear scientists, the decision of the Council of

Ministers of the USSR No. 674-292 of April 10, 1954, it was decided to create a rocket capable of carrying a nuclear charge. The R-5M rocket became it. February 2 In 1956, test tests of this missile equipped with a nuclear charge were carried out. The tests were successful. By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 842-464 of June 21, 1956, the R-5M missile with a flight range of 500 to 1200 kilometers was put into service¹⁹. By August 1, 1956, 30 R-5M missiles had already been fired, 80 missiles were ordered for 1957, and 100 missiles for 1958. The adoption of strategic nuclear missile weapons required a fundamental revision of the role of means of armed struggle in modern warfare.

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And it was done. The years 1946-1959 were notable for the hard work of state and military bodies in creating strategic ballistic missiles, equipping combat units with them, and developing principles, forms and methods of their use. In 1957-1958, almost all divisions of the RVGK engineering brigades were re-equipped with the R-5 M missile, and 15 regiments mastered this missile in the Air Force²⁰. According to the plan for the use of missile units in the event of hostilities, approved in November 1957, their redeployment to the border areas began. Two missile battalions of the 72nd RVGK engineering brigade were deployed in December 1958 on the territory of the GDR²¹. Such a deployment made it possible to deliver a nuclear missile strike to the entire depth of the Western and Middle Eastern theater of operations, where the main groupings of troops and military bases of the United States and NATO countries were located. Combat use of units with R-5M missiles in those years

It was planned by analogy with the R-1 and R-2 non-nuclear complexes and was intended to support the actions of ground forces in front-line offensive and defensive operations. This, of course, did not meet the requirements for the combat

use of parts of medium-range missiles (RSMs), but at that time it was determined by objective factors, namely:

- the enormous influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War;
- development of the theory of the combat use of RSD simultaneously with the development of these weapons in
- the troops; the inclusion of missile units in various types of armed forces;

- strict secrecy of all information related to nuclear missile weapons. With the adoption of the R-12 missile (Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 238-106 dated March 4, 1959²²) and the successful testing of the R-1423 missile, the combat use of RSD began to be planned for pre-selected targets from stationary positions. According to the draft manual on

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Combat use in 1959, in the event of aggression, missile units were no longer transferred to the operational subordination of the fronts, but were used only by decision of the Supreme High Command. The development of mine launchers for RSD reflected a fundamentally new look at their application.

In those years, the leadership of the USSR also gained the first experience of demonstrating RSD as a means of military-political pressure on a potential enemy. The effectiveness of this means is evidenced by the announcement of the Soviet government on November 5, 1956, about the possibility of using nuclear missiles against England and France, which attacked Egypt, which led to the resolution of the Suez crisis. Missiles became an effective tool in the politics of the Cold War era. The advent of modern weapons (intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear missile submarines, anti-aircraft missile systems, strategic bombers, etc.), requiring small but highly qualified personnel to maintain them, allowed the Soviet government to reduce the very large and expensive ground forces. In 1955, the USSR reduced the size of its armed forces by 640,000 men, in 1956 by another 1,200,000, and in 1957 by 300,000 men. 63 divisions and brigades were disbanded, part of the military schools, 375 ships were put into conservation. In a statement of the Soviet government dated May 14, 1956, in connection with the largest (1,200,000) reduction of Soviet troops, it was said that the USSR "strives to contribute to the practical implementation of the disarmament program." Despite the ideological differences between the two blocs, steps were taken to soften their positions. In 1959, Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States with a large delegation. This visit weakened

tension between the two opposing blocs. A superpowers meeting of the heads of government of the USA, USSR, Great Britain and France was scheduled for May 1960 in Paris, and Eisenhower was invited to visit the USSR.

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This warming in relations between the USSR and the USA also affected the military sphere. Speaking on January 14, 1960 at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N. Khrushchev, recalling that the Soviet Armed Forces, which numbered 5 million 763 thousand people in 1955, were reduced in 1955-1958 by 2 million 140 thousand people, contributed from on behalf of the government, a proposal to reduce the Armed Forces of the USSR by another 1,200,000 people. The Supreme Council approved this initiative, which was supposed to demonstrate the truly peaceful mood of the Soviet leadership at that time, the desire to alleviate international tension. By this time, it was becoming more and more obvious to the American military-political leadership that the doctrine of "massive retaliation" did not justify the hopes placed on it. The

success of the main strike of strategic aviation of that time depended on the survivability of forward bases, and they could easily be put out of action by the enemy. In addition, every year the vulnerability of bombers from Soviet air defense systems increased, which was continuously improved.

In January 1957, ground tests of the S-75 Dvina anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) began. It consisted of a radar guidance station, two-stage anti-aircraft guided missiles (a starting engine on solid fuel, a marching engine on liquid), 6 launchers, on-board equipment and power supplies. The technical characteristics and design features of the complex made it possible to roll it up in 4 hours, and deploy and configure it in 4-5 hours. The speed of its movement on the march on the roads is up to 20 km / h. This air defense system blocked the capabilities of the aircraft available at that time in the West and even the promising means of air attack, which were reported in the foreign press. The effectiveness of the S-75 simply amazed military specialists, especially front-line anti-aircraft gunners. Destroyed targets moving at a speed of 1,500 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 22,000 meters. Within 10 minutes one

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the division destroyed up to 5 targets coming at intervals of 1.5-2 minutes. The downed plane took 2-3 missiles. Not a single anti-aircraft artillery system possessed such characteristics. In November 1957, "Dvina" entered the troops. Soon, its modifications "Desna" and "Volkhov" appeared, and in 1961 - the Neva air defense system, which made it possible to destroy targets on a collision course at altitudes from 200 meters to 10 kilometers at a distance of 6 to 10 kilometers - at target flight speeds up to 1500 km/h This already lowered the combat capabilities of American aircraft.

But the main thing was that the strategy of "massive

retaliation" turned out to be unsuitable for of the political goals of the United States

and NATO. Firstly, the Soviet Union did not take the path of a "mirror" response to the United States on their strategy of "massive retaliation", but relied on missile weapons, while strategic aviation became an additional means of the USSR aerospace forces. Since the mid-1950s, the Armed Forces of the USSR entered a new stage of development. The aviation was equipped with intercontinental bombers, nuclear missile weapons were introduced into the troops on a massive scale. Secondly, the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt (1956), the conflict, connected with Syria (1957),

the events in Lebanon and Iraq (1958), the defeat of the French in Indochina, and the British in Malaya - all indicated that the unleashing of a nuclear war in any conflict in the Third World would be impossible and extremely dangerous. The strategy of "massive retaliation" could not prevent the collapse of the colonial system and the growth of the influence of the USSR, despite the political mistakes of the government of N. S. Khrushchev in the 50s. The inadequacy of "massive retaliation" to the emerging international situation confused the Pentagon's cards and eventually forced the United States to abandon this strategy. The Soviet Union was entering the nuclear-missile era. According to a number of military-strategic indicators, he was ahead of So

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United States, but was always ready for new disarmaments in the name of peaceful coexistence.

At the same time, Soviet foreign policy was far from ideal. How to behave correctly in the new nuclear-missile age - this was not immediately realized. There were many propagandistic, broadcast statements - there were not enough balanced, serious initiatives. Improvisation, largely ill-conceived actions, voluntaristic, strong-willed approaches to solving the most important problems of life in the world community were harmful.

3. 1956 - the year of crises

During these years, a number of crises also occurred in the countries of the socialist community. N. S. Khrushchev's secret report "on the cult of personality", reported after the XX Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) became known throughout the world. In the circles of the world community, he caused an extremely loud resonance. It had a particularly acute effect on the life of the countries of the recently created (1955) Warsaw Pact. The previously latent centrifugal currents initiated by the opponents of the USSR in the countries of the socialist camp, the dissatisfaction of certain sections of the population in these states with Moscow's policy immediately after Stalin's death began to manifest itself openly. This was expressed in unrest in Poland and the GDR (1953), but gained particular momentum in 1956 during the political crises in

Poland and Hungary.

Signs of an approaching crisis in the Polish People's Republic began to appear even before 1956. In March 1954, at the XI Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), the report of the Secretary of the Central Committee, Bolesław Bierut, already spoke of the need to democratize party and political life in the country. The most compromised figures were removed from the party apparatus and a number of political prisoners were released from prisons, including a well-known political figure ²⁷⁵

Vladislav Gomulka. At the third plenum of the PUWP Central Committee in January 1955, critical voices were heard against the top party leaders, who were accused of violations of the law and miscalculations in economic policy. The "fermentation of minds" intensified in Polish society, and especially among the intelligentsia²⁴. Various public organizations and discussion clubs (for example, the "Crooked Wheel Club") were formed, where questions of political and social life were sharply raised. The weakening of censorship made it possible to bring to the discussion of the general public the problems of ideology, economics and history that worried society - they were considered in the journals *Nova Kultura*, *Pshegląd Kulturalny*, *Simply*, and others. All this excited the consciousness of the people. The anti-Soviet broadcasts of foreign radio stations, such as Voice of America, Free Europe, and others, played a significant role. The development of free-thinking in Poland was also facilitated by the change in the situation in the USSR: the termination of the "case of pest doctors", the revision of the "Leningrad case", the exposure of Beria and his henchmen, the beginning of the rehabilitation of political prisoners, etc. All this could not but affect the internal political situation in Poland as well, giving rise to those political shifts that in 1956 led to a crisis in Soviet-Polish relations. A powerful impetus for political change was given by the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the report of N. S. Khrushchev "On the cult of personality and its consequences" in February 1956. In Poland, they learned about this from the report of the PUWP delegation on the work of the 20th

Congress of the CPSU, announced at a meeting of party activists in Warsaw on March 3-4. Despite the secrecy of Khrushchev's report, it soon became public knowledge. Thus, on March 10, the central organ of the PUWP, *Tribuna Ludu*, published an editorial with the title of Khrushchev's report. It became a sensation and led to ferment in the party and society. On June 28-29, a demonstration of workers from large enterprises in Poznań turned into street riots. The demonstrators put forward slogans: "Freedom!", "Bread!", "Down with communism!". It was already

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very serious action. There were even skirmishes between demonstrators and internal security forces. The spontaneous uprising was brutally suppressed with the help of troops: 70 people were killed, about 500 were wounded²⁵.

The Soviet leaders, worried about what had happened in Poland, were looking for a way to "normalize" the situation. A charismatic leader was needed to keep the Polish people in the socialist commonwealth and in the Warsaw Pact organization, created just a year ago. The Kremlin, and above all Khrushchev, saw such a leader in Vladislav Gomulka. As a victim of Stalin's repressions and as a person who had his own view of the "Polish path to socialism", he enjoyed unquestioned authority in the country and the party, opposed the repressive policies of recent years. Sympathy in the PUWP for Gomulka and support for him by N. S. Khrushchev led to the fact that in August he, as well as the

previously repressed party members M. Spychalsky and Z. Klishko, were rehabilitated and reinstated in the party. On October 17, Gomulka was included in the commission for the preparation of the new composition of the Politburo. On the same day, a meeting of the Politburo was held. It was decided to recommend Gomulka for the post of first secretary at the plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP, which was to open on October 19.

From that moment on, events began to develop with extraordinary rapidity. Here is what Khrushchev wrote in his notes "XX Congress and Poland": "We learned through our ambassador (P.K. authorities will come anti-Soviet-A. O.), minded."26 The Kremlin decided that the time had come for decisive action. On October 18, USSR Minister of Defense G.K. delegations N. S. Khrushchev, V. M. Molotov, A. I. Mikoyan and L. M. Kaganovich.

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Meetings of Polish and Soviet representatives took place on 19 October and 20 October. As Khrushchev recalled, "the conversation was stormy. The question was directly: are the Poles for the Soviets or against? The conversation was rude, without diplomacy. We made our claims and demanded an explanation of the actions that were directed against the USSR" 27. The CPSU delegation did not agree with the fact that the Politburo did not want to include Marshal K. Rokossovsky, who at that time was the Minister of Defense of Poland, in the new composition. The focus was on the problem of Polish-Soviet relations. During its discussion, Gomułka, describing the situation in the country, declared his confidence that the PZPR would be able to successfully cope with the situation and keep Poland in the socialist community and the Warsaw Pact. He demanded to clarify the status of Soviet troops in Poland, to stop the interference of official Soviet representatives in the internal affairs of Poland28. Meanwhile, outside the walls of the Belvedere Palace, events continued to unfold. The Soviet units of the Northern Group of Forces put on high alert on October 18

were not inactive. By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Konev, the tank division moved from the place of deployment to Warsaw. The situation was extremely disturbing. When Khrushchev asked Rokossovsky how much he could rely on the Polish troops, he replied: "Now the Polish troops will not all obey my order, although there are units (he named them) that will carry out my order" 29 .

While heated debates were going on in the Belvedere, a Soviet tank division was approaching Warsaw.

Upon learning of this, the Polish leadership urgently created two headquarters - military and civilian. The military headquarters was entrusted with the task of monitoring the movement of Soviet troops and informing the Politburo. "The civil headquarters was supposed to provide assistance to the military headquarters if necessary. Its assets were students and workers of the automobile plant, who formed a workers' militia. 800 people were armed with small arms. Self-defense detachments were created at other plants and factories³⁰ .

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The participants in the meeting were informed about the approach of a tank division to Warsaw. As Khrushchev recalled, in the midst of a heated argument, a very agitated Gomulka approached him. He said: "Comrade Khrushchev, a Russian tank division is moving towards Warsaw. I beg you to give an order not to bring her into the city ... I ask you to stop the movement of Soviet troops. Do you think that only you need friendship with the Polish people? I, as a Pole and a communist, swear that Poland needs friendship with Russians more than Russians need friendship with Poles. Don't we understand that without you we won't be able to exist as an independent state?" The Soviet delegation, after conferring with Rokossovsky, decided to stop the march of the tank ³¹

division. The situation was relieved when the Polish leadership became convinced through its channels that the Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Warsaw³² . On October 20, the Soviet delegation returned to Moscow, having previously agreed that the negotiations

will continue in the near future in Moscow³³ . In

those October days, rallies began on the streets of Polish cities, especially Warsaw, reaching their greatest intensity on October 19-21. Only after a mass (300 thousand people) rally in the capital near the Palace of Culture on October 24, at which Gomulka spoke from the balcony, calling for an end to the "meeting movement", the life of the country began to return to normal. The decisions adopted at the plenum of the Central

Committee of the PUWP began to be quickly implemented. K. Rokossovsky was dismissed from the post of Minister of National Defense (he soon returned to Moscow), the institute of Soviet military advisers was liquidated, the heads of political agencies in the armed forces were replaced, party leaders in the voivodeships were replaced, representatives of the United Peasant and Democratic

parties, the role of the Sejm as a legislative body increased, the church began to play a large role in public life"³⁴ .

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On October 24, an expanded meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held in Moscow with the participation of the leaders of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries: W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl (GDR), T. Zhivkov (PRB), A. Novotny (Czechoslovakia) and the representative of the PRC - Liu Shao -qi. It discussed the situation in Poland and Hungary, where popular unrest was also growing. Khrushchev reported on the trip to Warsaw of the Soviet delegation and the new composition of the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee. He spoke about the atmosphere of sharp disputes in which the discussion took place, about Gomułka's speech, which played a key role on the Polish side in the Belvedere

Palace³⁵ . The principles of sovereignty, equality in relations between socialist countries, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs are reflected in the Declaration of the USSR government on the foundations for the development and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist states. It was adopted on October 30, 1956 and published the next day in the Soviet and Polish press. The Declaration stated that "the countries of the great community of socialist nations can build their relations

only on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs"; proclaimed "the need to fully take into account the historical past and the characteristics of each country that has embarked on the path of building a new life", as well as the readiness to take "measures to ensure the further development and strengthening of economic ties between the socialist countries in order to eliminate any possibility of violating the principle sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations"; agreed to consider questions of the status of Soviet troops in Poland, who were there "on the basis of the Potsdam agreement of the four powers and the Warsaw Pact" and the recall of Soviet advisers to the USSR. A lot of space in the Declaration was devoted to the events in Hungary³⁶ .

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The second round of Soviet-Polish negotiations took place in Moscow on November 15-18, 1956. The joint declaration adopted at it affirmed the principle of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs³⁷. The declaration determined the status of Soviet troops in Poland, economic relations between the two countries and the procedure for the further repatriation of Poles who ended up in the USSR after World War II.

The results of the talks were greeted with enthusiasm in Poland. The new leadership of the country gained authority in all sectors of society. The crisis in Soviet-Polish relations was overcome.

Poland was the first of the countries of the socialist camp to achieve a favorable compromise for the country with an all-powerful patron, and to achieve it by political means, which allowed the leadership of the USSR to refrain from the use of force. After the conferences in Warsaw and Moscow, it seemed to the rulers of the USSR that the "Polish question" had been resolved. In Poland, indeed, until the end of the 70s, the resistance to the Soviet "model of socialism" (which always existed latently) did not reach such a degree of intensity as, for example, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, on the Soviet side, however, the demonstration of mutual understanding between the USSR and Poland, although it contributed to a large extent strengthening Polish-Soviet relations, but did not complete "Polish question" like a ghost, like "the shadow of Hamlet's father" loomed in the background in all the vicissitudes of the confrontation between the USSR - the USA and NATO - the Department of Internal Affairs.

The Polish crisis was resolved by political means, although Moscow was ready to use force and even took steps in this direction. It was possible to avoid violence because the political leadership of the USSR showed prudence, the ability to compromise, having met the constructive position of the Polish leaders on the issue of building Soviet-Polish relations on new principles. "Polish October" showed the possibility of a humane solution of disputes between the USSR and other countries.

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us of the socialist community. And although the methods of forceful pressure did not disappear from the arsenal of political means of the USSR, in its foreign policy an increasing place began to be given to the search for other political methods that take into account the interests of the other side. Events in Hungary played out according to a different scenario.

As in other countries of Eastern Europe, the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU received a great response in Hungary. However, the Hungarian party political leadership, headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party (VPT), M. Rakosi, continued the same political course taken back in Stalin's times, which caused increasing discontent in the country. In the summer of 1956, general discontent in Hungary reached a breaking point. In the USSR, this caused alarm. A high-ranking party delegation was sent to Budapest to work

out the necessary measures to stabilize the situation. MA Suslov, a member of the Politburo who visited Hungary, however, did not see any special reasons for concern at that time. After this visit, Rakosi's supporters proposed "to develop and implement measures to ensure the strengthening of party work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local bodies, as well as the adoption of other necessary measures to combat the subversive activities of the opposition and enemy agents." However, the campaign "to restore order" launched by the government has stirred up an already restless Hungarian society. There was a danger of an explosion of popular anger. Plenum

The Central Committee of the VPT, which began its work on July 18, 1956 with the participation of Mikoyan, who arrived in Budapest to clarify the situation, removed Rakosi from the post of first secretary of the party Central Committee. Erne Gere became the first secretary of the party. He, in essence, continued the previous course, which was supported by the absolute majority of the Politburo, and only Janos Kadar, a well-known politician recently released from prison, advocated political change³⁸. However, Hungarian society continued to seethe. The Soviet leadership was aware of the complexity of the situation

tions. After the June meeting of the leaders of the communist parties in Moscow, N. S. Khrushchev wrote to I. Tito that if the Hungarian situation worsens, then the use of any means to overcome the crisis is not ruled out³⁹. In the Soviet Union, Hungary was considered "the weak link in the socialist camp"⁴⁰. By the autumn of 1956, an explosive situation had really developed, which the party and state leadership, headed by E. Gere and Prime Minister A. Hegedusch, failed to foresee and defuse.

October 22, 1956 at the Budapest Polytechnic University to the usual demands formulated by students - convening a party congress, removing the Stalinists from the leadership, expanding socialist democracy, returning to the post of former prime minister I. Nagy (removed from this post back in 1955 for attempts to carry out democratic reforms), the rejection of state deliveries of agricultural products that are excessive for the peasantry, etc. - demands were added that reflected national democratic aspirations: the provision of civil permission for a multi-party system, the holding of free elections, the return of the old national symbols. The students demanded the normalization of Soviet-Hungarian relations on the basis of equality and the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, as well as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. On October 23, 1956, a rally of solidarity between students and Polish workers in the struggle against government policy was planned.

The situation in the country also caused concern among the Soviet leadership. The military units stationed in Hungary were put on high alert. On October 23, the head of the KGB of the USSR, I. A. Serov, and the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, M. S. Malinin, were already in Hungary. On this day, students and the residents of Budapest who joined them went on a demonstration, demanding the removal of the "symbol of Stalinist tyranny and political suppression" - a monument to Stalin, the return to Rakosi's homeland, on

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who went asylum in the USSR in order to be brought to justice for his anti-people actions and crimes⁴¹. The demonstration and rallies on 23 October passed peacefully, but

in the evening, after the end of the working day, hundreds of thousands of representatives of various social groups, including workers from the largest industrial enterprises in Budapest, gathered near the parliament building. They demanded that the disgraced Imre Nagy speak before them, insisted on his return to the post of prime minister of the country and the continuation of his reforms. The demonstrators began to dismantle the monument to Stalin. Some of the protesters, led by students, went to the radio building to get their demands broadcast on the radio. The leadership of the Hungarian radio did not want to talk to the students, and the guards responded to the students' attempt to enter the building with fire. Blood was shed... Outraged demonstrators disarmed a group of soldiers who had arrived to support the guards of the building. The bloodshed, the casualties among civilians led to the fact that a number of policemen and military personnel took the side of the masses. The uprising began. At night, the Hungarian party authorities took urgent measures to replenish the country's top leadership with people from the democratic wing of the party, in

the hope that with their help it would be possible to calm the rebels. I. Nagy was urgently reinstated in the top leadership and appointed by the Presidium of the VPT to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But both this and the fact that a state of emergency was introduced could no longer turn the tide of events. On the same day, USSR Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov informed N.S. Khrushchev of an urgent request from Gera to assist in dispersing a "demonstration" of an unprecedented scale⁴².

However, Moscow

hesitated. Only after a new appeal from Budapest, which spoke of "an exceptionally dangerous situation and the need for Soviet intervention," the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided on military intervention. When the decision was made, Zhukov gave the order to a special corps of Soviet troops. On October 24, at dawn, the Soviet units entered Budapest.

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The main forces of the special corps in Hungary from 2 to 4 o'clock local time, having entered the Hungarian capital, took control of the most important objects of the city and cleared the area of the radio station from the rebels. It should be noted that the Soviet troops then did not meet resistance.

The demonstration of force was intended to intimidate the "rebellious Hungarians", but the tanks on the streets and the dispersal of the demonstrators only exacerbated the situation in the country. These actions led to the introduction of new demands, in particular, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, which supported the collapsed Hungarian party leadership. And it still did not realize the scale of the danger.

On October 25, instead of trying to peacefully resolve the aggravated conflict (in those conditions it was quite possible), Gera began to threaten. This significantly complicated the situation in the country. After the provocative shelling of unarmed demonstrators on October 25 in the square near the parliament building (there were many dead and thousands injured)

the beginning fraternization of students and youth with Soviet soldiers ceased. On the same day, October 25,

J. Kadar took the post of Gere. The election of Kadar to the post of leader of the HTP allowed the Nagy government to take concrete steps to end the crisis in a democratic way. However, the presence of Soviet troops, their participation in the suppression of the

uprising contributed to the fact that, along with the demand for the democratization of the country's internal life, the rebels raised issues of national sovereignty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. I. Nagy, only under pressure from the masses in order to alleviate tension, in the interests of ending armed skirmishes, in one of his speeches on the radio on October 25, was forced on behalf of the government, with the approval of the Central Committee of the VPT, to declare that Soviet troops would be withdrawn "immediately after the restoration of peace and order"⁴³. I. Nagy's statement was regarded by the Central Committee of the CPSU as unauthorized, not agreed in advance with the Kremlin "both

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the desire to start negotiations with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

After that, the government of I. Nagy, without mentioning the withdrawal of Soviet troops, began to resolve the conflict with the rebels by peaceful means. It called for a ceasefire and declared an amnesty for those who laid down their arms.

The people, however, continued to put pressure on the government to comply with its three main demands: to withdraw Soviet troops; to form a government on a coalition basis; liquidate the state security agencies responsible for the mass shooting on October 25 at the parliament. The Hungarian Writers' Union demanded an immediate ceasefire and proposed an amnesty for the participants in the fighting and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the barracks. But there were also more radical demands: to withdraw Soviet troops from the country before the beginning of 1957, and also to withdraw Hungary from the OVD⁴⁴. The events of the following days heated up the situation even more: there were executions of peaceful demonstrators in Miskolc, Győr, Esztergom, Kecskemét and other cities. They showed that forceful measures do not reach the goal and national reconciliation is possible only as a result of concessions and negotiations, satisfaction of at least part of the demands of the insurgent people. Negotiations were started with the rebels in Budapest. On the evening of October 28, the prime minister spoke on the radio and promised to satisfy part of the demands of the rebels. He outlined the program of the renewed government, which also included representatives of the once influential party of small farmers. A government order was issued for an immediate ceasefire. The Soviet units also ceased hostilities, respectively. In agreement with representatives of the USSR, the government of I. Nagy disbanded the state security agencies. Recognized

organs of people's self-government that arose spontaneously—revolutionary and workers' soviets. The national coat of arms and the national holiday were restored

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March 15 is the Day of Remembrance of the Revolution of 1848. Nagy's statement said that, in accordance with the agreement reached with the government of the USSR, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest would begin.

The government statement caused relief and was met with approval from the population: it meant a turning point in the confrontation between the government and the rebellious people, the prerequisites for a peaceful dialogue and overcoming the confrontation began to take shape,

the possibility of a peaceful way out of the current situation.

Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest on October 30. But the process of mutual movement towards a peaceful way out of the situation was overshadowed by a new serious incident. On October 30, at the Budapest City Party Committee, a group of rebels noticed soldiers of the disbanded state security agencies. The rebels believed that the arrested were kept in the basement of the building. Wanting to free them, those gathered in the square tried to enter the building. The delegation sent there was destroyed, after which a shootout began, which ended with the storming of the building and the execution of its defenders⁴⁵. The new uprising in Budapest turned out to be unexpected, both for the Hungarian and for the Soviet leadership, and for the world community. As early as October 28, the UN Security Council put on the agenda the question of the situation in Hungary. Around the same time, the Moscow leadership became aware of the principled positions of the US administration on the Hungarian issue. Fear of a final break with the principles of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements (especially since Washington knew about the impending invasion of Egypt by the Anglo-French-Israeli forces) and the unwillingness of a possible conflict with the USSR led the Washington administration to proclaim a policy of non-interference on October 27, about which the ambassador United States in Moscow Ch. Bohlen on October 29 additionally notified the Soviet leadership⁴⁶. On the same day, Israel, having started a war against Egypt, invaded the Suez zone.

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cash. The armed forces of England and France intervened in the military conflict. All these factors ultimately had a decisive influence on the policy of the USSR, whose leaders changed their tactics of behavior towards Hungary⁴⁷. However, the West's

position on the Hungarian events was ambivalent, contradictory and largely inflammatory. The Hungarian population was extremely disturbed by the broadcasts to Hungary from the Voice of America and Free Europe radio stations. Often, these broadcasts contained, in essence, a program of action for people who did not agree with the order in Hungary. In addition, the materials of these radio stations were compiled in such a way that they created

many Hungarians under the illusion that if the development of events takes on an "extraordinary character", then "the West will not leave Hungary in trouble." However, when the events really took on an extraordinary character, then everything turned out quite differently. As studies of recent years show, the Western powers had no intention of going to the aid of the Hungarian rebels⁴⁸.

In the leading circles of the USA and NATO, it was believed that the events in Hungary were an internal affair of the Soviet bloc. In this regard, the testimony of F.-J., then Minister of Defense of the FRG, is eloquent. Strauss:

"At first, the Americans inspire hope in the Hungarians, it becomes and when it's serious, they leave the Hungarian people to their fate. on

There could be no talk of military intervention by NATO. The suppression of the Hungarian popular uprising was seen as an action affecting the Red Army the Not interests of NATO ...

today it is firmly convinced that the Russians I and Not would have been would be an invasion carried out by the Americans in advance took care of if to take a clear stand"⁴⁹.

However, a combination of circumstances, international factors (Washington's position, the progressing Suez crisis, etc.) pushed most of the Soviet ruling elite to take decisive action. November 1 I. Nagy on the radio proclaimed the neutrality of Hungary and announced its readiness to live in friendship with all neighboring countries,

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including the USSR, on the principles of equality and independence⁵⁰. It was time for the Soviet government to take action. The situation in the world was very difficult. Military operations continued in Egypt. The political crisis in Poland has just been settled. Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the socialist community could lead to unpredictable consequences for the world of socialism and the prestige of the Soviet Union. And the decision was made. On November 4, 1956, at 12 noon, Marshal Zhukov reported to the highest party authorities: "At 6:15 am on November 4 of this year, Soviet troops began an

operation to restore order and restore people's democratic power in Hungary"⁵¹. It was also reported on the occupation of cities, including the Hungarian capital, the most important bridges, railway junctions and other strategic facilities of the country. Attention was drawn to the fact that the Hungarian garrisons did not offer resistance to the Soviet troops. I. Nagy, after the active offensive of our troops on Budapest, informed the people of the country and the world community on the radio about "obvious intentions to overthrow the legitimate democratic Hungarian government"⁵² and, with the rest of the communist reformers from the government, took refuge in the building of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Radio Budapest in Russian and

Hungarian constantly broadcast the message: "The Hungarian government asks the officers and soldiers of the Soviet Army not to shoot. Avoid

bloodshed! The Russians are our friends and will remain so!"⁵³ Early in the morning of November 4, almost simultaneously with the start of military operations, an appeal was heard on the waves of Solnok radio by the new Revolutionary Workers' Peasants' Government of Janos Kadar, created in Solnok. a request to the command of the Soviet troops that it "help our people defeat the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution, restore the people's socialist system, restore order and tranquility in

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our country "⁵⁴. With the appearance in Budapest on November 7, 1956, J. Kadar began a new chapter in the relationship between Moscow and Budapest. From October 23,

1956 to January 1957 (until separate armed did not provide skirmishes between the rebels and the Hungarian authorities and Soviet troops ceased), 2,502 were killed and 19,226 people were injured on the Hungarian side.⁵⁵ On the Soviet side, they were killed, died of wounds and went missing 720, and 1540 people were injured⁵⁶ .

The events in Hungary darkened Soviet-Hungarian relations for a long time and became for the world a symptom of trouble in the camp of the socialist countries. They added fuel to the fire of the Cold War, gave an impetus to the creators of American foreign policy of the special services to strengthen propaganda organizations And corruption activity American for the from within the states of the Warsaw Pact and the entire socialist community, using and whipping up anti-Soviet sentiments, supporting nationalist elements in these countries. Nevertheless, despite the blunders of Soviet policy in a number of countries of the socialist camp, the authority of the Soviet Union and

the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism in the zone of the national liberation movement, in the growing "third world" grew. The desire of each of the great powers to establish (USSR, USA) or maintain (England, France) its influence in the "third world" became an actual feature of the world confrontation. The USSR, which had already created a

belt of friendly states around itself, supported in every possible way the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the former or still remaining colonial powers, spreading the ideas of socialism in these countries.

England and France tried to keep the former colonies in their orbit, the United States sought to master these countries

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as markets. These contradictions were especially clearly manifested in 1956, which was truly a year of crises.

The most important of them in the battle for the "third world" was the conflict that went down in history as the Suez crisis. In the Middle East, with the collapse of the colonial system, a "power vacuum" has formed.

Therefore, the old metropolises - England and France, and the new superpowers - the USSR and the USA, rushed there.

Until the mid-1950s, Egypt, which was a protectorate of Great Britain from 1914 to 1921, having become an independent Kingdom in 1922, actually remained under the control of Britain. On October 15, 1951, Egypt terminated the 1936 treaty, under which British troops were stationed on its territory. But the British not only did not withdraw their troops, but also increased their number to 120 thousand people. The response was mass protest meetings and partisan struggle against the British occupiers. On July 23, 1952, in Egypt, a revolutionary organization of "free officers" headed by Colonel G. A. Nasser overthrew the monarchical regime and proclaimed the country a republic. The new government led by Nasser sought to pursue an independent policy. This led to a deterioration in relations with England and exacerbated the confrontation with Israel. Despite the fact that in 1950 Britain, the United States and France signed an agreement prohibiting them from selling weapons to both the Arab countries and Israel, Paris and Tel Aviv concluded a secret agreement in 1954 to supply Israel with the latest French weapons⁵⁸. In 1953, the United States offered President Nasser military and economic assistance to Egypt and the replacement of British troops with NATO forces, but was refused. In an effort to extend its presence in Egypt, Great Britain signed an agreement with Egypt in 1954 to withdraw its troops within 20 months and transfer all military facilities in the country to the Nasser government. With the creation in 1955 of the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Great Britain) to Egypt

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was invited to join this organization, but Cairo refused. The situation in the Middle East was getting worse. Israel and the countries of the Baghdad Pact were viewed by Egypt as a hostile environment. The people's liberation war in Algeria, the independence of Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco - all this spoke of the rapidly developing process of the collapse of the colonial system of the West. Favorable conditions were created for the expansion of Soviet influence in this region, which greatly worried the NATO leadership. Their fears were not built on sand. Since 1955, at the request of Nasser, after the West rejected his offer to supply Egypt with weapons, Moscow secretly, through Czechoslovakia, began to sell modern weapons to Egypt: tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc.⁵⁹.

In the USA, Great Britain and other countries of the West, the Soviet Egyptian action caused growing concern: they did not want to let the Russians into the Middle East, already engulfed in revolutionary ferment. President Eisenhower promised Nasser American financial assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam. But when the Egyptian president recognized the PRC and began to buy weapons from Czechoslovakia, the United States

On July 21, 1956, they retracted their promise. This put Egypt in a hopeless situation: the collapse of a grandiose project threatened with huge troubles for the country's economy. Then, 5 days later, on July 26, Nasser took an extremely daring step: he decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. At a grand rally in Alexandria the next day, he announced that the proceeds from the nationalization of the canal would go to the construction of the Aswan Dam, and announced the promise of the USSR to provide economic assistance to Egypt. (The Soviet government agreed to this in June, during the visit of Foreign Minister D. G. Shepilov to Egypt.) Nasser's statement caused a storm in London and Paris. On July 27, British Prime Minister A. Eden sent a telegram to Eisenhower. He wrote that the West could not allow Nasser to take over Suez. He demanded not

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slow joint Anglo-American actions, believing that otherwise the American-British influence in the Middle East would be "irreparably undermined." He argued that the interests of maritime states were threatened because the Egyptians did not have the technical competence necessary to operate the canal. Eden reported on the preparation in England of a plan of military action against Egypt, believing that the West should "bring Nasser to reason." Eisenhower did not share the views of the British. He believed that "the power of a sovereign state to alienate private property in its own territory can hardly

be questioned ... Nasser acted within his rights." But he was also sure of something else: "...thinking about our situation in Panama, we must not allow this action to come to Nasser just like that"⁶⁰.

However, the British and French played their game. At a meeting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the United States at the end of July, the positions of London and Paris coincided: to nip in the bud the attempt of disobedience by Egypt by any means, without stopping at the use of force. The United States urged them not to rush, hoping to receive political dividends in the Arab world through their peacekeeping. Not being a colonial empire, the United States could find understanding among the Arabs in their struggle against colonialism and ultimately push their

allies-competitors in the richest oil-bearing region. Therefore, they proposed to internationalize the canal, transferring its management to international jurisdiction. The discussion during the week did not lead to an agreement.

Then the former Suez Canal Company withdrew its pilots, who were guiding ocean-going ships through a narrow and difficult fairway. It was a well-calculated blow. The Egyptian government, not ready for such a turn of affairs, began to search for new pilots, but in the face of opposition from London and Paris, this task was not an easy one. Then the Soviet Union came to the aid of Egypt.

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By order of N. S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, pilots from the USSR were sent to Egypt. Most of them were highly qualified and could quickly master the working conditions on the Suez Canal. Pilots went to Egypt as "private individuals" hired by the administration of the canal⁶¹. With this act, the Soviet government demonstrated to the emerging "third world" its solidarity with the peoples gaining independence, and showed the West that the USSR was entering the international arena as an active participant in world politics in the "third world". The tendency of the United States to dissociate itself from the bellicose position of Great Britain and France, the

actions of the USSR to provide assistance to Egypt further increased tension in the Middle East. The governments of England and France began to prepare an intervention in Egypt. Israel joined in the development of military plans. A kind of coalition was formed, in which each of the participants pursued their own goals. England and France sought to preserve all military-political and economic

benefits from owning the Suez Canal. In addition, Great Britain hoped to strengthen its shaken political influence in the Near and Middle East, and France - to punish Egypt for its active support of the national liberation struggle in Algeria. Israel's goal was to expand its territory. The United States watched with alarm the military preparations of its allies. American intelligence agencies noted the increased intensity of the radio exchange of encrypted messages between London and Paris. Air reconnaissance reported that Israel was mobilizing, and there were up to 60 French Mister-class fighter-bombers at Israeli air bases. Upon learning of this, President Eisenhower was furious: not only did the French, despite the agreement on the ban on the sale of weapons to the countries of the Middle East, obtain permission from the United States to sell 24 "Misters" to Israel, they are still behind the back of the United States together

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then 24 delivered 60 such aircraft to Israel. Through Secretary of State D. Dulles, he conveyed to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion that in the long term, Israel's aggression "cannot but lead to a catastrophe and those of his friends who he still has in the world will not be able to help him, no matter how strong they may be." ⁶³.

Meanwhile, England, France and Israel launched a systematic preparation for aggression against Egypt. In early September, it was decided to transfer French units from Algiers to Malta: from here it was closer for them to operate in Egypt. Israel was supposed to launch the attack, which was guaranteed financial and military-technical assistance. In 1956, Israel devoted half of its own budget to preparations for a new war. At the same time, NATO states

supplied Israel with tanks, aircraft, guns and small arms. In January 1956, 100 tanks were received from England, in February Canada supplied ammunition worth 30,000 dollars, and in April the first of 100 ordered French Mister aircraft began to arrive. Hundreds of Israeli officers of all branches of the military were trained in NATO countries. In addition, officer cadres were trained at the General Staff Academy, opened in Israel in 1954⁶⁶.

For the war against Egypt in 1956, Israel mobilized 150,000 people. His ground forces were armed with 400 tanks, more than 400 guns, and about 500 armored personnel carriers. The naval force, augmented by three frigates supplied by Canada and two destroyers from England, had 30 warships. The Air Force consisted of 360 aircraft, including old American and British aircraft equipped with new weapons. In general, Israel possessed significant military power.

On October 16, at an Anglo-French meeting in Paris, the final decision was made to attack Egypt. On October 23, 1956, the general staffs of England, France and Israel completed the development of a joint action plan. Joint Anglo-French Headquarters,

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who led the invasion, was stationed in Cyprus; the Israeli General Staff exercised leadership from its territory. 25 thousand British and the same number of French were to take part in the joint air-land-sea operation. Taking into account the naval and auxiliary forces, the number of the Anglo-French expeditionary force exceeded 100 thousand people. In total, 229 thousand soldiers and officers of the three countries, 650 aircraft and over 130 warships were concentrated for the intervention⁶⁸. The Egyptian army by that time had significant weapons acquired both in the West and in the socialist countries. However, Egypt did not have sufficient military potential to ensure the defense of the state while simultaneously attacking it on land, from air and sea. With significant human resources, the country did not have the opportunity to prepare a combat-ready army, since a large proportion of the draft contingent turned out to be unfit for military service due to illness, illiteracy, and also due to a lack of weapons. In addition, before the start of the aggression, the Egyptian armed forces were in the process of reorganization, and the new military equipment received from the socialist countries had not yet been fully mastered. In the ranks of the ground forces there were 75 thousand, in the Air Force - 11 thousand people. The Egyptian National Guard of 100,000 did not receive sufficient training and did not have the necessary weapons. In total, the ground forces were armed with about 600 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns of various types, 400 field guns, 200 anti-aircraft guns and 200 armored personnel carriers⁶⁹. Some of these tanks and guns before the start

hostilities were mainly on the bases, and not in the troops. The Egyptian Air Force included about 15 squadrons of British and Soviet-made aircraft, but before the start of the aggression, not all Soviet aircraft were put into service. In general, out of 128 modern aircraft, only 4270 were in combat readiness.

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Egypt could oppose the interchangeable fleets of the USA and England with only 4 destroyers, 7 frigates and several auxiliary ships. The tripartite aggression against Egypt proceeded in two stages. At the first stage, Israel carried out an offensive in the Sinai Peninsula, and England and France carried out air raids on Egypt; on the second, England and France planned to land amphibious and airborne assault forces in the Suez Canal zone. The Israeli offensive was to unfold simultaneously in three directions: along the Mediterranean coast with an auxiliary maneuver to encircle and destroy Egyptian troops in the Gaza region; through the Mitla Pass to Suez and Ismailia, and to a limited extent along the coasts of the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. On October 29, Israeli troops invaded Egypt. Israel sought to inflict a military defeat on Egypt that could lead to the fall of the Nasser regime; destroy the bases of Palestinian militants

in the Sinai; force Egypt to conclude a peace treaty on favorable terms for Tel Aviv. The Israeli grouping of troops created for the invasion included 10 brigades (about 100 thousand people), 200 tanks, about 600 guns and mortars, about 150 combat aircraft and up to 20 warships⁷¹. The main goal of the group was to seize the Gaza Strip on the Sinai Peninsula, as well as to enter and consolidate on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. Great importance was attached to interaction with the Anglo-French troops, to agreeing with them on the timing of military operations⁷². Egypt fielded two rifle divisions against Israel, as well as local self-defense units, which did not represent any serious fighting force. Some of the reserves were deployed to the most threatened areas. The fighting on the first day of aggression was carried out mainly in the southern, Suez, direction. Troops of the Israeli attack group "Center" with the support of tanks captured a number of Egyptian settlements. In other directions they moved more slowly out of 297

for the fact that the technique got stuck in the sand. After Israeli airborne troops landed in the area of the Mitla Pass, French planes began to deliver military equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and water to him. 60 French jet fighters with French crews deployed to Israel the day before the start of the invasion supported the actions of the Israeli ground forces. At the same time, ships of the British and French navies were moving towards the Egyptian shores⁷³.

On October 30, England and France, playing the role of "peacekeepers", presented Egypt and Israel with an ultimatum demanding that both sides withdraw their troops 10 miles (16 kilometers) from the Suez Canal. At the same time, they demanded Nasser's consent to the occupation (of course "temporary") of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. This ultimatum was a demonstrative gesture aimed at the world community. It was directed only against Egypt, since by this time the Israeli troops were still 50 kilometers from Suez. In addition, the ultimatum gave the parties a very tough time to think about the answer: 12 hours - until 4.30.31 October GMT74. (This was reminiscent of Hitler's ultimatum to Poland on August 30, 1939, when the Poles simply did not have time to comply with Germany's demands on time.) Reporting to the US President about this ultimatum, Secretary of State D. F. Dulles noted that "this document in its rudeness and cruelty surpasses everything he had ever witnessed." US Representative to the United Nations G. Lodge said at the UN General Assembly that the US intends to submit a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt, the withdrawal of the Israeli army to the original border and the renunciation of all UN members from the use of force, as well as their participation in the embargo on trade with Israel until the troops are withdrawn. This message was met with prolonged applause. The countries of the "third world" were enthusiastic about the intentions of the United States to support

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Egypt, rebelling against the powers that have the closest ties to Washington. The rating of the USA in the world public opinion jumped up sharply. Eisenhower's appeal to the conflicting parties and peoples of the world further raised the authority of the United States. The President stated that Britain and France did not consult with the United States when deciding on armed intervention, that the United States would not take part in the conflict, that their goal was to stop the war that had broken out in the Middle East. True, he immediately made the reservation that such a position of the United States would not affect the ties of friendship that bind America with Britain and France, as well as with other partners in NATO76 . The Soviet government, preoccupied with the events in Hungary, came out on November 1 with

a stereotyped statement from the Foreign Ministry. Only later, after reading Eisenhower's statement and the responses to it in the world, N. S. Khrushchev realized that the Americans had seized the initiative, acting as peacekeepers and not tying the hands of their allies. The Soviet leader understood that it was necessary to take some important step, worthy of a mighty, but peace-loving power, however, shackled by the Hungarian uprising, he decided to wait a few days77 . Meanwhile, the events around Egypt were becoming more and more ominous. On October 31, Israeli troops reached the approaches to the canal in the Suez region. On the same day in combat

action turned on the Anglo-French aviation. Its task was to maintain air supremacy, as well as massive raids on Egyptian cities and military installations. Port Said, Cairo, Ismailia, Suez, Alexandria and many airfields were bombed. The destruction of half of the Egyptian airfields as a result of raids and the disabling of up to 140 combat aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force allowed the aggressors

conquer domination V air And carry out unhindered landing of air and sea assault forces . Naval artillery bombarded coastal fortifications. The Egyptian command still managed to keep part

airplane 299

Commodity of Soviet production. Soviet and Czechoslovak pilots managed to overtake all the combat-ready MIG-15, MIG-17 and IL-28 to safe airfields in Saudi Arabia. Attempts by the Egyptian aviation to counteract the air enemy and the ground forces of Israel did not bring success: the pilots of the Egyptian Air Force did not have the experience of modern air warfare.

Given the threat of an Anglo-French landing, the Egyptian command withdrew its troops from the Sinai Peninsula and deployed them in the Suez Canal zone. On November 1, Israeli troops managed to break through the Egyptian defenses along the Mediterranean coast. On November 2, with the support of aviation and French naval artillery, they captured the city of Gaza and the next day were 15-20 kilometers from the Suez Canal. On November 5, the Israelis captured a key point at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba - Sharm ash-Sheikh, as well as the islands of Tiran and Sanafir belonging to Saudi Arabia. The entire Sinai Peninsula was in the hands of Israel. In the battles for Sinai, the Egyptians suffered heavy losses, but the calculation of the aggressors that defeats at the front would lead to the overthrow of the Nasser government did not materialize. Then England and France decided to launch an invasion on their own. It began with airborne assaults carried out by the Anglo-French troops stationed in Cyprus. On November 5, with air support, the British parachute brigade captured Port Said, and the French brigades captured Port Fuad. On the night of November 6, an amphibious assault began on the captured bridgeheads, supported by

122 warships arrived from Malta and Toulon, among which were several battleships, 4 aircraft carriers and 2 helicopter carriers. The combined Anglo-French invasion force included 80,000 men, over 430 tanks, 520 guns and mortars. They were supported by about 600 aircraft⁷⁹ . Slowly moving south along the canal, the Anglo-French troops were preparing to attack Cairo. A distinctive feature of the operation was the widespread use

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title airborne troops. The lack of air defense among the Egyptians allowed the enemy to use aircraft at low speeds and produce

landing from low altitude. Helicopters were used for the first time for the transfer of marines. Military operations were accompanied

by decisive political actions. On November 1, Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Syria followed suit and placed its armed forces under Egyptian command. The Syrians blew up the oil pipelines that ran from Iraq through Syria to the sea. On November 3 A. Eden rejected the call of the UN Security Council for a ceasefire. The next day, Eisenhower, having learned about the position of Great Britain and that the Anglo-French squadron, which had left the ports of Cyprus, was approaching the Egyptian coast, suggested to Eden that the ships be returned to Cyprus. Eden replied: "...If we turn back now, the entire Middle East will be engulfed in flames... We cannot allow a military vacuum at a time when UN forces are only just being formed."⁸⁰ It became clear to Washington that Britain and France were determined to achieve their goals. In Moscow these days they were racking their brains on how to help Nasser. In October, the Soviet government could not pay sufficient attention to the events taking place in the Middle East. In those days, the socialist world was shocked by anti-Soviet

demonstrations in Poland and an uprising in Hungary, where it came to an armed clash in which Soviet troops also took part. These events riveted the main attention of the Soviet leaders. But in late October - early November, the Soviet Union managed to politically settle the issue with the Polish government, and the uprising in Hungary was suppressed by the new Hungarian government of J. Kadar with the help of Soviet troops. Now Khrushchev could switch to Egypt. The non-intervention declared by the Americans made it easier for the Soviet leader to make a decision: now that the Americans had dissociated themselves from the Anglo-French

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tsuzsky adventure, it was possible to make a statement in which, along with a call to stop the aggression, there would be a threat to use force otherwise. The American position ruled out a direct challenge to the United States on this issue.

But another question arose: how could one strengthen his threat so that it sounded convincing for London and Paris. Conducted a number of political actions. Minister of Foreign Affairs D. G. Shepilov turned to the Chairman of the Security Council Jalal Abdokh with a proposal to present an ultimatum to the aggressors demanding to stop hostilities within 12 hours, and the USSR expressed its readiness to place its air and naval forces at the disposal of the UN. Protest demonstrations were held in Moscow outside the embassies of Great Britain, France and Israel. The Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv left Israel. But what better way to reinforce the determination of the USSR to provide effective assistance? And then Khrushchev decided to apply the technique, which he then repeatedly used when

emergence of military-political crises and armed conflicts. He decided to threaten with nuclear missile strikes on London and Paris in order to force the British and French governments to end the war in Egypt. At that time, the USSR had several R-5 missiles with a range of 1200 kilometers, which made it possible to hit targets in England and France from the territory of the USSR and its European allies. They were tested at the Kapustin Yar test site. However, there were no missiles of this class combat-ready, let alone deployed in combat positions. But during the visit of the Soviet government delegation headed by Bulganin and Khrushchev to London in the spring of 1956. The latter talked a lot about the creation in the Soviet Union of missiles with a range reaching England. Then it seemed to make an impression. Moreover, Khrushchev spoke directly about the transition of the USSR from mass armies to nuclear missile weapons. In addition, it was known in Moscow that Western intelligence knew about the launches of the RA 302

ket in Kapustin Yar, but, as the Kremlin believed, they did not know the degree of readiness of missile weapons for combat use. Khrushchev decided to play on this.

On November 5, an appeal was published in Moscow by Soviet Premier N. A. Bulganin to the leaders of England, France and Israel - Anthony Eden, Guy Mollet and Ben-Gurion. The tone of the address was harsh. The Soviet Union warned that a local conflict could escalate into a world war, and suggested that the United States and other UN member states use their armed forces together to stop the bloodshed. The Soviet Union declared its "determination by the use of force to crush the aggressors and restore peace" in the Middle East. The note sent to the UK read, in part:

"IN what position was would England herself be attacked by on stronger states possessing all types of modern destructive weapons?

V present time And Not expel To England's navy or air force, use other means, such as rocket technology. If rocket weapons A were used against England or France, it would be a barbaric action, "you probably called

82 .

This message produced the impression of a bombshell in London and Paris. Guy Mollet was lifted out of bed. After reading the Soviet ultimatum, the French prime minister rushed to call London. There was the same reaction. All night long consultations were going on by telephone between Eden and Guy Mollet: they were trying to figure out how real the threat was. After the previous US declaration of non-intervention, Britain and France remained face to face with the USSR. Eden recalled how Khrushchev, during a visit to London in the spring, boasted of Soviet missile power. On the morning of November 6, both governments announced a ceasefire from 0000 hours on November 783. Moscow rejoiced: the bluff was a success. But the Kremlin did not know that in those same days there were intensive consultations between London and

Washington. The point is that Bull
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Ganin also sent a letter to Eisenhower with a proposal that the USSR and the USA join forces and jointly put an end to hostilities:

"The Soviet government addresses To government
United States with a proposal to stop the aggression to stop further bloodshed. The United States has a And
strong navy and powerful aircraft in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has a strong navy and a powerful V
air force. The immediate joint use of these means by the side of the United States of the Soviet Union would be
a reliable guarantee for the cessation of aggression ... If this war is stopped, there is a danger that it may
escalate And And
CO
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V third world war" 84 .

This Soviet proposal deliberately, not without intent, exaggerated the capabilities of the Soviet fleet and aviation. Khrushchev had the idea of sending Soviet troops to the Middle East, and above all airborne units, but USSR Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov reported to the government that the General Staff had worked out the option of airborne assault and came to disappointing conclusions. Even if Turkey and Iran do not prevent the overflight of aircraft, transfer a sufficient number of troops and weapons, it will not be possible to arrange their supply due to the lack of aircraft. In a clash with the expeditionary forces of the Allies, which are provided with everything necessary, and with the dominance of the British and French fleets and aviation in the Mediterranean, the Soviet airborne units would be doomed to defeat . But Washington didn't know about it. At a meeting at the White House on November 5, CIA Director Allen Dulles said that according to available intelligence, the Soviets had promised the Egyptians "to do something" in the Middle East. He assumed that the USSR would send military aviation to Syria. It was decided to reject the proposal of the Soviet premier. The President instructed FBI Director Hoover to issue a statement warning 304

tell the Russians that if they try to send troops to the Middle East, the United States will counteract this with
using force.

On November 6, Eisenhower ordered Dulles to conduct reconnaissance flights by US aircraft over Syria and Israel, "avoiding, however, flights over Russia." Their task was to establish the presence of Soviet troops or aircraft at bases in Syria. If they were discovered, the president believed, "the British and French would have a reason to destroy them." He also asked if the US Navy forces in the Mediterranean had nuclear anti-submarine weapons.

"These guys," the president said of the Soviet leadership, "are both furious and fearful at the same time...
This

combination is the most dangerous state of mind ... And if these guys do anything, we should hit them, and if necessary, hit everything we have in the basket. "He believed that Bulganin's letter was generated by the fear of the Russians. They, according to Eisenhower, they feared that the events in Hungary would lead to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, created a year ago. In this regard, Moscow seeks to demonstrate its strength in order to show the West its high military capabilities, to keep it from the temptation to interfere in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, he declared that if the Soviets attacked the French and British, then "we will enter the war and we will have the right to take military action." But already on the same day he was informed that, according to intelligence, there were no Soviet Air Forces either at the air bases in Syria. This, of course, reduced the threat of an expansion of the conflict, but nevertheless, measures were taken in the United States to increase combat readiness: servicemen who were on vacation were recalled to their units.⁸⁶ In a telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Eden, which took place on November 6, the British Prime Minister announced that he had just announced Britain's readiness to agree to a ceasefire. "I can't express how glad we are,"⁸⁷ the president commented on the news. 305

In the meantime, Moscow was anxiously watching developments in the Middle East. Since the idea of an airborne landing fell away, it remained to rely on Bulganin's formidable statement. The Kremlin did not yet know about Eden's last telephone conversation with Eisenhower. But soon news arrived about Eden's speech in the House of Commons on November 6, in which he declared that the British troops had fulfilled their tasks and from zero o'clock on November 7 they were ceasing military operations in Egypt. And although the fighting in Port Said continued, it became clear that the war was coming to an end. On November 8, the shooting stopped. Israel has promised to withdraw its troops from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. By the end of November, UN forces had taken up positions on the Egyptian-Israeli border. Anglo-French troops were withdrawn from Egypt in December 1956, and Israeli troops in March 1957. Thus ended the Suez Crisis. The Kremlin regarded this as a success of its policy. Today, many years later, this crisis attracts the attention of historians not by its military aspect (it is quite typical for many local

military conflicts of that time), but by its political aspect. One of the most important directions of that time was the rivalry for the possession of "spheres of interest" in the emerging "third world". In 1957-1964, the leaders of the USSR visited India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran and other countries. The leaders of India, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Somalia, Senegal, Laos, Cambodia and a number of other states visited the Soviet Union. More than 20 agreements on cooperation and provision of loans to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, including India, Indonesia,

Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Afghanistan, UAR, Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali. The amount of assistance provided was quite significant: the OAR covered up to 50 percent of appropriations for economic development at its expense, while India covered 15 percent during the implementation of the second five-year plan.

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The intensification of contacts between the USSR and the liberating countries, the support of their national-patriotic forces caused Western countries backlash. Soviet foreign policy was perceived (some statements by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders gave grounds for this) as an attempt to spread the Soviet ideological system to the whole world, to cut off the developed states of the West from markets and sources of raw materials.

As a result, the West stepped up military pressure on the USSR. After the crisis of 1956, the NATO countries proclaimed the "doctrine of interdependence", heading for a closer coordination of their actions. The readiness of the United States and its allies to oppose any pro-

communist changes in countries where there was no "Soviet influence" has increased significantly, to try to overthrow those governments that pursued a line towards an alliance with the USSR. Already in 1957, the United States proclaimed the "Eisenhower Doctrine", according to which an "influence vacuum" formed in the Near and Middle East as

a result of the weakening of the positions of Britain and France. However, attempts by the United States and Great Britain in 1957-1958 to fill this "vacuum" and to impose governments pleasing to the West on Syria and Iraq met with resolute opposition from the USSR. The failures of US policy in the Middle East prompted the West to take a decision at the NATO Council session in December 1957 to deploy nuclear weapons bases and missile launch sites on the territory of the countries participating in the bloc. After the Caribbean crisis, the United States adopted a land-based strategic missile program. Their number increased from 294 to 1,054 from 1962 to 1967. The Soviet Union made no secret of its sympathy for the national liberation zone and supported the forces that took the most radical, anti-imperialist positions. The program of the CPSU, adopted by its 21st Congress, put forward the proposition that the liberated countries should face the best of alternatives .

native: moving along the path of non-capitalist development as "the path of peoples to freedom and happiness", when it is possible "during the life of one generation" to turn a backward country into an industrial one, to eradicate inequality, to ensure a high material and cultural standard of living for the working class and all working people. At the same time, it was emphasized that the USSR and other socialist countries would help the developing countries in every possible way, provide them with support, including arms.

But the United States also intended to achieve its goals by political means, supported by forceful pressure. "If the use of force becomes impossible, diplomacy may also lose its effectiveness," wrote the famous American political scientist H. Kissinger⁸⁹. But for this it was necessary to have such military power that would make a frightening impression not only on the countries of the "third world", but also on the great powers. The strategy of "massive retaliation" adopted in the United States in 1954 provided for the waging of a global nuclear war against the USSR and its allies "by means and in areas of one's own choice", and was a means of deterring, above all, the Soviet Union⁸⁹. The United States really capable of inflicting had forces, a crushing blow: strategic bombers with atomic bombs. The USSR also possessed nuclear weapons, but did not have means of delivery to the territory of the main NATO power - the United States. The most intensive measures were taken to catch up with the United States in terms of the latest aviation and nuclear missile weapons. But this took years, and time did not wait. And then Khrushchev decided to again use the tactics of military-political bluff. The idea was to use frightening propaganda, combined with a demonstration of the very small number of long-range bombers, and after 1957 strategic missiles, to give an exaggerated impression of the air and nuclear power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Subsequently, this idea was accurately reflected by H. Kissinger. He wrote: "...what a potential aggressor believes is more significant,

destination

create

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than what is objective truth."⁹⁰ In 1955, Khrushchev "scared" the Americans with Tu-95 bombers, demonstrating at an air parade in Moscow literally all aircraft of this type available in the country (less than 10). Tu-95 capable of striking the U.S. During the Suez crisis, he uses this technique against England and France, frightening them with missiles that are not yet in service with the Soviet Army, later claims that the USSR makes missiles "like sausages", although they were few then.

4. USSR: breakthrough into space

The political effect of the Soviet atomic threat during the Suez crisis sunk into Khrushchev's soul. He became an ardent supporter of the rapid adoption by the Soviet Army and Navy of strategic nuclear missile weapons; overcoming the resistance of the top generals, the majority of whom were distrustful of missiles, he spares no funds for their development. The goal is to intimidate America, to drive it away from the temptation of an air-atomic strike on the USSR. But for this it is not enough to have missiles of only medium

range, even if they can operate at 2000-4000 kilometers. What was needed was an intercontinental missile (ICR) capable of hitting targets in North America at a distance of 8,000 kilometers or more. In addition, she had to carry a powerful nuclear charge. intercontinental rocket with a thermonuclear Sakharov, began back in 1952. It is by the way that the design of Dmitriyevich of the charge, and hence the entire scale of the rocket, was adopted on the basis of my memorandum. This predetermined the work of the entire huge design and production organization for many years," Sakharov wrote. "It was this rocket that launched the first artificial Earth satellite into orbit in 1957

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and a spaceship with Yuri Gagarin on board in 1961 "91. The name of this rocket is R-7. It was on it that the design bureau of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev worked since the mid-50s. But even then, in the mid-50s, the royal the

R-5M rocket, for the first time in history, carried a warhead with an atomic charge through space, flying 1200 kilometers, hit a target in the Kara-Kum desert, not far from the Aral Sea.⁹² However, the R-7 became the main focus of work for Korolev and his design bureau at that time. the thoughts of the developers, it became the meaning of their

life.

"Seven" with a nuclear charge of a number of megatons unknown to us so far in our minds seemed to be some kind of beautiful goddess who will protect and cover the country from a terrible transatlantic enemy, "writes one of the creators of this rocket B. E. Chertok⁹³. To test the R-7 in In the desert of Kazakhstan, near Tyuratam station, a new missile range was opened in early 1957, which later went down in history under the name "Baikonur". so that it does not go beyond the USSR, it was necessary to launch rockets at a distance of not 8000, but 6314 kilometers, so that the rocket fell in Kamchatka, and not in the Pacific Ocean . , Yelizovo. Several experimental rockets R-7 were manufactured, each of which had its own number. On May 15, rocket No. 5 launched, but unsuccessfully. Controlled flight lasted 98 seconds. Then a fire started on one of the engines on the rocket, and at the 103rd second it was eliminated on command from the ground.

Two subsequent launches also failed: June 6 and July 12. It was not until August 19 that rocket scientists achieved significant success: the rocket reached the target area. But ... the warhead did not fall to the ground, it burned out 20 seconds before hitting the target. Nevertheless, on August 27, TASS announced the creation in the USSR of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its

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successful test. The message specifically emphasized that now the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are able to reach any point on the globe without using aviation, which is vulnerable to air defense systems. That report spoke of the successful completion of a series of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear charges⁹⁵. Americans - the Pentagon and the CIA, who were engaged at that time

intense

trials

intercontinental

ballistic missiles, did not believe the TASS report. They admitted that the tests of the Soviet ICBM were successful (they did not know that the warhead did not reach the ground, but the information received from reconnaissance flights confirmed that the USSR was close to creating an ICBM), but did not believe that such a missile was already adapted to deliver a hydrogen charge⁹⁶. However, intelligence data showed that the Russian missile program was being carried out very successfully. So it was. The next test - September 7, 1957 - showed that, although the head part collapsed again, before reaching the ground, its fragments fell in the target area. According to them, it was determined that the flight relative to the aiming point did not exceed 3 kilometers, and the deviation did not exceed 1 kilometer⁹⁷. It was necessary to bring the R-7 to such a condition that the warhead accurately hit the target. But it took time. And then it was decided, in order to fill the pause and not irritate Khrushchev, who was mainly worried not only by the military, but also by the political, propaganda effect of the Soviet MKRs, to launch artificial Earth satellites (AES). The satellite did not require landing at a precisely specified place on the earth's surface, the power of the rocket was sufficient to throw into space into orbit with an apogee of up to 1000 kilometers a device weighing up to 80 kilograms, while the Americans planned to launch into space the Avangard satellite weighing 10-15 kilograms⁹⁸. So the Soviet Union came close to launching satellites, ahead of the Americans in the most important area of scientific and technological progress - the mastery of outer space.

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During that period, the USSR also achieved major successes in competition with the United States in testing nuclear charges. In September 1955, a new Soviet nuclear test site, on Novaya Zemlya, went into operation. On September 21 of that year, the first underwater nuclear explosion in the USSR was carried out there. The test site was also adapted for nuclear tests in the atmosphere. But the Americans also conducted intense nuclear tests, and with a slightly greater intensity than the Soviet Union. So, in 1958, the United States carried out about 80 nuclear explosions, and the USSR - 72. "The record for the power of the exploded charge also belonged to the United States: 15 mgt (Bikini Atoll, 1954).

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union repeatedly spoke at international forums with proposals to stop nuclear testing. In January 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided unilaterally to stop

testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons and declared its

readiness not to renew them if the Western powers follow the example of the Soviet Union. But the West did not respond to this call. In January 1961, the US continued nuclear testing. Then the Soviet Union broke the moratorium and began preparations for a new series of nuclear explosions. The most powerful were carried out at the Novozomelsky test site in October 1961. A thermonuclear bomb of high power - 30 megatons was detonated in the air on October 23. The effect was impressive: there was huge destruction in the affected area, some residential buildings and barracks in the northern part of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago were damaged (people were evacuated in advance). On the same days, underwater and surface explosions were made, but of much lower power. All tests were successful¹⁰⁰. Then they began to prepare tests of "superbombs". All precautions have been taken. Local authorities and military garrisons on the archipelago and the mainland received appropriate warnings. Reindeer herds were driven into the depths of the Arkhangelsk region, for the duration of the test, flights of aircraft and vehicles were prohibited.

ships at sea. Early in the morning on October 30, the Tu-95 carrier aircraft took off. A "superbomb" with a capacity of 58 megatons was suspended from below on a special mount to its fuselage (it did not fit in the bomb bay). The aircraft entered the assigned area at an altitude of 12 kilometers. The explosion was programmed at an altitude of 5-6 kilometers. To reduce the impact of the light pulse, the TU-95 was painted white with a special paint. Before dropping the bomb, the crew broadcast false signals in order to mislead the air and sea reconnaissance of NATO countries. And at 8.30 am, the "superbomb" dropped on a special parachute reached a predetermined height - an explosion occurred. Here is how the participant of these tests, Lieutenant General G. G. Kudryavtsev, described his impressions:

"Almost unexpectedly for ourselves, we saw a bright light explosion flash. (250 And despite on long distance from kilometers), were literally blinded. Soon we felt the heat, as if someone nearby had opened the damper of a powerful fire-breathing furnace. The thermal impact was much higher on 23 October. which we had to experience He grew up stronger than that

The bubbling fireball quickly rose upwards. eyes. Flashes continued inside him for several on seconds. The slight mist that had enveloped Rogachevo immediately evaporated. The connection between the ships, zones, the mainland, the Il-14 carrier aircraft, Marshal Moshkin, Belusha also instantly interrupted. Disruption of communications was noted by other explosions of nuclear bombs, prolonged (more than an hour) earlier, the fireball "swelled", but rising up. from behind the mountains, in the area of And even the With Matochkina With sides of which the explosion was observed by Minister Slavsky And after But such a sudden And Not happened.

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He How would tried to reunite

With

hot ball, but the distance between those quickly increased the ball. assessed by experts, rose
With nuclear cloud, kilometers. Cloud By
up heights 70 to the north, which, respectively,
carried away, as predicted the dust column, And
by scientists. A few minutes before us
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a shock wave rolled in, they felt the earth A a little earlier — seismic. We
tremble under their feet, as if alive. Somewhat later, strong thunderous peals of an explosion, from the Novaya
Zemlya mountains, were heard. Reports soon
A then we heard the sounds reflected by the phone began to arrive as a result of from
By the explosion. Recovered after an hour
O And

damage "great WITH carrier aircraft reported that the task of radio communications. completed, 101
shook" Dont Have, but their .

The Il-14 experienced the impact of the air wave, although it was at a distance of 200 kilometers from the
explosion site. There were no casualties at the training ground and ships. However, in the northern zone, within
a radius of 100 kilometers, doors and window frames were knocked out in houses, and the air defense radar
reflector failed. The explosion of the "superbomb" was visible on the islands of Vaigach and Kolguev and on
the northern coast of the mainland. On Dixon (700 kilometers from the explosion site), a shock wave was
clearly felt, window panes were broken in some houses.

The tests of the Soviet "superbomb" had a wide resonance in the world, but did not stop the nuclear race.
At the same time, the United States and NATO understood that the Soviet Union, not following in the wake of
the United States, was going its own way, responding adequately, but not identically, but, so to speak,
asymmetrically to the challenges of the West. American strategists noted that the USSR was slightly ahead of
them in testing nuclear weapons and creating some powerful strategic
missiles, but only in tests! It was still far from mass production and deployment of missiles in positions.
And the rivalry pushed both superpowers to further confrontation.

The arms race was on the rise. It was carried out before, but the missile threat in the statement of the
Soviet government during the days of the Suez crisis, the R-7 tests and the "superbomb" gave a new impetus
to the build-up of missile arsenals by both sides. On October 4, 1957, a reception was held at the Soviet
embassy in Washington for Soviet and American 314

scientists participating in joint negotiations on holding the International Geophysical Year. In the midst of the
reception, Dr. Berkner, chairman of the US National Committee

for the International Geophysical Year, was urgently called to the telephone. A few minutes later, he
hurriedly ran into the hall and clapped his hands: "I beg your attention, gentlemen! Ladies and gentlemen! Now
a Soviet artificial Earth satellite is flying over us, at an altitude of 900 kilometers!"

It is difficult to imagine the impression made by his words. At first, everyone seemed to be numb. "Like a
shock after

bomb explosion!" exclaimed one of those present. When they came to their senses, the guests rushed to the Soviet scientists: everyone wanted to get information from representatives of the country in which the great miracle was born - the first satellite of the Earth. The entire press of Washington was excited. American newspapers in October 1957 were full of big headlines: "Amazing news", "The Triumph of Moscow".

The New York Times wrote: "It is already clear that October 4, 1957 will forever go down in the annals of history as the day of one of the greatest achievements of mankind ... This specific symbol of the future liberation of mankind from the power of the forces that chained it to the Earth, was created and launched by Soviet scientists and technical specialists. All mankind should be grateful to

them..."¹⁰² Less than a month later, the second Soviet satellite was launched into space. Its weight increased more than six times and exceeded 500 kilograms. On board the satellite was a living creature - the dog Laika. It has become clear to the whole world what gigantic strides the Soviet Union is making in the peaceful

exploration of outer space. "The launch by the Soviet Union of two artificial satellites of the Earth," wrote then the well-known American scientist R. Stebbins, "...was a major turning point in international relations ...", caused "serious doubts about the adequacy of the military, political and economic preparations for which behind

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the Western powers have hitherto relied on."¹⁰³ "Soviet satellites," wrote American military expert Professor B. Brody, "dealt a blow to American complacency by showing for the first time that the Russians are capable of surpassing us in technical achievements of great military significance."¹⁰⁴ The strategy of "massive retaliation", which was based on a sudden strike by strategic aviation and assumed the advantages of the United States over the USSR in

delivery vehicles (over 1,500 B-47 and B-52 strategic bombers), turned out to be untenable. , and strategic aviation as a means of delivering nuclear bombs to the target has lost its former paramount importance, since in the event of a surprise attack on the USSR by strategic aviation forces, the retaliatory nuclear missile strike overtook the aggressor before its bombers flew up to the target. artificial satellites of the Earth - everything indicated that powerful, fundamentally new means of armed struggle appeared in the Union. And this meant that the Pentagon's plan for an air nuclear war against the USSR could not be carried out with impunity: the aggressor would immediately receive a devastating retaliatory nuclear missile strike. It was adequate but asymmetrical,

tests

first

Soviet

purely its response to the challenge of Washington, which in the 50s based its entire strategy on air-nuclear power. By creating a huge costly strategic bomber, squeezing the ring of air bases around the USSR, the Pentagon believed that, developing response measures, the Soviet Union would follow the same path (the 1955 air show in Moscow seemed to confirm this). American strategists expected that in the costly competition in the field of strategic aviation, the Soviet Union would always be in the role of catching up, and the burden of spending on creating a huge

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fleet of strategic bombers will force the USSR to constantly increase the military budget and thereby reduce spending on the civilian sectors of the country's economy, reduce standard of living of the population of the

USSR. However, the Soviet Union then took a different, less expensive, but more effective path. Intercontinental ballistic missiles were more formidable, reliable and faster weapons than strategic bombers. Moreover, they did not require extremely expensive overseas bases, because they operated from the territory of the country itself. This is what made American strategic aviation a weapon of yesterday. Although the information available at the CIA and the Pentagon testified that the Soviet Union did not seek "superiority" over the United States in nuclear missile weapons, but only wanted to ensure the possibility of an adequate effective retaliatory strike in the context of the arms race unleashed by the NATO countries, and above all the United States, and protect yourself from air-nuclear aggression. In the United States, a propaganda campaign about America's "missile gap" was gaining momentum. Things went so far that an "investigation" of the reasons for the US missile lag behind the USSR was carried out in Congress. But the senators who began to deal with this issue in 1959 "remained in the dark" that the intelligence information that the president and the CIA leadership had did not give any reason to think that "the Russians had begun mass production and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles". Meanwhile, the CIA kept talking about the "missile danger", even claiming that the USSR was allegedly producing 15 missiles a month. The secret services, as if not knowing about the true state of affairs, made forecasts according to which the Soviet Union in 1960 could have up to 500 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The head of the CIA A. Dulles, speaking publicly in Congress, said that the USSR had achieved "nuclear superiority" in order to

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"Threatening the United States with its intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, calmly engage in consolidating their positions in a number of unstable regions of the non-communist world."

In an atmosphere of deliberately inflated anti-Soviet hysteria

the bosses of the military-industrial complex ardently advocated an all-out escalation of the arms race in order to "regain nuclear superiority", and clearly used the hype about the "missile gap" to their own selfish interests. They used the trick of the big deceit, which was formulated by one of the bosses of the largest military monopoly, General Dynamics: "People need to believe in the existence of a long-term danger." The myth of the "missile gap" was also used by John F. Kennedy, who fought for a seat in the White House. But, having come to power, his government discovered that the hyped "lagging behind" was a sham. R. McNamara, who became Minister of Defense in the 60s, spoke about this to journalists back in February 1961. And in the 80s, he frankly told the Los Angeles Times correspondent about the background of that big deception: "The 1960 missile lag was invented by those forces in the Department of Defense that ... tried to push through their own special program, in this case, the expansion of production missiles in the United States, exaggerating Soviet power"¹⁰⁵. Amid cries of "missile lag," a decision is made to deploy American medium-range ballistic missiles around the world. To maintain the myth of the "threat", the administration even went so far as to organize round-the-clock duty in the air of strategic bombers, which, as it turned out later, are really a threat! - had on board 4-5 hydrogen bombs with a capacity of 24 megatons each! "Many employees in the Air Force and the Pentagon were very proud of the faked missile gap. They said that there was no other way to get sufficient funds to create the weapons systems necessary for

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maintaining our superiority, which was a real problem," stated the well-known US public figure D. Ellsberg. However, it took a very long time to put them into service.

Suffice it to say that the Thor missile began to be developed in 1956, and on January 25, 1957, its first, moreover, unsuccessful test launch took place. Only the fifth tests in September 1957 brought a successful result. Nevertheless, at the end of the year, the rocket was put into mass production and put into service in 1958. This haste was caused by the Pentagon's desire to bring the Thor and Jupiter into service as soon as possible. combat readiness and put on combat duty in Western Europe.¹⁰⁷ True, Pentagon specialists were somewhat worried about the fact that when deploying medium-range missiles in countries

In Europe, part of the personnel of the missile bases, recruited from Europeans, will gain access to American nuclear missile secrets, but the militant desire to quickly surround the Soviet Union with missile sites overcame these fears. At the same time, it was decided to study the possibility of using a medium-range missile, in particular the Jupiter, from specially equipped ships of the Liberty type. To do this, it was necessary to constantly keep on board, or even produce directly on the ship, a large amount of liquid oxygen, which serves as an oxidizer in the rocket engine. In addition, in order not to be vulnerable to submarines, it was necessary to maintain freedom of maneuver, especially in preparation for a missile launch, which was very difficult. Both the missile guidance system and the ship's navigation system required improvement. In the end, work on Jupiter was abandoned, but the joint work of the army and navy on the missile guidance system led to 319

the creation of new guidance systems, which were subsequently used in "Polaris", "Poseidons" and "Tridents" launched from nuclear submarines.

By deploying Thor and Jupiter missiles (range 3,000 kilometers and 3,500 kilometers) on European bases, Washington pursued two goals: in the event of war, hit objects in the USSR in the shortest possible time and from shorter distances, and consequently, with greater accuracy; to disperse the means of a nuclear attack in order to divert more Soviet missiles to them in a retaliatory strike, substituting the European countries of NATO under it. The placement of medium-range missiles in the European countries of NATO was proposed

at a session of the NATO Council in December 1957 by US Secretary of State D. Dulles. He convinced his bloc partners that the missiles would be used only with the consent of the country in whose territory they were deployed. The session decided "to place at the disposal of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armed Forces in Europe medium-range ballistic projectiles" and to create "stockpiles of nuclear warheads" in Europe.

But only three NATO countries went for it: England, Turkey and later Italy. As a result, in 1959-1960, four squadrons (60 launchers) of missiles "Thor" were deployed in England, two squadrons (30 launchers) "Jupiter" in Italy and one squadron (15 launchers) "Jupiter" in Turkey. . Squadrons of missiles "Thor" became part of the British Royal Air Force, and squadrons of missiles "Jupiter" had a dual subordination: the Italian and Turkish commands and the NATO command in Europe. The nuclear warheads for all these missiles remained under the jurisdiction of the American command.

Describing the appointment of new missile bases in Europe, the American magazine Fortune wrote that "for the United States, this is a critically important item in the worldwide system of bases, which

allows our country to place all its nuclear strike power within the reach of the territory of the Soviet state .

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This is how medium-range missiles first appeared in Europe. However, if the Americans did not classify the Thor and Jupiter missiles as strategic weapons, referring to their shorter range compared to ICBMs, then for the Soviet Union, which they were aimed at, this type of weapon was a strategic threat. In fact, being launched from starting positions in England, Italy, Turkey, missiles could hit objects in the European part of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries in a matter of minutes (8-12 minutes). "Thor" and "Jupiter" could only be used as a surprise first strike weapon, for which they were intended. Otherwise, they become targets themselves. The missiles were located on unprotected launch sites and required lengthy preparations for launch. So, it took at least 20 minutes to prepare for the launch of the Thor rocket. The missile squadron (15 missiles) was dispersed over five launch sites, each with three launch pads. As the American military theorist R. Osgood noted, these missiles were "virtually useless for anything other than the first strike." And consequently, the territories where they were deployed became the primary target for a retaliatory strike by the side subjected to a nuclear attack. Awareness of the danger in 1957 stopped the governments of other NATO countries from following the example of England, Italy and Turkey. What was a strategically "important arc" for the Americans had very dangerous consequences for the peoples of Western Europe. "Washington controlled the defense, and consequently the politics and even the territory of its allies," wrote Charles de Gaulle afterwards. And he wrote not without reason. Back in 1955, officers and generals of the West German Bundeswehr, who first participated in the NATO military-staff exercise "Carte Blanche", were horrified by the ease with which their American colleagues plan atomic explosions on German soil. Considering the possible human losses, some of them shed tears. 321

Nevertheless, at the December session of the NATO Council in 1957, succeeded in getting approval for the US representatives American plan to deploy stockpiles of American nuclear bombs and warheads for strategic and tactical missiles in a number of European NATO countries. These stocks were under the control of the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe - an American general.

Thus, Western Europe was increasingly turning into a nuclear arsenal. Along with American missiles and aircraft, the nuclear "club" included two more European capitalist powers - England, which had nuclear, and then, since 1957, thermonuclear weapons, and France,

who created this weapon in 1960. Germany did not stand aside either. At the December session of the NATO Council, Directive MS-70 was adopted, which provided for the training by 1964 of 30 combat-ready divisions of NATO countries equipped with nuclear weapons. After the approval of this directive in May 1958, the West German military department began to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons carriers. Since the NATO plan provided for the transfer of nuclear weapons to the allies immediately with the outbreak of war, the leadership of the Bundeswehr announced that it was necessary already in peacetime to have the appropriate combat means and teams trained to use them. 150 West German military specialists were sent for training in the United States, and in November 1958, the American tactical missile "Honest John" entered service with the Bundeswehr. A division equipped with these missiles was available in each corps. A squadron of Matador cruise missiles (with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers) was formed in the German Air Force, as well as 6 battalions of Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missiles. The most important goal of the American ruling class was to prepare for a nuclear war against the countries of the socialist community in the new, changed conditions, when the strategic invulnerability of the United States was irretrievably a thing of the past. American poly

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tics and strategists sought to prevent, or at least postpone, the very possibility of the Soviet Union achieving parity in nuclear weapons. For the same purpose, the military-political leadership systematically rejected or thwarted Soviet proposals for control over

weapons. The Pentagon was looking for ways to "reliably" contain the Soviet state. However, the fear of the increased offensive capabilities of the USSR forced the US military leadership to abandon the already obsolete strategy of "massive retaliation." Moreover, this was not a voluntary departure from the total method of achieving the goal inherent in the American state, but a forced maneuver, a new attempt to find a way out of an unusual situation for it, when it could no longer use unlimited military force to solve the tasks facing it, without risking being destroyed. In this regard, instead of the strategy of "massive retaliation", with its stake on an unpunished nuclear attack, the strategy of "flexible response" was adopted. "The strategic doctrine," wrote one of its creators, the chief

of staff of the US Army in the second half of the 50s, General M. Taylor, "which I could offer instead of a massive retaliatory strike, is called the "flexible response" strategy. This name indicates that we must be able to respond to any possible challenge and act successfully in any situation"¹¹⁰. By "any situation" was meant that the United States, along with

preparations for a global nuclear missile war should take advantage of all other types of armed conflicts - from local wars with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons to all sorts of small incidents carried out by sabotage groups. In the early 1960s, the new American administration of President John F. Kennedy completed the development of a "flexible response" military strategy. Explaining it

military

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essence in a message to the US Congress dated March 28, 1961, Kennedy said that "US strategy must be both flexible and resolute, provide for the preparation and conduct of any wars - world or local, nuclear or conventional ..."111 Developing the idea of the President, the Secretary of Defense USA R. McNamara, in his speech on June 16, 1962, admitted that the strategic invulnerability of the United States had disappeared and their territory had become within the reach of Soviet nuclear missile weapons. The meaning of the strategic concept of "flexible response" was to use

the armed forces and means of the US and NATO, depending on the circumstances. To do this, the Pentagon had to have such a military machine that would provide the United States with a choice of military means of struggle in any circumstances of all kinds of confrontation with the Soviet Union. US military theorists have also changed their views on the role of the armed forces of the NATO bloc. The old NATO concept of "shield and sword" was formulated in a new way. Speaking at a session of the NATO Council in Paris in December 1962, US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara said that now the "sword" of NATO should be the armies of Western European NATO members and US troops stationed in Europe, and American strategic forces (strategic bombers and ICBMs) become NATO's nuclear "shield"112. Thus, if in the 1950s the "shield" was conventional weapons, and the "sword" was strategic aviation carrying atomic bombs, in the 1960s they reversed their roles. It was an attempt to show the allies that their role in the plans for a future war was growing. In fact, American nuclear missiles and strategic bombers are offensive weapons in the Pentagon's arsenal. With the strategy of "flexible response" and in the conditions of the increased capabilities of the USSR to deliver an inevitable crushing retaliatory strike, as well as with a decrease in the ability of strategic bombers to break through air defense war against the USSR and other countries Var

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The Swedish Treaty was planned to be fought first with conventional weapons of the NATO countries, then with the use of tactical, and in a critical situation, strategic nuclear weapons. However, already in 1962, President John F. Kennedy on the possible decision of the leaders of the United States not to inflict the first

a blow if their vital interests are in jeopardy". At the same time, he understood by "threat to national interests" any opposition to US foreign policy¹¹³.

The "flexible response" strategy did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons up to a general nuclear war. This strategy concealed the danger of turning every military conflict into a nuclear war and stimulated preparations for a nuclear war against the socialist countries. "The concept of flexible response does not mean," noted Western researchers, "the abolition of massive retaliation, which is its complement"¹¹⁴. "Massive retaliation" as a military-strategic concept and an instrument of diplomacy was not canceled, but only faded into the background, because the "flexible response" strategy proceeded from the fact that in determining the forms of using armed force to implement a global strategy, taking into account the existing balance of forces, it is necessary a certain restraint. In this regard, the role of "limited", "local" wars has increased as a means of achieving some particular goals in the struggle against the forces of socialism, the international workers' and national liberation movements in various regions of the globe. The containment of communism also determined this time the content of the military strategy of "flexible response". It was clearly outlined in its basic principles. Thus, one of them - the principle of "assured destruction" - provided for the achievement of quantitative and qualitative superiority of the United States over the USSR in strategic nuclear missile and conventional weapons. This was supposed to expand the sphere of foreign policy and military-political influence of the United States and further change the

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the attitude of military forces in their favor. Another principle - 2.5 wars - was supposed to ensure such a development of the US armed forces that would enable the American ruling circles, in order to achieve the foreign policy goals of their global strategy, to wage two major wars in Europe and Asia, including with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and to carry out "small interventions" in Africa, the Middle East or Latin America. The principle of "forward basing" of the armed forces provided for the expansion of the global system of American strongholds. At military bases and in operational groupings of naval forces in certain areas of maritime space, it was planned

to have strategic and tactical bomber aviation, as well as nuclear submarines with missiles and interventionist troops. These forces were to take an active part in delivering a surprise nuclear strike against the Soviet Union or in a limited war on the periphery of the world socialist system. A special place was given to Europe as a possible theater of military operations. It was envisaged to prepare 30 combat-ready

divisions equipped with nuclear weapons as part of the bloc by 1964.

weapons. The armed forces of European NATO countries and US troops located in Europe were saturated with missiles tactical And operational-tactical tactical aviation destination, aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, atomic artillery. Already by the middle of 1963, NATO missile units in Europe included 2 divisions of Redstone missiles, 2 divisions of Sergeant, 8 divisions of Corporal, 3 divisions of tactical cruise missiles Lacrosse, 25 divisions of unguided missiles "Honest John". The US Air Force in Germany had 6 squadrons of Mace cruise missiles. Atomic artillery of caliber 280 and 203.2 consisted of 26 divisions. The introduction of rocket weapons into the troops of the West German Bundeswehr was especially rapid. In 1963-1964, 3 divisions of Sergeant missiles were formed in it. Subsequently, their number doubled. Was formed

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14 divisions of Honest John missiles, which in 1966-1967 were replaced by American Lance guided missiles with a range of up to 75 kilometers. All of these types of missiles could carry nuclear weapons. Yes, this was provided for by the "strategic principle" of the Bundeswehr. The then Minister of War of Germany, von Hassel, said that the leadership of the Bundeswehr provides for the use of "atomic weapons both on the battlefield and in the operational and strategic areas."

Tactical aircraft of the FRG could also be used as carriers of nuclear weapons. The main emphasis was placed on equipping the majority of fighters with F-104C bombers. As early as 1964, 60 per cent of all Bundeswehr nuclear delivery vehicles were in the West German squadron. In 1964-1965, the Matador cruise missiles in the Bundeswehr Air Force were replaced by Meis cruise missiles, which entered service with two squadrons. Naval aviation was also armed with 104C aircraft 115 .

The US and NATO military leadership also took steps to transfer a significant part of the nuclear attack weapons directly to the command of the bloc's armed forces. In 1963, 3 American submarines with Polaris missiles, part of the British strategic bombers Vulkan and Viktor, armed with Bluestil air-to-ground cruise missiles, were placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander of NATO Armed Forces in Europe. Canada, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy transferred to NATO several squadrons of tactical fighters capable of carrying nuclear bombs. NATO was also assigned aircraft - carriers of nuclear bombs from the French tactical aviation stationed in West Germany. Most of these air attack weapons later formed the backbone of the so-called "NATO Mobile Forces". These forces, according to the NATO military command, were supposed to have a high combat

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ability and to be in constant readiness for transfer to the area where hostilities could begin. They were supposed to be an "Integrated force equipped with nuclear weapons" for NATO. In 1965, the mobile forces included detached contingents of the ground forces of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, England, the USA, as well as parts of the air forces of these countries (excluding Canada) and the Dutch air force. In the mid-1960s, mobile forces took part in major NATO exercises, especially those held near the borders of the countries of the socialist community¹¹⁶. Thus, the tactical and operational-tactical forces of NATO were assigned a significant role in the war on the

European continent. However, the main place in the new strategy was given to strategic means of attack. In the new conditions, when the expectation of impunity for a surprise nuclear strike on the USSR is a thing of the past, specialists from the Pentagon made

adjustments to their plans. If earlier, confident in its impunity, the American command counted on destroying large Soviet cities, military-industrial and administrative-political centers with nuclear bombs and missiles in the first strike, now the emphasis was on destroying the Soviet military potential. It was supposed to destroy the main part of the Soviet means of delivering nuclear weapons and deprive the USSR of the possibility of a retaliatory strike by a sudden strike, and then by the threat of nuclear missile bombardment of Soviet cities and the destruction of the population "to try to end the war

on favorable terms for themselves." This concept called "counterforce" was put forward by R. McNamara in the first half of the 60s. So, in February 1962, speaking in Chicago, he stated that the United States could use its strategic forces to destroy "enemy bases before he had time to make the second volleys." In January 1963, he proposed "strike first on Soviet bomber bases, missile launch sites, and other military installations associated with their long-range nuclear forces. "

range, in order to reduce the force of any subsequent attack on their part, and then, if necessary, strike back at the Soviet urban and industrial complex"¹¹⁷.

Here it is worth dwelling on the characterization of the personality of Robert McNamara, undoubtedly an outstanding US Secretary of Defense in a series of colorless persons who held this post before him (except for J. Forrestal). To begin with, McNamara, when newly elected President John F. Kennedy invited him to the post, demanded written guarantees from him that he would personally select assistants of his own choice. And he received such guarantees. Further, upon assuming his post at the Pentagon, he immediately stated that "the management of the Department of Defense requires not only a strong, responsible civilian

control, but such activity of the Minister, which would include active, meaningful and decisive leadership of the Pentagon, and not just a passive practice of simply considering differences between traditional and interested factions. "Finally, he introduced into the practice of the Department of Defense system analysis, which was conducted civilian specialists to work in the ministry. It was they who began to dominate the Pentagon to the detriment of the professional military, whose proposals for the first time (!) became the object of technical expertise. McNamara put the principle of "cost-effectiveness" at the forefront. Such a line, in essence, knocked out the initiative in formulation of military policy from the hands of the military, and primarily the commanders of the branches of the armed forces. In his practical work, the Minister of Defense relied mainly on the analytical apparatus he created, staffed by civilian specialists. The center of the Pentagon was not the operational bodies, as it always was, but research and engineering bureau. Based on their findings, decisions were made on new types of weapons and the need to adopt them into service was justified.

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Moreover, McNamara sometimes had a decisive influence on the development of the country's strategy. In fact, he played the role of President Kennedy's chief foreign policy adviser. All these features of the line of the new Secretary of Defense gave rise to his contradictions with the OKNSh and Congress. He developed the theory of "counterforce strike", which envisages drawing the USSR into a quantitative arms race (with the United States always superior in quality). And, unfortunately, in the 60s, the USSR accepted this challenge and responded this time in an identical way, although it had the opportunity to develop its original advanced technologies and achievements in space exploration, advanced rockets, etc. But by 1967, McNamara himself was disappointed in his opposition theories. He realized (and later spoke about it) that the "counterforce" theory destabilized the strategic balance. And then he (one of the first) proposed a containment strategy based on fear. But all this was later, and then the strategy of "counterforce" became an important component of the military-political "doctrine of containing communism." This strategy provided three options for dealing with a period when anything in the world goes against American foreign policy:

use of force, including strategic means
aerospace attack, to remove obstacles to US policy in the outside world, that is, the right to be the first to strike at the strategic forces of the opposing side (counterforce strike);

infliction of "unacceptable damage" to the enemy's economic potential in the course of a retaliatory or retaliatory strike against US territory (countervalue strike);

demonstrative military pressure on the opposing

side in a period of aggravation of the international situation. All these provisions were developed in the military policy of the Kennedy administration and were continued after his death by Secretary of Defense McNamara and his successors. Since the territory of the USA is

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Within the reach of Soviet missiles, which could destroy many American cities in a matter of minutes, part of the strategic means of aerospace attack had to be redirected from the cities of the USSR to missile and air bases in order to minimize the force of the Soviet missile strike. "To make the nuclear power of retaliation invulnerable, not inferior to anyone" - this is how J. Kennedy formulated the tasks of military development in the field of strategic weapons. But now there were already two tasks: the first was to disable the USSR's strategic air defense systems before they struck US cities (counterforce strike); the second is to deal a crushing blow to the cultural and political centers

and the national economic potential of the USSR. Such a formulation required the issue of building up strategic missiles; placing part of them (medium-range missiles) at forward bases in order to reduce the flight time compared to the USSR MKRs located on Soviet territory; increasing the survivability of first-strike missiles. All these tasks were solved by the program for the deployment of strategic weapons the Kennedy government, which was based on the following provisions:

accelerated commissioning of intercontinental missiles and missiles on submarines, as well as strategic bombers (strategic triad);

qualitative improvement of missile weapons (improving the accuracy of hitting targets and technical reliability); increasing combat effectiveness at relatively low cost by equipping

missiles with individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which made it possible to increase the number of warheads that could hit targets; an additional strategic threat is created by the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe (Thor, Jupiter) and submarines with Polaris missiles, which makes it possible to reduce

flight time. 331

According to McNamara's scenarios, US strategic missiles could deliver a powerful counterforce strike, and then, after a weakened Soviet retaliatory strike on American cities, launch a second strike on the cities and military industrial centers of the USSR. If the Soviet Union delivered the first strike against US strategic forces, then the United States should be prepared to retain such a number of strategic offensive weapons that in

counter-value strike against the USSR to inflict "unacceptable damage" on it (that is, destroy 25 percent of the population, 50-70 percent of the economic potential). Calculations by the McNamara department showed that when Soviet missiles hit US cities, they lose about 100 million people, but they either win the war or incline the enemy to negotiate and conclude peace on American terms¹¹⁸. The option of a first strike against the USSR was apparently the most preferable. In any case, in 1962, Kennedy said that the Soviet Union "should not be sure that the United States would not strike the first blow if their vital interests were threatened." Later he went even further, saying that "under certain conditions we must be ready to use nuclear weapons first. " nuclear war if they deem it necessary. "We give our potential adversary the strongest incentive ... to refrain from striking our cities," McNamara emphasized in a speech delivered at the University of Michigan on June 16, 1962.¹²⁰ By the end of the 50s Europe already had over 130 large American air, naval and missile bases, as well as several hundred other military installations. The network of these bases covered the Federal Republic of Germany, England, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Ni

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Netherlands, Luxembourg and other countries. The US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean also adjoined the system of bases. Its aircraft carriers continuously patrolled off the southern coast of Europe in order "to be able," as the American press wrote, "in the event of a war, to send their planes with atomic bombs into the heart of Russia"¹²¹ .

The growing involvement of the countries of Western Europe in the process of nuclear missile armament caused growing concern in the world community, and above all the peoples of Europe. The struggle against the threat of nuclear war, which unfolded in European countries, embraced tens of millions of people of various nationalities who realized the mortal danger threatening humanity in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. The competition in the arms race, in which both superpowers were increasingly involved, and after them the countries that supported them, affected the vital interests not only of the opposing sides, but of all peoples.

planets. The paths to collective security outlined by the UN (for which it was created) were blocked by the mutual distrust of the military-political blocs. The growth of the defense might of the Soviet Union, the growth of its ability to thwart an air-nuclear attack by the United States and NATO, to deliver a crushing retaliatory nuclear missile strike -

that's what worried Washington, and worried for a long time. The desire to look behind the "Iron Curtain" dominated US intelligence organizations from the first post-war years. Strictly reliable, documentary data were required. The experience of World War II, as well as of the pre-war years, showed that undercover intelligence did not always provide the government and military command with accurate information. There were many doppelgänger agents who supplied their masters with disinformation, sometimes leading to very sad consequences. Yes, and "reliable sources" often created an unreliable picture of events. But aerial photography, which has received significant development, and in the last years of the war, and electronic intelligence, which was conducted by Avia 333

tion, made it possible to obtain reliable, without a doubt, information. Therefore, the CIA and the Pentagon had high hopes for aerial reconnaissance of objects in the USSR.

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CHAPTER V USA: PENETRATING THE IRON CURT

On June 24, 1956, another air parade took place in Moscow in honor of the Day of the USSR Air Fleet. On him were

28 foreign military aviation delegations were invited, including the American one, headed by the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General N. Twining. Foreign delegations, who were on the government platform together with members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and numerous spectators were shown the latest jet fighters created in the design bureau of famous Soviet designers: A. S. Yakovlev, A. I. Mikoyan, P. O. Sukhoi. 7 new samples were shown, which were available at that time in the amount of only a few copies. The display of the new fighters caused a lively response among the guests. The piloting skills of our pilots were noted, clarity 339

organization of the parade, the characteristics were highly appreciated aircraft shown.

In the afternoon of the same day, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, gave a big reception at the Central House of the Soviet Army. After the reception, all the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, the heads of the American, British and French delegations and the ambassadors of these countries, as well as leading aircraft designers, went to the park, where a festive table was laid under the trees. Khrushchev delivers one of his long toasts "in defense of peace" and addresses General Twining. "Today we showed you our aircraft. Do you want to see our missiles?" "Yes," is the quick answer. "So we won't show them to you," Khrushchev continued to the laughter of those present. "First, show your planes and stop sending violators into our airspace. We will shoot down uninvited guests." US Ambassador Ch. Bohlen was excited. They tried to make amends for the incident in the following days with Russian hospitality when traveling around the country. On July 1, the day of the departure of the delegations, N. Twining was solemnly seen off by the highest military leaders of the Soviet Union¹. But what caused Khrushchev's irritation? What offenders was he talking about? Why did an unprecedented number of foreign military delegations come to the 1956 air parade? We find answers to these questions in

what happened in the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s. As already mentioned, in those years, intensive work was carried out in the Soviet Union to create an effective air defense system and test nuclear and missile weapons.

1. Pentagon: secrets of electronic warfare 2.

Since the end of the 40s, when plans were hatched in the United States for an air-atomic attack on the USSR, the question arose before American intelligence, what was the effectiveness of

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Soviet air defense, and in the mid-50s, the CIA and the Pentagon began to receive information that work was being launched in the USSR on

creation of rocket weapons of various classes and purposes. Questions arose: what is the state of and prospects for the development in the Soviet Union of various types of the latest weapons; what is priority: missiles or bombers; how developed and reliable the Soviet air defense system is. At first, knowledge of the capabilities of the USSR's air defense was extremely necessary for the successful operations of American strategic aviation in the event of a global nuclear war.

But even before that, immediately after the end of World War II, violations of Soviet borders by American reconnaissance aircraft began. So, in April 1946, when the Soviet Union was withdrawing its troops from Iranian Azerbaijan, the Americans sought to keep the course of the withdrawal under "their control." On April 5 of this year, two American aircraft violated the Soviet-Iranian border in the Astara region and invaded the airspace of the USSR for 6 kilometers. The Soviet government sent a note of protest through diplomatic channels to the US embassy in Moscow. Ambassador Bedell Smith promised to look into the incident and prevent it from happening again. The incident was not reported in the press of both countries, so as not to arouse public opinion about the unfriendly act at a time when allied relations had not yet been interrupted. But violations of Soviet borders continued in subsequent years. On February 25, 1947, a violation of the Soviet border was noted near Ratmanov Island (Bering Strait), and on December 23 of the same year, in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula. Soviet protests over these cases had an effect. American reconnaissance aircraft were advised, depending on the outline of the borders of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, not to approach them, respectively, at 3,12,20 and even 50 miles from the coast or the borders of the socialist camp².

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This continued until, in 1949, the Soviet Union became the owner of the atomic bomb. In the same year, studies of the upper layers of the atmosphere with the help of rockets began in the USSR. Since 1953, anti-aircraft missiles have been successfully tested against aircraft flying at an altitude of 7 kilometers. In 1955, the S-25 anti-aircraft complex, capable of hitting targets at an altitude of 18 kilometers, entered service with the air defense of the Soviet Army. In 1954, the M-4 intercontinental bomber was demonstrated at the air parade in Moscow. In July 1955, the new intercontinental TU-95 was demonstrated for the first time at a parade in Tushino. This turboprop aircraft was far superior in range to the M-4. NATO countries believed that mass production of two strategic bombers TU-16 ("Badger") and TU-95 ("Biar"), analogues of the B-47 and B-52, was launched in the USSR. New Soviet fighter interceptors appeared, radar stations for detecting air targets and guiding fighters to the target, information about the intensive work of the USSR on

strategic missile programs. The growth of the defensive might of the Soviet Union, the growth of its ability to thwart an air-atomic attack by the US and NATO, to deliver a crushing retaliatory strike - that is what worried the American ruling circles. Therefore, reconnaissance of Soviet air defense and air force, navy, as well as nuclear plants and missile ranges, became a priority for the relevant bodies of the air force, the CIA and other interested organizations of the United States and a number of other NATO countries. In addition to traditional means (agents, aerial photographic reconnaissance, industrial espionage, etc.), the new conditions for the high saturation of the fleets and armies with electronic equipment required the organization and systematic conduct of electronic intelligence to monitor the operation of the radar network for detecting air targets, test sites for various purposes (nuclear, missile, maritime, aviation

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onnyh) and other important objects. It was then that intensive reconnaissance flights began near the borders of the USSR in order to collect the necessary data.

Accordingly, the Soviet reaction became tougher. Already during 1949 and early 1950, US reconnaissance aircraft were accompanied by Soviet interceptor fighters. They did not shoot down American intelligence officers, but they showed their readiness for this. So, on October 22, 1949, two La-7 fighters made four runs on the RB-29 over the territorial waters of the USSR and fired warning machine-gun bursts, showing the intruder the need to leave the area that was dangerous for him³. The American press was indignant at the hostile actions of Soviet fighters against "unarmed aircraft." However, the most objective journalists - for example, Walter Lippman - noted that the Soviets were simply demonstrating their determination and ability to "oppose American strategic air power" ⁴. I must say that the intelligence organizations of the Soviet Union were also engaged in similar activities, but with less aggressiveness. Warships and fishing trawlers, aircraft and ocean liners equipped with special equipment conducted electronic reconnaissance of the air defense system of the American continent, research centers and ranges where aviation and missile technology was tested,

detection and reconnaissance stations. For

American intelligence, the Soviet air defense and border airfields of the Air Force became a priority in the late 40s.

"We are conducting reconnaissance of Russian radar stations, signals. Thus we listen, analyze and we learn write them down

at the same O Russian achievements V radar area

And

time we study the means of conducting a radar war by Russia. must provide our bombers with shells the ability to fly outside the visibility of air defense radar systems

And

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tivnik And V That oke time be the help of V able to detain the Russians
bombers are a matter of life With our air defense systems. For us it
and death."

This is how the American magazine "Popular Science" defined in January 1961 in an article entitled
"Our secret radar war with Russia" what was happening in the airspace near the borders of the USSR in
the 50s. Later, this phenomenon was called "secret electronic warfare", which continued with varying
degrees of intensity until recent years.

"In In this contest of intellects, the main weapons are, at first glance, black containers with the
harmless on strictest equipment, only sometimes newspaper full houses report downed
And sharpness of mind. Radar warfare, holding on V reconnaissance
secret, — aircraft. Soldiers fall silent when asked about O

their this. It is forbidden to name the numbers of units of units conducting And
radar reconnaissance " 5.

The soldiers didn't stop talking in vain. They knew that reconnaissance aircraft often deliberately
violated the airspace of the USSR in order to force as many Soviet radar stations as possible to work and
to reveal the capabilities of the radar network of the border regions of the USSR.

For this, a special tactic of action was developed.
air reconnaissance reconnaissance aircraft. depending from type
The authors of the mentioned article also explained this:

"From the RB-47 aircraft, which goes 850-900 12,300 With cruising speed
kilometers at an altitude of meters, the horizon is more than 320
kilometers away. Thus, the aircraft can fly with impunity along the borders of the Soviet
Union to study the operation of radars located by Russia on

And
on territory

kilometers away.³²⁰

"Many times," recalls avionics operator Bruce Bailey, who flew more than 400 reconnaissance flights,
"during the course of the mission, we

made false maneuvers towards the Soviet
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borders to force the Soviets to turn on additional radars . Usually, reconnaissance aircraft flew below the
radar visibility horizon, then they sharply gained altitude near the borders of the USSR. For what purpose?
The answer to this was given by the already cited magazine "Popular Science":

"There is no doubt that the Russian locators Not work all the time. Why show your
cards? Therefore, electronic intelligence aircraft deceive radar operators in the hope that other radars are
connected. this deception, as the Radars have done before. An experienced airborne reconnaissance
operator studies only radar — flying on purpose close range V
signals. It can intercept secret data

Not come across on

Not

radio communications. However, the main purpose of the radar reconnaissance aircraft is the study of data, with the help of which methods of suppressing enemy radars are determined.

With

7.

Intensive reconnaissance activities of American aviation in the border airspace of the USSR began in 1949, simultaneously with the adoption of the Dropshot plan and was determined by a special directive of the OKNSh. Here is the text of the transmittal to this directive, sent to the headquarters of the US Air Force Strategic Air Command signed by the head of intelligence of the Air Force:

"Top Secret Air Intelligence Directorate to

Lieutenant Colonel Tauler USAF Electronic Intelligence Program

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the implementation of "aggressive armed forces to launch information about ". electronic weapons of foreign To intelligence programs in order to obtain maximum countries Experience shows that the most effective method of collecting 2.

intelligence is aerial reconnaissance.
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3. As a result of two conferences held one between representatives of the strategic aviation command and the US Air Force Headquarters, the other between the heads of the interested units of the Air Force Headquarters, a program was developed to concentrate the efforts of electronic intelligence. The By attached directive informs the Means Commander,

4. strategic air command O forces And which must be withdrawn to implement this requirement, necessary for programs, And contains instructions and the most successful completion of the task. Recommendation: 5. To the Deputy Chief of Staff

— send to the boss
operational management to study, sign the attached directive to the relevant And authorities.

C. P. Cabell, Major General, USAF Chief of Intelligence June 3, 1949."

1.

The implementation of this directive led in subsequent years to intensive flights of reconnaissance aircraft along the borders. the Soviet Union, often with an invasion of its airspace. U.S. News and World Report writes:

"As the documents show And interviews of participants in the events, 1950 at the With end of the 60s, the United States produced up to 10, maybe up to more than 20 and, flights along the borders of the Soviet Union of air defense thousand spyware systems ... to establish the location of the location of the radar stations of And China's goals/Their task identify forces And the Soviet border areas. Due to the was regime of secrecy still enforced by the Air Force, Navy, CIA, to the National Security Agency - organizations that played a key role

And

V aerial espionage, — exact

the number of reconnaissance flights may never be known."

Not

Naturally, in the Soviet Union, organizations and people associated with the defense of the country, from the first days of the appearance of air reconnaissance at the borders of the country, reacted sharply

whether on American aircraft flights. Notes of protest were repeatedly announced, which, as a rule, did not have a positive

result. Since 1950, the interception of reconnaissance aircraft began with the aim of forcing them to land on Soviet territory or destroy them. Between 1950 and 1970, according to US News and World Report, "at least 252 American airmen

were shot down in the course of spy air operations, of which 24 were killed, 90 survived, and the fate of 138 aviators has not yet been elucidated." The first victim of this secret air war was an RB-29 aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters over the Baltic Sea near the city of Liepaja. Here is how this episode is described in Soviet documents:

"From the journal of violations of the state border. April 1950. "8.04

From 8

17.30 violation of the border south of Liepaja. The American B-29 aircraft deepened the territory of the USSR for 21 kilometers. The demand of our fighters to follow opened fire. After return on fire, the leader fled.

Not obeyed

And

fighter plane turned

side of the sea and

eleven

And here is the report of the leader of the interceptor fighter group (two pairs of La-11 fighters were raised), the flight commander, senior lieutenant B. Dokin, to the unit commander:

"Being on duty in first readiness 17.22, took off. After takeoff, I received the a command at 4000 command to climb 17.30 met

meters to take the course of a four-engine aircraft 360 degrees... IN

with signs south of Liepaja 8 kilometers O.), With American identification A. pair

which was heading 135 degrees. Seeing the plane, he handed (on the coastline. -

over to the second pair of senior lieutenant Gerasimov - to force the intruder, Gerasimov stepped I approached him on the right behind and forward, making a deep sway, turned to the left. The

intruder took a course of 270 degrees - a pair of senior lieutenant Gerasimov sea Then To landing.

And

And V

And behind

Not went.

I gave a warning

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a direct turn to me. The led lieutenant 12 shells. The intruder started

By Tezyaev, seeing this, gave fire

by

which went H 500 meters. Presumably a shore plane"

With a large decrease in the intruder turn, And

came in on clouds

fell into 5-10 kilometers from 12.

A lot of attention was paid to this incident both in the Soviet Union and in the USA. In mid-April, the Minister of the Navy of the USSR I. S. Yumashev reported to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. A. Bulganin on the measures taken by the command of the Navy to search for the downed aircraft, as follows:

"To Comrade Bulganin N.A.

Reporting: After death April American aircraft B-29 B-29, not (By
According to foreign press reports, it was the US Naval and the plane is military
Intelligence "Priviter". — took active measures the Baltic Sea between A. O.) The Americans searched
the islands of Gotland By for him by examining Bornholm. A search
And for a large number of aircraft
was of particular value to the V for several days gives grounds to believe that the lost aircraft
Americans. the possibility of finding important secret aircraft
Not excluded
pa
documents and valuable secret equipment. the circumstances indicated
Considering I suppose
expedient to search for the sunken American
aircraft and raising it in order to seize documents and secret
equipment, if any. Approximate coordinates of the crash site of the B-29 aircraft
were established by a fighter aircraft of the 4th Fighter Aviation Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Filanovich,
two hours after the plane crash, observed a large oil slick at W-56°30'0, D at 20°28'0 and an unidentified
floating object three miles north of it. It can be assumed that the discovered oil spot showed the location of
the sunken American aircraft. search for the sunken aircraft will be carried out for inspection by divers at the
same time

from two diving
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stations of the alleged crash site of the detected oil slick depths of the sea meters. At V area 50 65
on And
unsatisfactory result of diving
survey will be carried out by trawling with a bottom trawl And
metal detector search V the area of the alleged impact of the aircraft, with a total
area of 130 square miles, as indicated V
scheme.
For the production of trawling, 4 minesweepers of the 4th Navy will be allocated. in the event of a from
sunken aircraft being discovered, its soil will be surveyed in
IN order to remove the rise to the surface in
on With And
first of all documents and valuable
equipment, Estimated and then the plane itself.
time for trawling the area April 20, 1950. Yumashev" — one month.

13.

It remains to add that the search for positive results did not bring either in 1950 or in later periods,
including the end of the 90s. However, then, in the 50th, the Americans realized that it was dangerous to joke
with the USSR air defense,

they had to be more careful. On May 5, 1950, the OKNSh formulated the goals and procedures for
conducting air reconnaissance operations. The main emphasis was placed on electronic intelligence, which
was supposed to reveal the number and ability to detect air targets.

Soviet radar. General O. Bradley, then chairman of the JCS, suggested that these operations be called the "airborne electronic intelligence project" (AER) and assigned the Air Force intelligence the task of "obtaining as much information as possible about the enemy's electronic means." The procedure for carrying out these operations was also determined: not to approach closer than 20 miles to the territory of the USSR or countries controlled by it; reconnaissance aircraft, as a rule, should not have any weapons¹⁴. Thus began the flights of

electronic reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, which lasted for many years.

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In the course of reconnaissance air operations, there were many dramatic incidents, skirmishes in the air, downed reconnaissance aircraft. However, air battles did not always end with the victory of the Soviet side. On September 4, 1950, in the neutral waters of the Sea of Japan, off the coast of North Korea, a Soviet bomber was shot down by US Navy fighters. 2 crew members died immediately, the third, Lieutenant Gennady Mishin, was picked up by the Americans, but died of his wounds. His remains were transferred to the USSR in 1956. On November 18, 1952, near Cape Gamow in the Far East, a real battle took place between American carrier-based fighters from a US Navy aircraft carrier, located 100 kilometers from the Soviet coast, and Soviet MIG-15 fighters of the 5th Navy of the USSR Navy. The report said:

"At 14:17, a group of unknown aircraft was discovered south of Cape Gamow. 38 minutes this group side of our At 14 o'clock aircraft began to move on the course of the territory. At 14 on north, V

hours 48 minutes the commander of the air link captain Belyakov of the air, that two reported we With aircraft come into battle. After that the connection V tail And What are entering With them V With fighters

stopped. As installed, air the battle took place 30-35 on height 8 thousand meters above the sea in Gamow kilometers from cape coast and in which, due 10-15 kilometers of four from our maritime border. to fighters time on the airfield returned alone, engine failure, in combat came off from their aircraft. Another area of Cape Lion the aircraft fell into the sea in an air battle, presumably shot down by participated. The pilot died. and in the Americans. Not The other two

This was later confirmed by the Americans. True, the American aircraft, presumably R-2 ("Neptune"), according to American data, did not return to its base. In 1952, the Americans lost 2 RB-29s along with

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crews 16. The most famous case in 1952 was the crash (or destruction?) of an RB-29 aircraft that took off from

Yokota Air Base in Japan on June 13 at 10:07 a.m. JST; communication with it was lost when, according to the report of the crew, the aircraft was over the Sea of Japan near the Soviet coast. After that, the RB-29 disappeared. The US Embassy in Moscow sent an inquiry to the Soviet government about the possibility of having any information about the missing plane in the USSR, but received no answer. The US government did not develop this sensitive topic. In Tokyo, it was reported that the State Department did not conduct a special investigation, and relatives were told that the plane was missing. Later it became known that on June 25, a report from the Far East to Moscow indicated that on June 13, an American RB-29 aircraft was discovered 180 kilometers from Vladivostok, which was shot down by a Soviet MiG-15 fighter over Soviet territorial waters of the Sea of Japan south of Vladivostok¹⁷. The main task of the Americans, as already mentioned, was reconnaissance of the radar network of the Soviet air defense forces. Performing reconnaissance missions, reconnaissance aircraft in the Far East operated from airfields in Alaska (Aielson, Elmendorf) and from Japan. They were interested in the areas of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Sakhalin, Sovetskaya Gavan. The Far Eastern regions of the USSR were of interest to the Americans primarily because here the borders of the USSR and the USA (Alaska) came close to each other. In this regard, the Pentagon was interested not only in the radar, but also in Soviet airfields in Chukotka and Kamchatka, from where Soviet bombers, both piston TU-4 and jet IL-28, could take off. Since July 1953, reconnaissance flights over Siberia began to be carried out by new RB-47 jet aircraft at an altitude of about 14 thousand meters. They photographed airfields. The Soviet air defense fighters that flew out to intercept them could not stay at such a height for a long time and, as a rule, did not reach them. RB-29 and RB-50, with

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long range, but lower speed and height, conducted reconnaissance along the Soviet borders in the north.

If in the Far East, when conducting reconnaissance flights, American aircraft constantly had to deal with the opposition of Soviet air defense fighters, then on the northern borders of the USSR, the situation was different. US Air Force scouts, operating in the early 50s in the Soviet Arctic, discovered a few radar posts on the northern borders of the USSR, located at a great distance from each other. This led the US Air Force command and the Pentagon to the idea that it was the northern route, the shortest way leading to the vital areas of the Soviet Union, that would be most favorable for the operation of strategic bombers in the event of a 3rd World War. General Goodpeister, military adviser to President Eisenhower, believed that the absence of Soviet radar stations in the vast expanses of northern Siberia, all the way to the pole, was the most important

operational information in the event of the entry of the United States into the conflict of the USSR. "This was one of the most important secrets of the Cold War," noted one of the leaders of US electronic intelligence. "We could launch an air attack with strategic bombers across the North Pole, and the Russians had no way of knowing about it." Only in the second half of the 1950s did the construction of a network of Soviet early warning radars begin in the northern regions of Siberia. However, as the United States believed, its effectiveness in the space between Murmansk and Chukotka was not great. The intensity of American aerial radar reconnaissance increased every year. By the mid-50s, more than 100 reconnaissance aircraft were involved in solving these problems, and the geography

of flights was also expanding. In the north and northeast, reconnaissance was carried out by the 55th strategic intelligence wing, based at Topex Air Base in Canada, about 30-40 Aircraft technology was improved,

aircraft.

radio electronic and photographic

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some equipment for reconnaissance aircraft. If in the late 40s and early 50s the main aircraft were RB-29 and RB-50, then already in the mid-50s reconnaissance jets RB-47 and RC-135 were widely used. Naval reconnaissance used R-4M "Mercator", R-2 "Neptune" and other aircraft for the same purpose. The planes were equipped with 100-inch telephoto cameras for photographing ports, factories, shipyards, air bases, missile positions; electronic equipment made it possible to detect the frequencies of Soviet and Chinese radars in the entire range of frequencies used by them, and to determine their location. The annual number of reconnaissance flights increased from 1,000 at the beginning to 3,000 at the end of the 1950s .

From time to time, reconnaissance aircraft flew over the territorial waters of the USSR or invaded its airspace. Soviet fighters took off to intercept, tried to force the violators to land or, if they did not follow orders, shoot them down; air battles broke out, planes were shot down, people died. So, on July 27, 1953, the Soviet military transport aircraft Il-12 during the flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok was attacked by 4 American fighters. It must be said that on this day a truce was signed between the parties that fought in Korea, and an end to this war was put. The Soviet plane followed the established route, which passed over the territory of the PRC at a considerable distance, up to 300 kilometers, from the Sino-Korean border. Approaching the IL-12, the American pilots were convinced that it was a military transport aircraft "flying east." This is evidenced by the reports of Captain Pierre and Senior Lieutenant Scarori, whose fighters attacked the IL-12. Nevertheless, American fighters shot down an unarmed plane 130 kilometers southwest of the city of Dunhua. The crew and passengers - a total of 21 people - were killed²⁰ .

Two days later, on July 29, an RB-50 flying from Yokota (Japan) passed along the Korean Peninsula and went along the Soviet border north of Vladivostok.

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There were 17 people on board the reconnaissance aircraft: the crew and specialists. Soviet radars found the plane on the traverse of Vladivostok and flew it. The report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, to the Minister of Defense of the USSR on this incident said:

"Radar stations of the fleet, continuing to monitor the movement of an unknown aircraft, our territorial waters of Askold Island in the direction of finding V 7.01 discovered his intruder was V out the identity of the intruder aircraft — walking 10,000 meters. V on on height

And targets his 7.06 appearance in our waters were sent to our two fighter planes At 7.11, the presenter on meeting with him. pair discovered an intruder V fighter (pilot Captain Rybakov) 10 south of Askold, which turned out to be an American RB-50 aircraft with 4 red stripes of from islands US Air Force identification marks. When approaching for identification, our fighters were fired upon by an aircraft leading fighter aircraft were intruder, the left blade and on keel And

on

front fuselage" 21 .

The American version was strikingly different from the Soviet one. According to co-pilot Captain John Roche, their plane was suddenly fired on by a Soviet MiG-15 fighter, which hit two RB-50 engines with fire, after which it fell into the sea. Roche was picked up by a rescue ship 18 hours after the crash. He was the only one left alive from the crew22 .

Today it is difficult to say who opened fire first. The situation in those days in the Far East was very nervous. The Korean War has just ended (July 27, 1953). Under these conditions, events could take any turn. In this case, both Soviet and American testimonies show the measure of hostility on both sides and their desire to blame the incident on the enemy. Relatives of the dead crew members of American reconnaissance aircraft were told that the planes had crashed. Even many years later

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The United States hid the truth from relatives. The wife of Captain Sam Bush, a member of the RB-29 crew who went missing off the coast of the USSR in the Sea of Japan during a reconnaissance flight, recalled: "I was told that the crew's task was weather reconnaissance." And here is what Gordon Berg, brother of Eldie Ray, who also died along with the entire crew of RB-29, said: "Eldie wrote that they were flying on a serious mission and he was scared ... We were informed that there was no information about the aircraft and about the pilots The Air Force told my mom to come to terms with what happened . "23

But radar reconnaissance was only one of the areas of air espionage. Soon after it began, another appeared. After Truman's approval in 1950 of a plan to conduct reconnaissance

flights with penetration into the deep regions of the USSR, American aircraft (and not only reconnaissance aircraft) began to increasingly make deep incursions into the airspace of the USSR. There were cases when their routes passed through several regions. They also attracted allies. In the mid-50s, RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft (or an earlier model - RB-45) operated from British airfields with RAF markings. So, on April 17-18, 1952, three

RB-45s piloted by British and American pilots, starting from England, invaded the airspace of the USSR and passed along three routes: through the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. The flights took place at an altitude of 12,000 meters, to the line of Pskov, Smolensk, Kharkov²⁴. Soviet radars led these aircraft, but fighters and anti-aircraft artillery could not bring them down. As the air defense system of the USSR improved, the risk of such flights increased more and more, losses grew. If in 1950 only one intruder was shot down, then in 1951 and 1952 - two each, and in 1953 - three. Meanwhile, more and more information was accumulating in the United States about the deployment of an extensive program in the USSR

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construction of new aircraft, missiles, submarines. What is the state and prospects of Soviet strategic weapons, where are the air bases and deployed missile positions - these are the questions that have become the main ones for politicians and the military in Washington. It was already known that at the Kapustin Yar training ground,

located V lower reaches Volga, experimental rocket launches. But what? How comparable are they with intercontinental missiles, which tested in the US? It was necessary to penetrate the "Iron Curtain". But how? In the winter of 1954-1955 in Turkey, in a mountainous region near the city of Diyarbakir, with the consent of the Turkish government, a special radar station with a long range was built. In the early summer of 1955, this station went into operation. Its data made it possible to obtain information about what was happening in Kapustin Yar. By the end of 1955, with the help of the radar station in Diyarbakir, the Americans already knew that missiles were being tested in Kapustin Yar, that tests were being conducted intensively and quite successfully. American experts believed that the Russians were far ahead in creating strategic missile weapons compared to the Americans. American public opinion became increasingly convinced that the United States was lagging behind the USSR in the most important areas of scientific and technological progress.

The White House and the Pentagon came to the conclusion that

immediately begin collecting data on Soviet programs for the development of strategic air attack weapons. It was decided to organize systematic flights over the territory of the USSR in order to collect information about Soviet weapons and armed forces through aerial photography and electronic intelligence. During these years, the British adopted the Canberra bomber, which was very advanced for that time. Since, as the Soviet air defense system improved, the losses of obsolete reconnaissance aircraft grew, it was decided to use Canberra for reconnaissance.

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ru". Churchill gave permission, but on the condition that the flight would not be from England. In August 1953, the Canberra launched from the Giebelstadt airfield (FRG) along the route: Germany - Czechoslovakia - Kiev - Kharkov - Kapustin Yar (Volgograd region) - Iran. On the way, the plane was repeatedly attacked by Soviet fighters and fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery. From anti-aircraft fire in the Kapustin Yar zone, the Canberra experienced such a vibration that the photographs turned out to be of extremely poor quality. After receiving many holes and dents, the plane still reached Iran, where he landed. But the crew commander, B. Amory, said: "Never again!" Churchill agreed with this²⁵. He was afraid of countermeasures from the USSR. And for good reason. The risk was considerable. At that time, the command of the USSR Air Defense Forces considered the Canberra aircraft a very difficult target for Soviet interceptor fighters. The pilots flying to intercept were tasked with shooting down the Canberra at any cost, up to ramming. Colonel Nikolai Sysoev, commander of the fighter regiment of the Baku Air Defense District, with whom the author of these lines happened to serve together in those years, recalled:

"In theory, we Not ordered to ram the "Canberra" forehead, most V But recommended, if necessary, to use a ram to the vulnerable places of the bomber, so By Not that, having damaged it, they would die themselves. But directing MIG fighters is not despite the desire of the command to help the radar, on target With at night, 26 intercepted an enemy "

My other colleague, General Mikhail Shulga, recalled how he, a fighter pilot who served in Grozny in 1954, received the task of intercepting the Canberra, which flew from Iran through Kapustin Yar and Grozny with a return to Iran:

"I gained altitude, even climbed from 16 000 meters, as I was ordered to look for the enemy on 16 500 above and to the right. saw him, height, prepared weapons for And I But above yourself. I tried to increase the fight, but break

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The teller was still trying to dial 2 on height, but characteristics of the height fighter, this. "Try another dash up," But Not allowed

With

success." ²⁷

Secret air war in the airspace of the USSR and on its borders continued.

With the adoption of the "massive retaliation" strategy in the United States, the Americans had to establish targets for strikes on the territory of the USSR, determine the procedure for their destruction, and verify in practice the real capabilities of Soviet aviation and air defense. To this end, systematic reconnaissance flights continued. Part of the aircraft, according to the plan approved by Truman, undertook deep incursions into the airspace of the USSR. So, on April 28-29, 1954, three American reconnaissance aircraft (this time they were RB-47s) with British identification marks, flying out of England (ScalThorpe airbase), repeated the route through the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, with the aim of reconnaissance of the airfields of Soviet intercontinental bombers M-4. However, by that time, Soviet air defense had already adopted more advanced means of combating an air enemy. The plane, approaching Kyiv, was met by strong anti-aircraft fire and, fearing being shot down, turned back. Two other scouts were attacked by fighters and were forced to turn back so as not to expose themselves to further risk²⁸. On May 8 of the same year, another three RB-47s, also from England, took off to photograph Soviet military installations in the area of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Lake Onega. They were ordered, observing radio silence, to go to the Murmansk region. Two crews, after photographing objects around Murmansk, were to return to the base. The third crew (commander G. Austin) had the task of photographing 9 airfields on the Kola Peninsula, then going to the Arkhangelsk area and further to Onega ³⁵⁸

lakes and land in Norway. In the Murmansk area, an American intelligence officer was met by three Soviet MIG-17s. This was a serious enemy: the MIG-17 could operate at the same altitudes and speeds as the B-47. Maneuvering, the crew of Austin was forced to deviate from the given route, which made it difficult to complete the task. Near Arkhangelsk, 6 fighters were already raised to intercept an air reconnaissance. RB-47 chose to leave the airspace of the USSR and head for the skies of Finland. Soviet fighters opened fire, the Americans returned fire, but hurried to cross the Finnish border. The only thing they could then report to their command was that no heavy Soviet bombers were found on the northern airfields. But American aviation continued deep reconnaissance for a possible nuclear strike on the main cities of our country. B-47 bombers, starting from the airfields of Europe, more than once went to the border of Novgorod, Smolensk, Kyiv. According to the conclusion of Soviet experts

of that time, it was not excluded that on

there could have been nuclear weapons on board the B-47. This in itself was already dangerous, since there are cases when there was an accidental release of nuclear bombs. Such cases were carefully hidden. So, on February 20, 1950, the B-36 bomber was forced to drop an atomic bomb over the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Canada. It was blown up 100 meters above the ocean surface. A similar incident was repeated in November 1950³⁰. Soviet radars detected and observed many flights, but air defense combat weapons were not yet able to successfully counteract jet bombers flying at high altitudes and speeds. This further strengthened the desire of the military-political leadership of the USSR to improve and strengthen Soviet weapons. On a large scale, new radars were introduced into the Air Defense Forces of the country, mobile anti-aircraft missile systems were developed, capable of 359

hit targets at high altitudes; new bombers and supersonic fighter-interceptors were built. And this, in turn, pushed the American military-political leadership to even more intensive reconnaissance of new types of weapons in the USSR.

Here it is appropriate to say that the US leadership was fully aware that the illegal intrusion into the airspace of the USSR is a violation of international law. The incident of November 7, 1954 is indicative in this respect. On this day, Soviet fighters shot down an American reconnaissance aircraft RB-29, which made a reconnaissance flight along the coastline of the Soviet Far East in the Sea of Japan. 10 pilots from the crew parachuted out and were rescued by American emergency services, one person died³¹.

In the United States, a campaign began in the press accusing Soviet pilots of shooting down an innocent aircraft. Senate Republican leader William Knowland appeared before President Eisenhower demanding "sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union," citing public demand. Eisenhower cautiously made it clear to the senator that the plane was performing a task that was by no means "innocent" in nature:

"IN international relations such things happen, We sometimes talk about it ... which cannot be explained in words to the general public ... we behave very aggressively, I can afford to tell even my wife ... Our intelligence But you don't know anything operate quite often like this. So anything can happen." Not

actively and

He said that he knew the arguments of those who want to break off diplomatic relations with the USSR, but this would be a "step towards war", and finished:

"And if this is done, attacked? As That the next question will be: are you ready To for me, attack. It is necessary to understand what can That I personally Not ready To

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drink the day when we have to enter finds out that we somehow ^V war. And if the people
provoked her ..., "

Nevertheless, despite the full understanding of the danger of violating Soviet borders, American intelligence not only did not stop them, but also thought out new moves in this direction, designed to increase the volume of intelligence information and at the same time reduce the risk of failure and loss of life. In 1956, the US reconnaissance aviation received more advanced photo and electronic equipment. It was equipped with B-47E and B-47H aircraft. In March-May, such aircraft operated from the air base in Tula (Greenland), flying over the North Pole and the Kola Peninsula, Novaya Zemlya, and the Bering Strait. Every day during daylight hours 4-5 crews took off. Their routes included the invasion of Soviet airspace. These reconnaissance flights confirmed the initial data that the northern regions of the USSR have an underdeveloped radar network and few active air defense systems. "In the same year, Operation Genetrix was carried out: a massive launch of balloons from Germany and Turkey, whose routes passed through the USSR and ended in the Pacific Ocean, where containers with photographic equipment were dropped in a designated area, where they were picked up by special teams. However, this operation was not successful. Of the 516 balloons launched, only 44 reached the Sea of Japan. The rest were shot down by Soviet fighters or did not reach the designated area for technical reasons³⁴. Since the launch of balloons into the airspace of the USSR did not give any tangible results, the US Air Force continued deep aerial reconnaissance of the border regions of the Soviet Union. In March 1955, three RB-45s under the command of Major J. Anderson made a reconnaissance flight at night with the task of establishing the deployment and capabilities of the radar station of the socialist bloc in the territory of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic republics of the USSR. The night was chosen

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wound on purpose to make it difficult for Soviet fighters to intercept the scouts, who countered the spy planes. All three RB-45s returned safely to their bases. In April and early May of the same year, the US Air Force SAC carried out the "Project Seashore" (sea coast) on a special assignment from the OKNSh.

Four RB-47Es, equipped with 100-inch telephoto cameras, carried out reconnaissance flights over the regions of Northern and Eastern Siberia. They operated from Aielson Air Force Base (Alaska). The main task of these flights was to reconnoiter the air defense and air force systems on the northern route, the main one for US strategic aviation, leading to the deepest military-industrial regions of the Soviet Union by the shortest routes.

In March-May 1956, the SAC command conducted another reconnaissance operation - the Home Run Project. For 7 weeks, new RB-47E and RB-47H reconnaissance aircraft, operating across the North Pole, flew on missions almost daily and conducted reconnaissance of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to the USSR and the North Siberian regions of the USSR in the space from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. This operation was carried out by a special SAC unit consisting of 16 RB-47Es of the 10th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, as well as 5 RB-47H aircraft of the 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. They were served by two squadrons of tanker aircraft (28 KS-97). The flights were made from the Thule Air Base (Greenland) and were conducted in almost complete radio silence. The Air Force intelligence leadership divided the Soviet Arctic space into three basic sectors: from the Kola Peninsula to Dixon Island (Kara Sea); from Dixon to Tiksi Bay (Laptev Sea); from Tiksi to the Bering Strait. As a rule, B 47 flew in pairs for photo (E) or electronic (H) reconnaissance, depending on the purpose of the aircraft. In the course of daily flights conducted during the daytime by the American 362

scout, managed to get photographs of the Soviet Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site; to establish that the radar stations in the north of the USSR are not numerous and are separated from each other by considerable distances. The airfield network in these areas clearly did not provide the required number of interceptors. During the entire operation, only in three or four cases did the RB-47 have to evade the pursuit of Soviet fighters.

The lack of effective air defense in the north of the USSR allowed the Americans to move on to more active operations. On May 6 and 7, 1956, six RB-47s, taking off from the Tule airfield, crossed the North Pole and intruded into the airspace of the Soviet Union during daylight hours near the town of Ambarchik. They managed to freely photograph the territory from Anadyr to the Bering Strait, after which they landed at the Aielson airbase (Alaska). In total, 156 reconnaissance flights were made from Thule during this period near the Soviet northern borders. "Soviet radars observed and tracked these flights, but a small number of fighters, and, as a rule, of obsolete types, did not allow

the fight against intruders to be at least somewhat effective. But the government of the USSR did not disregard the activities of American aviation along the northern borders of our country. The US Embassy in Moscow was handed a note of protest dated May 14. On May 28, President Eisenhower invited the top leadership of the US armed forces and the CIA to a meeting on the Soviet note. stop air reconnaissance flights in the north of the USSR. The next day, the State Department handed a note to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, which expressed

regret that navigational difficulties in the Arctic could cause American aircraft to violate the airspace of the USSR, if there were any "36. Thus, until the second half of the 50s, US and NATO aviation conducted mainly

reconnaissance

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border regions of the USSR, trying to obtain information about air defense and nearby airfields. But over time, more and more information was accumulated about the work in the USSR to create nuclear and missile weapons. However, the main objects of these programs (test sites, positions for the deployment of new types of weapons, etc.) were located in the depths of Soviet territory, where it became increasingly difficult for Western air reconnaissance to penetrate. The parade in Moscow in 1955 showed that the Soviet Union had achieved significant success in the field of creating strategic aviation. American public opinion became increasingly convinced that the United States was lagging behind the USSR in the most important areas of scientific and technological progress.

The Pentagon and the CIA came to the conclusion that it was necessary to immediately begin collecting data on Soviet programs for the development of strategic air attack weapons.

Such a tool was a plane specially designed for conducting photographic and electronic reconnaissance from high altitudes, inaccessible to fighters and anti-aircraft artillery of that time, created by the talented engineer Clarence Johnson, vice president of the Lockheed aircraft manufacturing company, and his employees Edwin Land and Edward Purcell. They called their brainchild "Angel", and officially U-2 (from the English word - practical). The search for a high-altitude reconnaissance variant began as early as 1951, when the American company Martin tried to adapt an improved version of the Canberra for this purpose. However, intelligence experts in the US Air Force came to the conclusion that a twin-engine aircraft would never be able to gain the required height. Then the Lockheed firm got down to business. In the fall of 1954, the creators of the U-2 project turned to CIA Director A. Dulles with a proposal to finance and adopt their project. Dulles was against it at first. Knight "cloak and dagger

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la", he considered reconnaissance aircraft to be a purely military means. However, Johnson and Land convinced him. On November 24, the inventors of the U-2 met with President D. Eisenhower. They convincingly convinced him that only such an aircraft could provide the necessary information about what was demonstrated in May of that year, at the parade in Moscow, the Soviet M-4 bomber (according to NATO terminology - "Bizon"), without risking being shot down by Soviet air defense. The President agreed that this aircraft be used under the auspices of

CIA, not Air

Force37 . The commander of the strategic air command, General Lemay, underestimated the capabilities of the U-2, which he later regretted. And then he told the officer who described the U-2 as a very effective means of photographic reconnaissance: "Young man, if I need to get photographs of objects in the USSR, I will send the B-29" 38 .

The CIA meanwhile set tasks for high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. First of all, they were supposed to conduct flights over the territory of the USSR and obtain information about Soviet weapons and armed forces. U-2 was a single-seat reconnaissance aircraft with a turbojet engine

J-57 from Pratt-Whitney. He was able to fly at altitudes up to 20 kilometers, take aerial photographs from these heights and conduct electronic reconnaissance. Such a height ensured the inaccessibility of the aircraft for Soviet air defense systems of that time. The aircraft could fly a distance of 4,750 miles (8,800 kilometers) without refueling and stay in the air for about 11 hours.

The designers of the aircraft in February 1955 completed the experimental model. The CIA has developed programs for upcoming reconnaissance flights in the interests of interested departments. The program was led by Deputy A. Dulles Richard Bissell. The first test flight of the U-2 took place in August 1955, and in May of the following year, the first detachment of these (unit "10-10") was formed, which began to be deployed in England. However, soon
aircraft

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The Tang government, fearing complications in relations with the Soviet Union, demanded that the reconnaissance detachment be removed from England. He was transferred to West Germany, to the Wiesbaden air base (near Frankfurt am Main), where he was preparing for the upcoming reconnaissance flights.

The director of the CIA that spring was pleased with the performance of his agency. In West Germany, with the help of German intelligence, American intelligence officers secretly dug a tunnel from West Berlin to East Germany, which led them to underground secret communication lines between Moscow and East Berlin. This made it possible to eavesdrop on secret negotiations with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the leadership of the GDR. Reporting to Eisenhower on the completion of work on the

U 2 project and in the Berlin tunnel, Allen Dulles told the president: "I have come to report to you on two of the most original projects: one very high and the other very deep." It is appropriate to note here that if the "high project" - U-2 operated successfully for 4 years, then the "deep" one - the tunnel near Berlin - failed a year later: it was discovered by Soviet counterintelligence in April 1956. The US Air Force command, which rejected the U-2 project, insisted before the president that the SAC be adopted for the RB-57D. was armament

reconnaissance version of the British Canberra, which was bought by the United States under license. This single-seat aircraft had two Pratt-Whitney J-57 engines, therefore it developed a higher speed than the U-2 (up to 900 km / h), but in terms of the main parameter - altitude - it was inferior to the latter. Nevertheless, Eisenhower allowed the Air Force to use this aircraft for reconnaissance of the Soviet Far East. Three RB-57Ds were stationed at the end of 1956 in Japan, at the Yokota air base. On December 11, they made flights to the Vladivostok region. However, contrary to the hopes of American intelligence officers that the Soviet radars would not be able to see the RB-57 at a considerable height (more than 17 kilometers), they were discovered. Soviet fighters were raised.

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American pilots preferred to stay away from them, outside the territorial waters of the USSR. A note of protest from the Soviet government dated 14 December confirmed the discovery of an attempt to violate Soviet airspace. It said:

"On December 11, 1956, 13.07-13.21 (Vladivostok time), three American jet aircraft of the B-57 type, having appeared on the side of the Sea of Japan south of Vladivostok, violated the airspace of the Soviet Union ... Clear weather excluded the possibility of loss of orientation by the pilots during the flight ... The Government of the Soviet Union ^{violation area} and good visibility The Union insists that the US government take action on crews and within the borders of the USSR by American planes. ^{on}

future Not committed violations of state

to punish the guilty

40 .

The US government has apologized. Eisenhower forbade Air Force aircraft to invade the USSR during reconnaissance flights, but made an exception for the CIA and its U-2. However, each of their flights was carried out only with his sanction. He approved the U-2 program at the end of 1954, counting on the fact that the high flight altitude would not allow them to be detected by the Soviet radar and there would be no complications with the Soviet Union. But a year later, when preparations were already underway for the practical implementation of the program, he told its leaders: "All this is good, guys. I think that the country needs such information, and I am ready to approve your program. But I must tell you one thing: there will come the day one of these machines gets caught, we'll get a storm."⁴¹ He turned out to be a visionary: after 5 years, the U-2, piloted by pilot F. Powers, crashed from a 20-kilometer height to the ground near Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), shot down by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile. But all this will be later, and then, in 1954-1956, the pilots selected by R. Bissel mastered the new technique. Needless to say, this task was not an easy one. In the course of test flights only in these years, 5 pilots died, before 1960 (F. Powers' flight) - 15, and in total (until 1974) - 2542 .

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In 1956, Eisenhower authorized U-2 flights in the airspace of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. They intended to start them in June, but the weather in the western regions of the USSR prevented such flights. Therefore, on June 20, pilot Karl Overstreet flew over Poland and East Germany: he was over Warsaw, Berlin and Potsdam. The flight was successful. At the end of June, the weather in the USSR improved, but the U-2 flights were postponed due to the stay of N. Twining in the USSR - at the air parade in Tushino and on a trip around the country.

2. CIA: what is there beyond the Urals?

Finally, on July 2, 1956, Eisenhower authorized five deep incursions into Soviet airspace during July, depending on meteorological conditions. The first flight took place on the Independence Day of the United States⁴³ - July 4th. Since this was a few days after N. Twining's departure from Moscow and Khrushchev's boastful speech at a banquet on June 24, the Kremlin considered this flight as an act of revenge on the US Air Force Chief of Staff. But it was just a coincidence: the decision had been made earlier. Within 10 days, a U-2 detachment from West Germany made these five deep incursions into Soviet airspace

at an altitude of 20 kilometers. One of the aircraft passed over Moscow, in the vicinity of which it discovered airfields based on M-4 bombers. Another photographed a shipyard in the Leningrad region where submarines were being built. The photographs taken with cameras with a focal length of 36 inches (90 centimeters) were of exceptionally high quality. As Bissell recalled, "The details were so clear that you could read the tail numbers on the bombers." Other flights were also successful. For Soviet military intelligence, these flights were not a secret from the very beginning. Already the first flights of heights

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ny scouts were observed by Soviet radar stations. So, on July 4, it was established that the U-2, discovered over Frankfurt am Main, proceeded through Dresden and Bialystok and at 0818 hours crossed the Soviet border at an altitude of about 17 kilometers. He passed at this altitude at a speed of 800-1000 km / h (taking into account the tailwind) along the route: Bobruisk, Vilnius, Kaliningrad and left towards the Baltic Sea. The flight over the territory of the USSR lasted more than 2.5 hours. The next day, the same flight was found on the route: Frankfurt am Main, Pinsk, Vilnius, Kaliningrad, Rostock, Hamburg. The plane was over the territory of the USSR for almost 3.5 hours, deepened 1000 kilometers into our airspace, flying at an altitude of 18 kilometers at a speed of 800 km / h. On June 9, three deep incursions into the air

space of the Soviet Union. Aircraft at an altitude of 16-20 kilometers appeared from West Germany (Frankfurt am Main, Nuremberg). One of them flew along the route. Prague, Szeged, Lvov, Zhitomir, Kyiv, Gomel, Bobruisk, Baranovichi, Brest, Munich; the second is Szczecin, Kaliningrad, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Minsk, Demblin, Erfurt; the third is Minden, Szczecin, Kaliningrad, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Bialystok, Lodz, Berlin, Hannover. Over the territory of the USSR they were 3-4.5 hours, deepened by 700-1400 kilometers at a speed of 800 km / h. The next day, another high-altitude reconnaissance reconnaissance was spotted, which, at an altitude of 20 kilometers at a speed of 900-1100 km / h, followed from Frankfurt am Main through Dresden, Chernivtsi, Odessa, Nikolaev, Kerch, Sevastopol, Izmail, Varna, Miskolc and left, in Germany. This was the end of the first series of high-altitude American reconnaissance flights⁴⁴. The radar stations of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries followed each of them (with some interruptions) throughout the route, the air defense fighters went to the target, but their ceiling was several kilometers lower than the U-2 heights, which did not allow them to act effectively.

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Measures were also taken through diplomatic channels. On June 10, 1956, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to the US government, stating that the violations of the air borders of the USSR by American aircraft were "a deliberate action by certain US circles, calculated to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America." In this note, as in notes of previous years, in connection with the intrusion of American military aircraft into the airspace of the USSR, it was emphasized that such actions are a violation of international law.

The Soviet note said that the violation was carried out by "twin-engine aircraft of the Air Force", and the Americans became aware that the leaders of the Armed Forces and the KGB of the USSR did not have accurate data on the violating aircraft, since the U-2 had one engine. The plane did not have US Air Force markings, so the State Department, while denying US involvement in the facts of the invasion, was not afraid of being caught red-handed. But after the July series of reconnaissance flights in 1956, there was a pause. This was due

to the fact that President Eisenhower banned U-2 operations over the USSR until further notice, which was facilitated by the events of this autumn associated with the invasion of Anglo-French-Israeli troops in Egypt, and the uprising in Hungary, crushed by Soviet troops. The US government was afraid of any incidents in relations with the Soviet Union and did not want to give reasons for this. Meanwhile, the areas of action of high-altitude reconnaissance flights were expanding. In the fall of 1956, one of the U-2 units was transferred to Turkey, to the Adana air base. From there to

September - October of this year, Francis Power and his colleagues made their first flights on the U-2. During the days of the Suez crisis, they conducted intelligence in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Cyprus. The head of these operations, Richard Bissell, sought permission from the US government to resume

flights 370

over the USSR. The CIA and the strategic air command were interested in the Kapustin Yar training ground, defense enterprises and air bases in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Volga region. But the president did not agree to the flights, citing the tense situation in the world. He allowed only shallow incursions into the countries of Eastern Europe and only in January 1957 gave permission for flights over the USSR.

A new series of reconnaissance flights began. But now they covered ever deeper regions of the USSR. Reconnaissance aircraft penetrated into Kazakhstan and Siberia, where new types of Soviet strategic aircraft were tested. weapons. From March to October 1957, Soviet air defense radars noted 5 U-2 overflights: 1 in March, 2 in August, one each in September and October. In contrast to the flights of the previous year, U-2 planes were now conducting reconnaissance of the regions of Transcaucasia (March, August), Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Siberia (August-September), and the Soviet North (October). They entered the airspace of the USSR for 150-1650 kilometers at altitudes of 19-21 kilometers at a speed of 700-900 km/h. And as before, for the active means of the USSR Air Defense Forces (fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery), they were out of reach. Meanwhile, 1957 was the year of the breakthrough of the USSR into space. The successes of the Soviet rocket scientists were accompanied by a noisy propaganda campaign launched by the government of N. S. Khrushchev. This even more encouraged the Americans to intensify illegal penetration behind the "Iron Curtain" in order to collect reliable information. U-2 flights, providing documentary data, were one of the most important sources of information about Soviet weapons programs. In 1960, the New York Herald Tribune wrote that with the help of the U-2, the United States began to receive "more reliable (than data for the state assessment)". Central Asia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. U-2 units began to be based in Japan (Atsugi airfield) and in Alaska.

earlier. — A. O.)

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Since the four flights made during this period (according to Soviet data) went unpunished, the Americans became more and more convinced that the Soviet Union did not have sufficiently effective air defense systems, and therefore, in the event of war, massive American strategic strikes would meet serious opposition, especially on north direction. Intelligence of Soviet strategic missile weapons

aviation

Not

showed that in 1957-1958, 6 launches of intercontinental missiles were carried out in the USSR, and this made it possible to conclude that more than 100 ICBMs were unlikely to be put into operation in 1959-1960 .

All this happened against the backdrop of more frequent cases of aggravation of the international situation. In 1957, the Turkish-Syrian conflict broke out, the following year, the American marines landed in Lebanon, and the situation in the Far East around Taiwan escalated. The Soviet Union repeatedly demanded an end to "imperialist interference", while declaring that otherwise the USSR would be forced to use force. However, the US did not respond to these protests.

From the beginning of the U-2 flight program until May 1, 1960, when F. Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk, about 20 sorties of reconnaissance aircraft were made. Each of them was carefully prepared in advance by the Bissell group, with the participation of representatives of the White House, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department and other interested departments. In order to create the most favorable conditions for reconnaissance of objects in the deep regions of the USSR, it was decided to conduct part of the reconnaissance flights using the air bases of Turkey and Pakistan - in particular, Peshawar. This was explained by the fact that, according to American data, the radar coverage of the Soviet airspace on the border with Afghanistan, in the area closest to West Pakistan, was very weak. In addition, starting from Pakistan, reconnaissance aircraft could quickly reach the most important for American intelligence

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Soviet facilities - testing grounds for missile and nuclear weapons. For reconnaissance

flights from Pakistan, U-2 aircraft were used, which were once transferred from Germany to Turkey to the Adana airbase, located in a sparsely populated area, where it was easier to hide reconnaissance aircraft from prying eyes. In addition, in the south of Turkey there were favorable weather conditions, which made it possible to fly at any time of the year.

By that time, Soviet intelligence already had a lot of information about the technology of the U-2 flight program. It was known that Soviet military facilities flying not only from were photographed by reconnaissance aircraft Pakistan and Japan, but also from airfields in Alaska.

The aerial photographs obtained as a result of U-2 flights were carefully studied by CIA specialists. These pictures, according to American intelligence officers, were of great value. They made it possible to uncover many nodes of the Soviet air defense system, to establish the location of fighter-interceptor airfields, the positions of anti-aircraft missiles, many radar stations and other components of air defense, especially around large cities of the USSR. Pictures from the U-2 showed that a wide range of And

construction of nuclear submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles. At the same time, aerial reconnaissance documented that no significant construction of strategic bombers was being carried out in the USSR. The photographs, revealing the location of aircraft factories, made it possible to draw conclusions about the possibilities of producing strategic bombers (by American standards, they turned out to be very modest), to obtain information about the approximate number of strategic aviation and its airfields. Obtaining data on the Soviet missile program required a lot of effort and time. Only a few years after the start of U-2 flights did the American leadership have extensive information about the Soviet

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strategic missiles. It was possible to establish that medium-range missiles (900-4600 kilometers), designed mainly for operations in the European theater of war, are being tested at the Kapustin Yar training ground. A test site for intercontinental missiles was discovered in the summer of 1957, shortly after U-2s began flying from Pakistan. It was located near the settlement of Tyuratam (Baikonur), located on the railway line near the Aral Sea. From here, missiles were launched eastward against training targets in Kamchatka and later in the Pacific Ocean. In terms of equipment and scope of work, Tyuratam was comparable to the American test site at Cape Canaveral, where US intercontinental missiles were tested. When photographing objects in Tyuratam, a U-2 camera captured a Soviet ICBM on a launcher. Equipment for launching artificial Earth satellites was also found there.

Soon the reliability of intelligence information began to be confirmed in practice. In August 1957, an intercontinental rocket was successfully launched from the Tyuratam test site, and in October and November of the same year, the first Soviet satellites were launched. There was no longer any doubt that the Soviet Union possessed intercontinental missiles.

Moreover, US intelligence has concluded that Soviet missiles of this class are superior in size and engine power to American ICBMs. Comparing this with a number of successful tests of nuclear bombs that have been carried out on Novaya Zemlya

in recent years, the Americans have come to the conclusion that the USSR is ahead of the United States in the field of nuclear missile weapons. In general, in those years, it seemed to politicians and military figures in Washington that the economy of the USSR was developing very successfully: the annual increase in investment in industry was 12 percent, the standard of living of the population was rising, great successes were achieved in the education system, etc.

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At the same time, since 1958, according to US intelligence, the military spending of the USSR began to increase. The mass production of rocket weapons and their adoption by the Soviet Army and Navy began. According to Pentagon calculations, by the mid-60s, the USSR could put up to 500 ICBMs on combat duty. This, it was believed, would be enough to destroy the main air and missile forces of the US Strategic Air Command, which could be in service by that time, and destroy the main US cities in a surprise strike. Information was also accumulating about the development in the USSR of work on the creation of anti-aircraft missile weapons. U-2s discovered an air defense range in Sary-Shagan, not far from Lake Balkhash. There, as it was established, test launches of anti-aircraft missiles were conducted, and successfully. All this was very disturbing for the White House and the Pentagon. There was a fuss in the American press about the US lagging behind the USSR in missile programs. However, by the beginning of 1960, American intelligence had established two significant, from its point of view, facts: first, the deployment of missile positions in the USSR proceeded at a very slow pace; secondly, almost all combat positions were located along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Americans explained this by the fact that the first Soviet ICBMs were too heavy and bulky, so they could only move by rail, and be delivered to positions along railway lines. The gigantic size of these missiles made it difficult to place them in mines, and launchers were placed on the surface. A major drawback of the first generation Soviet ICBMs was the extremely unstable liquid fuel, which had to be changed at short intervals, which also made it difficult to keep the missiles in constant combat readiness. This information was obtained during the U-2 flights, which, of course, was a great success for American intelligence, but not as complete as American historiography tries to present it. Of course, the reconnaissance flights of the American U-2 military aircraft, which continued in those

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over several years, became a difficult problem for the Soviet air defense and air force and a constant, as they say, headache for the Soviet high command and political leadership. The fact is that these flights were carried out just at a time when the Soviet air defense was relatively weak, was in the process of re-equipping with modern air defense systems: new radars, high-altitude interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), reconnaissance equipment.

In those years, the author of this book served in the intelligence agencies of the country's Air Defense Forces, first at the headquarters of the Baku Air Defense District, and then at the Central Command Post and at the Main Headquarters of the country's Air Defense Forces in Moscow. The reconnaissance and radio engineering troops of the Air Force and Air Defense followed, as already mentioned, all U-2 operations from the very first flight on July 4, 1956.

I must say that the first U-2 flights at such an altitude were in doubt, because radars were conducted with significant

breaks - failures, since many radars of that time - P-8, P-10, etc. - did not have altimeters, but only determined the azimuth and range to the target. More advanced radars - P-12, P-30, P-35 - could detect targets at an altitude of twenty kilometers or more, but they were still not enough, and therefore it was not always possible to follow a high-altitude target confidently, without failures. In just 4 years, we observed and conducted 18 U-2s, although, according to American data, there were more than twenty of them. As for the tactical and technical characteristics of the U-2, in the early years we had a very vague idea about this aircraft. Specialists and major military leaders believed that an aircraft (even a high-altitude one) could not fly at an altitude of 20,000 meters for 7-8 hours. Only A. N. Tupolev admitted that there is such an aircraft, and drew his scheme, close to the U-2. Others believed that the U-2 could only go part of the route at such an altitude, and the rest of the time it should be at lower altitudes, and therefore within reach for our fighters. Therefore, wherever there were such fighters, especially the MIG-19

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(ceiling - 18 kilometers), they were raised to intercept the U-2 when they flew in the base areas. There were also funny

things. So, in February 1959, a pilot from the Turkestan Air Defense Corps on a MIG-17, due to the "dynamic slide", climbed to a height of 17-18 thousand meters and saw a strange cruciform-shaped aircraft higher, 3-4 kilometers above him. Returning to the airfield, he described it, but the commander of fighter aviation, E. Savitsky, who arrived at the regiment, considered his report untrue. "There are no such planes," he said.

In the meantime, intelligence information about the U-2 was also accumulating in our country. We already knew that the U-2 could make long flights of 8500-8800 kilometers without refueling and stay in the air for 8-10 hours. U-2 airfields were also installed in Germany, Turkey, Japan, Alaska, and Pakistan. By the end of the 50s, the scheme for preparing the U-2 for a mission became clear. As a rule, a few days before the sortie, the U-2 and the S-130 accompanying it flew from Adana (Turkey) to Peshawar (Pakistan), where the U-2 pilot spent 1-3 days, waiting for good weather conditions, and then flew out on a mission. The choice of Peshawar as the launch airfield was also not accidental. Firstly, there was a weak radar network in TurkVO, which made it possible to pass through it unnoticed, and secondly, this route took the reconnaissance officer by the shortest route to the area of the most important training grounds Tyuratam (Baikonur), Sary-Shagan, Semipalatinsk, Kapustin Yar and other important objects. By 1960, with the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces in the Soviet Union, and given the areas that had already been explored by the U-2, it became increasingly clear on which routes new high-altitude flights should be expected. By the end of 1957, S-75 mobile anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) began to enter the air defense armament. Their tactical and technical data made it possible to hit air targets at an altitude of 25 kilometers at a speed of 1500 km / h at

range of 30-40 kilometers. By 1960, S-75s were already in a number of air defense formations. The loop around U-2 was shrinking.

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The Soviet leadership was extremely nervous about the U-2 flights, which obtained information that gave a fairly accurate picture of the deployment of strategic weapons in the USSR. And it undermined Khrushchev's noisy propaganda campaign about the number and accuracy of Soviet missiles. The notes of the Soviet government (and there were three of them - July 10, 1956, March 8, 1958, April 21, 1958) were ignored by the United States. The U-2 flights revealed the quantitative state of Soviet strategic

weapons, but they exaggerated the number of combat-ready launches and did not give a qualitative picture of the Soviet military efforts and their prospects. In the unfolding arms race, the USSR created powerful ICBMs capable of carrying large nuclear warheads. U-2 air reconnaissance spotted the first R-7 launches, but did not find that the warheads, exploding in the air, did not hit it before approaching the target. They were unable to determine the location of the Soviet missiles and their capabilities, which led to the Powers incident. Work on the creation of Soviet strategic cruise missiles, work in the field of anti-missile defense, and a number of elements of the space program of the Soviet Union⁴⁷ were not disclosed. In the future, despite the data available in the United States on the USSR's nuclear missile weapons, by the 1970s it was able to achieve strategic parity with the United States, which led to a relaxation of political tension.

Successes of the Soviet Union in space exploration

testified that he was confidently moving towards the status of a superpower. In May 1958, the USSR launched another satellite into orbit - an entire laboratory with a complex of research equipment. In 1958-1959, automatic interplanetary stations for lunar exploration were created, and work on a manned spacecraft was in full swing. All this was painfully perceived by American public opinion. Overseas, the impression was that the USSR was ahead of the United States in very important areas of technological progress. The growth was impressive.

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the influence of the USSR on the countries of the "third world" and the pace of development of the countries of the "socialist camp". According to the forecasts of American experts, the economic potential of the United States and Western European countries in 1960-1970 could increase by 40 percent, that of Japan by 55 percent, while that of the USSR by 70 percent, and that of Africa and Latin America by 60 percent .

The leaders of the military department and special services were especially worried about the programs for creating modern weapons in the USSR. As the U-2 flights and information obtained in other ways showed, more and more new positions of strategic missiles were deployed in the Soviet Union, nuclear submarines were built, anti-aircraft missiles, high-speed interceptor fighters began to enter service, air defense forces were widely equipped

means of radar and radio equipment. But the impunity of U-2 flights testified to the fact that the USSR did not yet have the means to combat high-altitude aircraft, that Soviet propaganda of the growing military power of the Soviet Union clearly exaggerates the successes of science and technology in this area, although high-altitude reconnaissance flights showed an intensive flow new types of weapons to the troops. The leadership of the CIA was aware that in the context of the constant improvement of Soviet air defense, the risk of deep

incursions into the airspace of the USSR was increasing. Therefore, measures were taken to improve the safety of U-2 flights. In 1958, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were equipped with passive jamming equipment to make it difficult for the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense to aim fighters and anti-aircraft missiles at a high-altitude target. The following year, the Pratt-Whitney J-75 high-powered engine was installed on the U-2, which made it possible to raise the practical ceiling of the aircraft to 22 kilometers. The routes of reconnaissance aircraft were selected away from the positions of anti-aircraft missiles, which were already known to the Americans. We were also alarmed by reports coming from agents from the USSR that Soviet intelligence was accumulating all 379

more information about U-2 flights. Richard Helms, one of the leaders of high-altitude intelligence operations against the USSR, recalled: "When in early 1959 I learned from the report of one of the best CIA agents embedded in Soviet military intelligence, Pyotr Popov, that the GRU had intelligence about the U-2, I almost didn't fall off the chair. A particular stir in Washington was caused by the incident with the C-118 aircraft in the

summer of 1958. This military transport aircraft (one of two used by CIA Director Alain Dulles) on June 27 flew from Wiesbaden (Germany) to Pakistan, to the Peshawar airfield, from where U-2 flights were made. On board the plane, which had US Air Force markings, were nine officers and soldiers, three of whom were CIA employees. They carried secret documents related to the program of reconnaissance flights over the USSR. Before the plane took off from West Germany in Wiesbaden, Dulles' deputy, General S. Cabell, disembarked. On the section of the flight route from Adana (Turkey) to Tehran, the C-118 aircraft violated the border of the USSR over the territory of Armenia. The author of these lines served at that time in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baku Air Defense District. In the evening of that day, I was urgently summoned to the command post of the district. An intruder plane was flying over Armenia.

Judging by the speed and altitude, it was a transport aircraft. A pair of fighters raised to intercept (I remember it was the Yak-25) easily "reached the target. The time was about 22 hours, the moon was shining. The leader of the pair reported:" I see the target - an American military transport aircraft, on our signals - follow me landing - does not react, tends to go beyond

cordon to Turkey. What to do?" This question was asked because then, in the 50s, the orders of the Minister of Defense on actions against violators often changed. Some of them indicated that in case of failure to comply with the requirements of the fighters, the target should be shot down, while others were prescribed only to force to landing, and further actions were not mentioned.

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at that time, only forced landing was envisaged. The situation, however, demanded

decisive action. The commander of the district, Colonel General V. D.

Ivanov, who was at the command post, asked the Central Command Post of the country's Air Defense Forces in Moscow: what to do, the target is moving towards Turkey? From there, the answer is: act according to the situation. And then Ivanov made a decision: to shoot down. Fighters completed the task. The aircraft caught fire

and began to lose altitude. Five crew members jumped out with parachutes. But at that time, the pilot, Major Lall, shot down the flames with a successful maneuver and, accompanied by fighters, landed the plane at the Gindarch military field airfield in Armenia. There were four other people on the plane. They were arrested, the plane was taken under guard. The local population, mistaking the American pilots who jumped out on parachutes for saboteurs,

detained the paratroopers and handed them over to the police. After the initial interrogation in the district departments of the KGB, the Americans were handed over to the interdepartmental commission (KGB, MO, border troops), which had flown in from Baku.

As soon as this became known, a group of officers from the headquarters of our district, including me, as well as employees of the KGB of Azerbaijan, flew to the scene. During the night, the crew members who remained on the plane, as well as those detained by the local population, were taken to Kirovabad (now Ganja), and from there to Baku. The Americans were placed in the KGB building (not in prison), two in a room. For nine days we found out the circumstances of the incident. They were treated correctly. They replaced torn and burnt clothes, provided the necessary medical assistance, and organized good food. They even congratulated us on the national holiday of the USA - Independence Day on July 4th. All Americans had US Air Force IDs. According to their version, the aircraft performed

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a regular flight to serve the American embassy in Iran and followed to Tehran, but, bypassing a thunderstorm front over Turkey, mistook Lake Sevan in Armenia for Lake Van in Turkey. During the investigation, we realized

that not all Americans on board the C-118 were "Air Force officers", and the facts showed that some papers were destroyed on the plane. However, there was no direct evidence. Only many years

later it turned out that it was a CIA plane on which three of its employees flew to Peshawar. The senior officer from the crew, Colonel Dale Brenner, already in the 90s told reporters that they managed to destroy documents for the upcoming reconnaissance operations during the landing approach. CIA officer Major Benny Shoup claimed in an interview that he personally managed to tear to shreds and swallow a document relating to U-2 flights.

Perhaps, with a longer investigation of this incident, we could have obtained all the necessary information from the C-118 crew and the tasks that they performed. But the political leadership of the USSR at that time was apparently not interested in blowing up this incident. After clarifying the circumstances of the violation of the air border of the USSR, the crew of the C-118 aircraft was handed over to the US representatives at the Soviet-Iranian border. Secret CIA documents on the U-2 flight program only by chance did not fall into the hands of Soviet counterintelligence. After this episode, when it turned out that the available instructions on actions against intruder aircraft were not clear enough, order No. 0049 of the USSR Ministry of Defense dated July 4, 1958 was issued, ordering to shoot down the violator if necessary.

Regarding this incident, there was also an exchange of notes between the USSR and the USA. The Soviet government in a note dated June 28, 1958 (published in Izvestia on June 29) reported:

"June 27, 1958, a military aircraft V 18.30 (Moscow time) 4-engine insignia of the US Air Force with 382

violated the state border of the USSR Yerevan deepened the airspace of V area south of 170 to G. the USSR kilometers. Followed the signals of 2 fighters. Fighters forced the plane to go He 240 landed in kilometers burned out. Nine people dressed as US Air Force personnel are on behind them Not the territory of the USSR. There has been an intentional violation. The Soviet government on landing. places demands the prevention of violations from of violation of the border — All And V US Air Force uniform on

from US take effective action To

On June 30, the US government sent a memorandum ("Izvestia", July 4) with the following content: "The DC-6 military transport aircraft was flying from Wiesbaden (Germany) to Tehran. "It was cloudy, mountains. The plane got lost. The violation was unintentional. Please return the crew and the plane, if possible, or the remaining parts of it."

A. ABOUT.)

On July 4, the USSR government explained to the US government that the intentional violation was that the plane did not obey the signals of the fighters. 4 days later, on July 8, Izvestia published the following information: "On July 7, 1958, in the city of Astara, the crew of an American

an aircraft that violated the border of the USSR on June 27, 1958 in the area south of Yerevan. "Then came the list of the crew. It would seem that everything ended in the best way. But 2 months later, on September 2, a new incident occurred in the same area. Again, an American aircraft - reconnaissance S-130 ended up in the airspace of the USSR. Here is what the commander of the air defense corps, in the zone of which the S-130 was shot down, General V. D. Sozinov (we worked with him at the headquarters of Kim Il Sung during the Korean War) and the pilot who shot down the plane, Viktor Lopatkov. Four MIG-17 fighters were raised to intercept the American reconnaissance. Two interceptors to the left and right of the S-130 383

gave him a signal: "Follow us." He left them to the border at a speed of 300. The leading fighter of the second pair, Senior Lieutenant Lopatkov, after a warning burst, to which the intruder did not respond, opened fire to kill. The plane, engulfed in flames, fell to the ground. It continued to burn for about two more hours. It was not possible to approach the plane. General Sozinov posted guards to avoid casualties among the population. All measures were taken to extinguish the fire. All 17 people aboard the C-130 were killed. A few days later, the remains of seven bodies were handed over to the Americans. Of these, only four were identified. (Thirty-five years later, the Russian-American commission on prisoners of war and the missing, of which the author of the book was also a member, once again investigated this incident. Excavations were made, a television film was made. All the data of 1958 were confirmed: the crew died.)

Here is what the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov reported to the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1958:

"September 2, 1958 V 15 hours 6 minutes was violated area 15
state border of the USSR V kilometers

southwest of Leninakan. Intruder aircraft at 10,000 meters at the speed of the Turkish
650 — 720 km/h on side deepened the territory of the USSR on kilometers. Elevated Fighter Pilot
45 Senior 15.12
before Lieutenant Lopatkov V 15.10 intercepted the intruder And V
shot him

down. By According to the pilot's preliminary report, the four-engine intruder had American
markings. The burning plane crashed in the Mastara area, 20 kilometers southeast of Leninakan.
Measures have been taken to find the downed aircraft. A detailed report will be presented later."

To

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A TASS statement appeared in the Soviet press:

"The US Department of State released a statement regarding a US Air Force aircraft that violated the state border on September 2, 1958

The And fallen V area G. Yerevan. IN this statement
USSR claims that the indicated American military aircraft was allegedly "intercepted and attacked by Soviet
fighters in the area of the Soviet-Turkish border, near Kars (Turkey), which ". To confirm these provocative
in speculations, the State Department cites a "recording" fabricated by American intelligence of radio
caused his demise Soviet Armenia communications between Soviet
fighter pilots who allegedly participated in an American aircraft. on

V attack on

<...>»

The details of the air incident, which were investigated by a special commission created on this
occasion, were set out in the "Act of Investigation ...", presented by the Acting Commander of the
Transcaucasian Military District, Lieutenant General Ivan Pavlovsky, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Defense Forces of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov. It said:

in Turkey, 50 kilometers south of Kars, radar facilities of the Transcaucasian Air Defense Corps
detected an air target number 7845, a single foreign aircraft. flight along unfolded and from the state border
of the USSR<...>

on height of 7500 meters.

At 1506 minutes foreign aircraft hours on high 10,000
violated the state border in kilometers south of Leninakan, 120 and following the area 20 meters
course of degrees, deepened the territory of the USSR 45 kilometers, approaching and a turn to the right,
it began to go towards the state border. The leader of the fighters, Senior
Lieutenant L<...>ov under To foreign aircraft last With

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walked To foreign aircraft queue fire, the direction And gave two warnings reacted continued
of the state border. After on What He Not And co
July 1958, the Commander of the V by the order of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR number 0049
Air Force, the intruder was attacked by fighters, which sequentially made two attacks as a result of fighter
attacks. 44 caught fire, began to collapse fell Leninakan. By interim team

By

And V area <...>

kilometers south of the city.

Personal inspection on plane crash site commission

installed:- By identification marks, photo machine gun plates, the intruder is on aggregates And
pictures from a US Air Force C-130A "Hercules" type military transport aircraft.

<...>;

on charred aircraft were found And deformed remains of
equipment for reconnaissance of radio equipment <...>;
on the site of the plane crash found charred

remains 7 human bodies. <... > It is possible that in addition to seven others, identified corpses were but completely burned out or mingled with others <...>"

The commission came to the following conclusions: "1. The US Air Force C-130A aircraft, tail number 60528 deliberately violated the state border of the USSR, carried out a reconnaissance flight over the territory of the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the board of the aircraft of the reconnaissance radio technical

Availability on equipment, the route of the aircraft along the Soviet border, the limits of the Soviet Union, the task. 2. The V invasion of the order to carry out an operational A also the presence presence of a good linear landmark Aria-Chay canyon, marking the state border, other good well-visible large areal landmarks of visual visibility, the moment of violation, in the presence of modern radio navigation equipment on board, completely eliminates unintentional

And With And on aircraft

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violation of the state border of the USSR by the said foreign aircraft. The action of the air defense RTP command during the IAD was a foreign

3. intruder aircraft complied with the requirements of the orders And 29

interception

correct and for protection

air borders of the USSR"

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After these two incidents, American electronic reconnaissance aircraft became more cautious when flying along Soviet borders, but U-2 operations continued. Pilots of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft increasingly delivered aerial photographs to the CIA and the Strategic Air Command, revealing the high rate of saturation of the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense units with new military equipment and electronic equipment. Indeed, at the end of the 50s, P-30 radar stations began to enter service with the air defense forces, detecting air targets at altitudes above 20 kilometers; since 1959, the air regiments have been armed with T-3 high-altitude interceptors with supersonic speed and a ceiling of over 20 kilometers; A very effective S-75 missile system appeared in the anti-aircraft missile forces with a range of 30 kilometers and a target engagement height of 25 kilometers at a target speed of up to 1500 km / h. The decisive stage of the undeclared "air war" was the spring of 1960. By this time a number of significant events had taken place. In September 1959, N. S. Khrushchev was on a visit to the United States. For 12 days, he met with President D. Eisenhower, senior political and statesmen, prominent economists, high-ranking military officers, as well as representatives of all walks of life in American society. The visit was held in an atmosphere of consent and friendliness. The joint Soviet-American communiqué, in particular, stated: "... The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed,

that all outstanding international issues must be resolved not by the use of force, but by peaceful means, through negotiations .

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During the visit, Khrushchev and Eisenhower had several confidential face-to-face conversations. As it became known later, they discussed the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, the question of Berlin, and the problems of mutual reduction of armaments. But Khrushchev never touched on the delicate issue of high-altitude flights by American planes over the territory of the USSR. The President of the United States was invited to visit the USSR in 1960. The improvement in Soviet-American relations also affected the general international climate: on May 16, 1960, a meeting of the heads of government - the USA, the USSR, England and France - was scheduled. The meeting was supposed to resolve many differences between the West and BOCTOKOM.

It seemed that international detente was approaching. But the events that took place in April-May upset the hopes of the world community. And at the center of these events were reconnaissance flights of U-2 aircraft.

At the beginning of 1960, the Soviet government announced that a new type of armed forces had been created in the USSR - the Strategic Rocket Forces. This message poured new wine into old wineskins: high-altitude reconnaissance operations American intelligence services resumed. Where are the strategic missiles of the USSR deployed? What samples are adopted? What are their combat capabilities and numbers? These questions worried the Pentagon and, in essence, came down to one thing: to what extent is the USSR air defense capable of counteracting modern American strategic aviation, the basis of US military power? New U-2 intrusions into Soviet airspace were supposed to answer this question. On April 9, 1960, at 4:47 a.m., the Soviet radar stations of the Turkestan military district detected an air target. According to the first reports, the target was in the airspace of the USSR, 430 kilometers south of the city of Andijan, at a distance of 250 kilometers from the Soviet-Afghan border. Following at an altitude of 19-21 kilometers, U-2

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at a speed of 780 km / h was moving towards Semipalatinsk. Having reached the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, the reconnaissance aircraft made several tacks over it (our radars were steadily targeting); then flew to the area of Lake Balkhash, where the range of anti-aircraft missile forces - Sary-Shagan was located, and from there proceeded to the range of strategic missiles - Tyuratam and through the city of Mary went to Iran. The entire flight lasted over 6 hours. How did it happen that the intruder, which had been in the Soviet

sky for such a long time, was not destroyed, although, as already mentioned, both the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force had forces and means capable of shooting down this U-2? What happened that day was like a theater of the absurd. When

the intruder aircraft was approaching Semipalatinsk, at the airfield of the air defense fighter regiment closest to the Semipalatinsk test site, there were two T-3 aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles, and pilots who had some experience in flying these fighters. But, in order to intercept, they needed to land at another airfield, since there would not be enough fuel to return to their own airfield. And such an airfield was at the Semipalatinsk test site. But the secrecy regime did not allow pilots who did not have special permits to land on it, and the T-3 pilots V. Nazarov and B. Starovoitov did not have such permits. The intruder plane was tackling over a top-secret training ground, and the Soviet aces were waiting for the results of negotiations between the command of the country's Air Defense Forces and the government of the USSR on obtaining the notorious permits. Only at 7 o'clock Moscow time was permission to take off received, but it was already too late. When the T-3 fighters arrived in the Semipalatinsk area, the U-2 was already out of reach: it was flying towards another secret object - Sary Shagan. The command of the air defense forces had hope: after all, there, in Sary-Shagan, the latest S-75 anti-aircraft missile system was deployed, the performance characteristics of which made it possible to hit targets at such a height. But by chance, the U-2 again escaped the threat of destruction. Shooting was not planned that day,

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and there were no missiles in position. And the technical site where they were stored was 100 kilometers from the position of the air defense system. But even there there were no missiles prepared for combat use. Emergency measures were taken, and soon the equipped missiles were already being transferred to the combat position, but the U-2, having finished photographing the Sary-Shagan training ground, was heading towards the Tyuratam training ground. By this time, significant air defense and air force forces were brought to the highest degree of combat readiness. But military happiness did not accompany Soviet aviators that day. The enemy scout was already over Tyuratam, and having completed the task, he left through Mary towards the Iranian border. The nearest air regiment of the Air Force had T-3 fighters, but the pilots had no experience of flying on this aircraft, and besides, there were no air-to-air missiles: they had not yet arrived at the warehouse. And yet, the T-3 of Senior Lieutenant Kudeli took off with missiles from the MIG-19. But since the U-2 was already at a considerable distance, control of the interceptor was transferred to the command post of another division, where they had no experience in controlling high-altitude aircraft: targeting did not take place. Another pilot, Captain Doroshenko, on a T-3 climbed to a height of 17,500 meters and saw an enemy scout, but ... 3 kilometers higher than himself. The pilot, in fact, just mastering the new aircraft, could not rise higher. Thus ended this day full of absurd and dramatic events. To investigate the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the air defense forces on the aircraft violating the airspace of the USSR, a commission was appointed, which included the author of these lines,

at that time he served in the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces of the country. Serious shortcomings were revealed in combat training and command and control of the forces and means of the air defense and air force. I remember that during the analysis of the events of that day, considerable omissions were discovered in the work of radio and radio equipment. In particular, radio reconnaissance in Transcaucasia revealed the flight of U-2 and S-130 from Adana (Turkey) to Peshawar (Pakistan) a few days before the reconnaissance flight, however, these data are due to 390

a number of accidents were not reported to the command. Truly, fate pursued our air defense that day. "Many generals and

officers received severe penalties. Khrushchev was outraged: reality overturned his repeated statements about the high degree of combat readiness of the Soviet Army. The probable routes of the expected new flights of the U-2 (the author was involved in their development. Yes, the lesson of April 9 was hard. But he was not in vain. The conclusions drawn from the failure soon led to success. It happened three weeks later - May 1, 1960. Pilot Francis Gary Powers, who was destined to make the fatal flight of the U-2 program on May 1, was one of the most experienced pilots of Richard Bissell's team. He has flown the U-2 since 1956. Now, for another combat mission, he arrived in Peshawar from Turkey on April 27. It was known that President Eisenhower ordered that the flight be completed on April 28. However, due to bad weather in the areas of the proposed route, A. Dulles asked the President to postpone the flight for several days. He agreed, but on the condition that the task would be carried out no later than May 1. Eisenhower did not want to receive any new protests from the Soviet Union on the eve of the "summit" scheduled for May 16 in Paris. The fact that the U-2 plane could be shot down was not even thought in Washington. Both the president and his entourage were sure that in the worst case, the plane would explode and the pilot would die.

But all the last days of April the weather did not improve, and the deadline was already approaching. Powers and his superiors were nervous. Finally, on the first day of May, weather conditions made it possible to carry out the planned reconnaissance operation. There were only a few hours left before the start of the May Day parade, when a high-altitude target was discovered southeast of Kirovabad of the Tajik SSR. It was a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers. He had the task of flying over the territory of the USSR at the maximum height

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on the route: Peshawar (Pakistan), Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Plesetsk and land at the Bude airfield (Norway). Flying over the points indicated on a special map, the pilot had to turn on the equipment for aerial photography and fixing the work of Soviet radars.

... The alarm signal, according to which the officers of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces of the country were to arrive at the command post, was immediately

communicated to them by phone before 6 am. The first notches of a high-altitude target approaching the border of the Soviet Union in the area south of the city of Dushanbe (it flew straight north at an altitude of more than 19 kilometers at a speed of 750 km / h) were obtained at 5 hours 36 minutes (Moscow time). The general on duty of the KP immediately reported the violation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, his first deputy Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, the Chief of the General Staff, General P. K. Demidov, and the Commander of Fighter Aviation, General E. Ya. Savitsky and anti-aircraft missile troops to General K.P. Kazakov. When, at the beginning of the seventh, the entire command of the Air Defense Forces of the country and we, the officers who

were part of the combat crew, took their jobs at the Central Command Post (at that time it was in the courtyard of the house number 3 of the Ministry of Defense on Frunzenskaya Embankment), the situation was quite nervous. It must not be forgotten that it was the morning of the First of May. At 10:00 a.m., a parade was to begin on Red Square, followed by a demonstration. The leadership of the party, government and the Soviet Armed Forces, including S. S. Biryuzov, was supposed to be on the podium of the Mausoleum. By 8:00 a.m., the command post of the Air Defense Forces of the country concluded that the flight route would pass through the Sverdlovsk region, then to the White Sea, and the

landing airfield would probably be in Norway. From the ground, the unidentified plane is being closely monitored. The nerves of everyone who is at the airfields, missile positions 392

yakh, command posts, headquarters of the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Air Force, at the limit. The flight has already been reported to the Minister of Defense, members

of the Politburo, N. S. Khrushchev. Phone calls from the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky from the Kremlin and personally from N. S. Khrushchev follow one after another. Their tone was approximately as follows: "Shame! The country has provided air defense with everything necessary, but you cannot shoot down a subsonic aircraft ..." Marshal Biryuzov emotionally retorts to this: "If I could become a rocket, I would fly myself and shoot down this damned violator ...".

As often happens at critical moments, various accidents prevent him from being knocked down on one or the other section of the path. Either the missile battalion, whose zone it touches, is not on combat duty that day, then the route passes outside the shelling zone or in such an alignment when a missile launch is impossible. Fighters don't get it at all. All necessary means of radar and radio reconnaissance are included. But the plane is silent. Apparently, he does not use long-range radio communications. In connection with the rise into the air of several pairs of fighters and the need to clear the sky from other aircraft, a signal is given to land on the nearest airfields of all aircraft not involved in the fight against the intruder. This allows radar stations to more reliably guide a target already flying at an altitude of more than 21

kilometers at a speed of 750-800 km / h. Khrushchev demands

to shoot down the plane at any cost. Calls from the government now and then are heard in the tense atmosphere of the Central Command Post of the country's Air Defense Forces. Still would! On the day of the national holiday, two weeks before the Paris summit meeting, a foreign reconnaissance plane flies in the sky of the USSR! Khrushchev and his entourage regarded this as a political provocation. And what is the U-2 - it was already known to Soviet intelligence. Meanwhile, the American reconnaissance plane is confidently going north: now it passes Tyuratam, flies along the Aral Sea, passes Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk.

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The intruder could only be shot down by high-altitude interceptors or anti-aircraft missiles, but for this it was necessary that the U-2 flew through areas where such means were available. Powers was approaching Sverdlovsk. From the Koltsovo airfield (Sverdlovsk), a high-altitude T-3 fighter went to intercept, accidentally appearing there during the transfer of the aircraft from the factory to the unit. Its pilot, Captain Igor Mentyukov, did not have a compensating high-altitude suit, an oxygen mask, and the aircraft was not armed. The pilot receives the task of approaching the intruder and ramming him. The risk was enormous, the chances of success negligible. After all, it was necessary to precisely aim a high-speed supersonic fighter at a target moving at subsonic speed, and do this in a matter of seconds, since the T-3 could not operate longer at the maximum height. Mentyukov gained the desired height, but did not see the target: the guidance did not take place. Here is how the pilot himself later spoke about it:

"I turn around, leave the location of the target. I have a new spread target. With from behind." Undertake feel like I'm falling. After all, it But was going without afterburner, 300 km / h. Fell down 15 did not notice how the afterburner." Evil the speed dropped to the CP: "Turn on thousand meters. "You A With took, I shout: ". need to know how 450 And at what speed does it turn on? Dispersed airplane before kilometers, I try to turn on the afterburner, although it turns on at kilometers. The He light is an emergency fuel balance. It becomes clear that IN it's time to light up — the guidance has failed.

(In 1998, however, he published an article in which he claimed that it was he who shot down Powers ...) It is already nine o'clock in the morning, a military parade will soon begin on Red Square, and an unknown plane is flying through the center of the country. What will be the effect of demonstrations of Soviet military power when a reconnaissance aircraft flies with impunity over the country of socialism, and Soviet air defense is not able to bring it down? Everyone understood this - from Khrushchev to the radar operators who monitored the flight. 394

Meanwhile, the U-2 enters the zone of action of an anti-aircraft missile battalion near Sverdlovsk. Commander of the combat crew, chief of staff of the division, Major M. Voronov

(the commander was on a business trip) gives the order: "Destroy the target." The first rocket shoots up towards the intruder. It should be followed by the second and third. But they don't go off the rails. Why? There was an extremely rare case: the guidance cabin was between them and the target. The reason for the delay is quickly eliminated. Meanwhile, the first rocket explodes behind the U-2, and its fragments pierce the tail and wings without affecting the cockpit. It happened at 8:53 am. But the falling fragments of the U-2, fixed on the radar screen, are perceived as a target. For us, who was at the command post in Moscow on May 1, 1960, we remember the reports about the launch of the rocket and the message that the target "flashed", either using interference or falling apart. The anxiety didn't go away. Meanwhile, there, in the sky near Sverdlovsk, Powers, realizing from a flash from behind and loss of control that he should leave the falling plane, was forced to drop the "lantern" and with difficulty, already at an altitude of less than 10 kilometers, got out of the cockpit. He could not use another way, since the explosion moved his seat forward and his legs were under the dashboard. During the ejection, his legs could be torn off. (This happened even with an undamaged aircraft in past years.) As he later recalled, his U-2, having lost its wings, fell vertically with its tail down. When he dropped the "lantern", gravity pressed him to the seat. Overcoming huge overloads, he tried to leave the falling plane, but was tied to the cockpit with oxygen hoses. Finally, he tore them apart and jumped out on a parachute. By this time, the height was already relatively small. As soon as he broke away from the plane, another missile hit the U-254 with a direct hit. During the fall, the fuselage, engine, wings and cabin of the aircraft were scattered on the ground at a distance of several kilometers from each other. 395

But no one in Sverdlovsk and Moscow knew about this yet. On the contrary, in the area of the disappearance of the intruder, a mark from the target reappeared.

Where did the new goal come from? But the fact was that after the unsuccessful guidance of I. Mentuykov to intercept the U-2, a couple more MIG-19 fighters were raised - Captain Boris Ayvazyan and Senior Lieutenant Sergei Safronov. Here is how B. Ayvazyan recalled these unforgettable moments:

"They took off. Powers above us, In a second But Where? I turn my head — around nobody. he noticed an explosion of five departing Eh, then it would have been a To earth points. collapsing U-2. guess the same reported here found out, because it's already I took the explosion for the self-destruction of the rocket, on am CP. Powers' plane, of course, was destroyed by the Not missilemen."

But the missilemen and radar operators still mistook the U-2 wreckage for passive interference applied by the spy pilot. Therefore, for the Ayvazyan pair, the task was still the same: upon detection, attack the enemy. On the next bend, Ayvazyan recalled, the connection with the follower suddenly broke off. Sergei Safronov fell silent. Ayvazyan saw something unusual in the clear sky

cloud and dived sharply. This saved his life.

In the division commanded by Major A. Shugaev, they perceived the mark that appeared from the fighters as an enemy target, which dropped to 11 thousand meters. In a matter of seconds, she was shot down (by order from the command post of the air defense army). Alas! It was the fighter of senior lieutenant S. Safronov, raised to intercept the U-2. Monitor screens cleared. There was a pause - it became clear that the intruder had been shot down. In fact, it was already half an hour after Powers was shot down, but Major Voronov and his combat crew mistook the U-2 wreckage that clogged the screen for passive interference applied by a spy plane, and the major delayed his report until the situation was clarified. Marshal Biryuzov picked up the government phone and reported to Khrushchev. Khrushchev expressed doubts, but said: "Come and report in detail." Biryuzov

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immediately ordered a group of several air defense officers to fly to Sverdlovsk, sort everything out on the spot, ensure the safety of the aircraft wreckage and report details. He himself went to the Kremlin for the parade. "When the marshal arrived at Red Square, the podium at the Mausoleum was already filled with statesmen, military leaders, guests. His arrival did not go unnoticed. Unlike other military men, he was not in the front, but in everyday uniform and did not immediately take his place among the other generals, but first, right on the podium, he went up to Khrushchev and reported the result in his ear. He nodded with satisfaction. After that, Biryuzov took his place among the military.

The departure of the special aircraft TU-104 to Sverdlovsk (Koltsovo airfield) took place at about 12:00. It was the first plane to take off from Vnukovo after the ban on civil aviation flights, introduced around 8 am on May 1. The plane was full. Groups of the apparatus of the Central Committee, military counterintelligence, the KGB, the General Staff and the Air Defense Forces of the country flew on it. All of them were members of the commission to investigate the incident.

Two hours later they were there. Powers was sent to Moscow. It remained to find and collect parts of the aircraft scattered over the fields and copses, take care of their protection, especially equipment and large, wide (24 cm) rolls of film footage. It was carefully wrapped in soldier's blankets, which then helped to develop it almost without loss and make sure how important objects and with what high quality were photographed. The engine was found in a swamp and was hardly lifted with a crane.

There was also such an incident: in one of the nearby villages, where the people in the Urals with a common feast celebrated on May 1, after the explosions of rockets and the fall of the plane of the downed plane, people began to beat it with crowbars, spilling the fuel inside, which was of great interest to military experts. Having ensured the collection, preservation and shipment to Moscow of all the remnants of the U-2, the air defense group returned to the capital to

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prepare an exhibition of trophies in the Gorky Park of Culture and Leisure. The commission

compiled the first report on the performance data and equipment of the aircraft, the goals and objectives that it solved during reconnaissance flights. An investigation into the Powers case has begun.

It was established that the U-2 had a wide-angle long-focus aerial camera "73-V" on board. He carried out seven-route photographing successively through seven glazed hatches. This ensured the capture of an area 160-200 kilometers wide, the length of the photographed strip was 3,500 kilometers. A lens with a focal length of 915-944.7 millimeters made it possible to take pictures at a scale of 220-230 meters per 1 centimeter from high altitudes. With the help of electronic reconnaissance equipment installed on the aircraft, it was possible to obtain information about the radio-technical support systems for the air defense of the USSR. In Washington, R. Bissell and others involved in the U2 program puzzled over the disappearance of Powers. The silence of Moscow was surprising: no information. Two days later, on

May 3, the NASA message, fabricated by the CIA and secretly approved by the president, was released. The report said that since 1956, NASA has been using Lockheed aircraft - U-2 under the program for studying the meteorological conditions of the upper atmosphere; one of these aircraft, which was on a mission on May 1, 1968 in Turkish airspace, went missing at about 9 a.m. - it may have crashed in the Lake Van area: the pilot who took off from the Adana airfield, while in the region of Eastern Turkey, reported, they say, about malfunctioning oxygen equipment. This message appeared in the newspapers on May 4, but did not attract much attention. The CIA leadership was anxiously waiting for the reaction of the USSR to the message, but Moscow remained silent. At a press conference in Washington, NASA representatives did not give any intelligible answers to journalists' questions. 398

The next day, a regular session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened in Moscow. Khrushchev, in his report on it, published the details of the incident with the reconnaissance aircraft, but kept silent about the fact that the pilot was alive, and parts of the aircraft and equipment allow us to draw conclusions about the nature of the tasks that he performed.

On the same day, a representative of the US State Department spoke to reporters with a statement in which the version of NASA was repeated, supplemented, however, by the fact that the aircraft, which was carrying out a research flight under the NASA program, in all likelihood, accidentally crossed the Soviet-Turkish border and ended up within the USSR .

A little over an hour after the statement by the State Department, the head of the NASA information department again came forward with a clarifying statement that the U-2 had cameras for

photographing cloud cover that this is an unarmed civilian aircraft. He also said that if anything is known about this plane in the USSR, he asks the Russians to report it so as not to prolong the search. But at the time when Washington was trying to cover up Powers'

mission, a signal came from the American embassy in Moscow that rejected all false versions. It produced the effect of an exploding bomb. The fact is that on the evening of May 5, at a reception at the Ethiopian embassy in Moscow, US Ambassador L. Thompson accidentally overheard a conversation between Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Y. Malik and the Swedish ambassador. The Swede asked how the USSR government would qualify the U-2 incident. "I don't know," Malik said, "the pilot is still being interrogated." "Interrogations of the pilot ..." - these words struck Thompson like lightning. He rushed to his embassy and gave a telephone message marked "Out of Queue" to Washington. She was 4 minutes late: NASA's second statement had already been released to the press. The statements made in Washington only added fuel to the fire. On May 7, Khrushchev again spoke to the deputies and said that the pilot was alive and in the USSR, American official circles recognized the fact

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deliberate intrusion into the airspace of the Soviet Union. President D. Eisenhower confirmed at a press conference on May 11 that the flights of American reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the USSR are one of the elements of the system for collecting information about the Soviet Union and have been carried out systematically for a number of years. He stated that he "ordered the collection, by any means possible, of information necessary to protect the United States and the free world from surprise attack and to enable them to make effective defense preparations." He also stated that these measures are necessary, because in the "Soviet Union, secrecy and secrets have become a fetish." The next day, he gave the order to stop U-2 flights over the Soviet Union⁵⁷.

The U-2 incident had very serious consequences: the summit meeting scheduled for May 16 in Paris did not take place, although the heads of the governments of the USA, the USSR and Great Britain arrived in Paris; Eisenhower's visit to the USSR, scheduled for June 10, was canceled, and relations between the USSR and the United States deteriorated. As for the reconnaissance flights of American aircraft over the USSR, they were terminated.

Thus ended the first stage of US attempts to "open the skies" over the Soviet Union, to penetrate the secrets of its weapons programs, carefully guarded during the unfolding competition in the military power of the two superpowers.

The fate of Powers himself is not without interest. It turned out quite tragically. In August 1960, for three days, an open trial was held in the Hall of Columns in the House of the Unions in Moscow, at which he was convicted by the Military

collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for 10 years ... His parents and wife Barbara were present at the trial. In February 1962, Powers was exchanged for illegal Soviet spy R. Abel arrested in the United States. Upon his return to the United States, F. G. Powers divorced his wife in 1963 and married an employee the same year.

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CIA Sue Downey, with whom he was previously associated in the service. The attitude of compatriots towards him at first was very negative. He was accused of not blowing up his plane after his defeat, did not commit suicide with a poison needle given to him, pleaded guilty at the trial. However, the main thing that worried the CIA and the Pentagon leadership was the question at what height did

the first missile hit Powers' plane. At the trial in Moscow (and earlier, during interrogations at the KGB), he said that this happened at an altitude of 68 thousand feet (about 20 thousand meters). Upon his return to the United States, he continued to assert the same thing, but added that he deliberately misled the Soviet investigation, emphasizing this height as the maximum for the U-2, although the true ceiling of the U-2 is 22 thousand meters. He said that he made such a confession to the Soviet court in order not to endanger his comrades, who were supposed to carry out reconnaissance missions after him⁵⁸. However, military experts in the United States did not want to believe him. They referred to the fact that U-2 No. 360, on which he flew, was undergoing major repairs before his flight and was not as reliable as new aircraft, and therefore his instruments could give an error. Some colleagues of Powers claimed that in conversations with them, he called the height at which he was hit by a rocket equal to 45 thousand feet (15 thousand meters). The designer of the U-2, K. Johnson, who specially came (incognito) to Moscow to look at the wreckage of the U-2 in Gorky Park, came to the conclusion that the plane was shot down at a lower altitude than Powers said. The height of the U-2's impact - 68,000 feet - was also questioned by the Senate commission, to which Powers testified⁵⁹. This issue was discussed decades later at the U-2: An Intelligence Revolution conference held in Washington in 1998⁶⁰. The author of this book also took part in it. There I met Powers' widow, and even earlier, his son F. G. Powers during his visit to Moscow.

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However, even then, in the 60s, the CIA soon issued a statement about the conscientious fulfillment by Powers of his duties in accordance with the contract and his duty as a US citizen. He was hired, rehabilitated in the eyes of public opinion. He received all the money owed to him by the CIA (\$2,500 per month during his time in custody and \$1,000 per month of service in the 10-10 unit from the summer of 1956 to May 1960, not received in accordance with

contract). In 1970 he wrote a book about his flight. The CIA leadership demanded to familiarize him with the manuscript. But the publisher was against it. After being turned down by Powers, the CIA was extremely dissatisfied with the content of this book after its publication. Powers had to resign from NASA, where he worked. Since 1971 he has worked for a television company in California.

Powers died on August 1, 1977 during a helicopter crash while flying in the Los Angeles area on official business, under rather strange (and still not completely established) circumstances. He did not live to be 48 years old. He was declared a distinguished veteran and, with the consent of US President Carter, was buried with due honors in the US capital Washington, at Arlington Cemetery, not far from the grave of President Kennedy...

After the international scandal caused by the Powers incident, the program of systematic reconnaissance flights over the USSR was terminated. But reconnaissance aircraft continued to carry out reconnaissance missions for the Soviet Armed Forces without violating the borders of the USSR, although this also happened. So, on July 1, 1960, exactly two months after the failure of the Powers mission, a US Air Force RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in the Barents Sea, off the coast of the Kola Peninsula. There were six people on board. Having taken off from England, the plane entered the secret Boston Casper route leading to the Soviet border in the area of Cape Svyatoi Nos. At 17.28 RB-47 entered air 402

space of the USSR. A few minutes later, a Soviet MIG-17 fighter approached him. Pilot Captain Vasily Polyakov gave the signal "follow me", but the RB-47 continued to move along its route. RB-47 co-pilot Captain Bruce Olmstead responded to Polyakov's warning shots with a 20mm cannon. The next minute, the two twin left engines of the reconnaissance aircraft were hit by Polyakov's burst. The plane lost control and began to fall into the sea. Navigator Captain John McCone and Olmsted ejected. After 6 hours they were rescued by a Soviet trawler. The corpse of the commander of the crew, Major Willard Palm, was also picked up. The rest of the crew died.

McCone and Olmsted were taken to Moscow. An investigation has begun. American pilots claimed that their plane did not violate the border of the USSR. However, according to Soviet radar data, the last part of its route passed over the territorial waters of the USSR. The American intelligence officers were awaiting trial. The corpse of Major Palm in a zinc coffin was sent to the United States. In October of the same year, a Soviet trawler picked up a piece of the RB-47 fuselage and the body of Major Eugene Poza, an operator of an intelligence radio station, in the Barents Sea. He was buried on Soviet territory. (With the formation in 1992 of the joint Russian-American Commission under the Presidents of Russia and the United States on prisoners of war and the missing, a member of which

is also the author of the book, the search for the grave of Major Poza has resumed and is ongoing to this day). In this incident, the US government initially announced that the aircraft had a research mission, but further investigation established that the RB-47 was conducting electronic intelligence and was over the territorial waters of the USSR. In this regard, the head of the Soviet government stressed that the promises of the US administration to stop reconnaissance flights in the sky of the USSR "are not worth a penny." He alerted the British government where the plane took off from,

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that such "aggressive actions could become dangerous for the British people. According to American data, the RB-47 was shot down over neutral waters. This idea was also suggested by the phrase in Khrushchev's statement that the plane went towards the sea and fell outside the borders of the USSR. But since U.S. intelligence agents flew around the USSR every day—a sharp U.S. reaction to this incident could complicate an already tense international situation. Moreover, when in August 1960 Presidential Security Adviser Gordon Gray suggested to Eisenhower that he provoke the hijacking of a Soviet aircraft or ship, regardless of its true location, declare him a "border trespasser" and launch an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, the president rejected this proposal. * 1 Soon an American C-47 transport aircraft violated the border in the Kuril Islands. Mutual irritation grew.

But still, in January 1961, immediately after John F. Kennedy took office as president of the United States, two pilots of the downed RB-47 aircraft were handed over to the American authorities as a sign of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and its desire to improve relations with the United States under their new government.

Similar cases occurred in the future. For example, in August 1962, a U-2 flew over Sakhalin. The US responded to the Soviet note of protest with an official apology. And although episodic violations of Soviet borders by American aircraft took place later, such a purposeful program of systematic aerial reconnaissance of the USSR, such as the U-2 flight program or the previous flights of reconnaissance aircraft RB-45, RB 47, Canberra, after the incident with Powers was no longer there. And the need for this with the advent of reconnaissance artificial satellites of the Earth (American "Midas", "Samos", "Ferret" and others) has disappeared. More advanced means of reconnaissance have supplanted aviation, although even today it plays a significant role. 404

Thus ended the most intense and dramatic covert air war waged by the United States and the Soviet Union in a fierce competition for superiority in the latest weapons. But there were more fights ahead.

dangerous...

Notes

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CHAPTER VI RUNNING TO ARMAGEDDON

In February 1960, returning from a visit to the USSR, US Representative to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge informed the US government that the Russians continued to lead the missile race. And although Khrushchev, in a private conversation with Lodge, said that in reality this was not the case, and the U-2 flights confirmed this, the hype continued in America about the "missile gap" of the United States from the Soviet Union. At that time, the US military-industrial complex was gaining strength and, together with the Department of Defense, demanded multibillion-dollar appropriations for orders for the latest types of weapons, and especially nuclear missiles. When the Minuteman solid-propellant intercontinental missile program was approved in the White House in 1961, presidential advisers believed that the national security interests of the country did not require the adoption of such a number (950) Minuteman missiles. One of those days, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had an interesting conversation.

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What do you think, Bob? President asked Robert McNamara, informing him of the point of view of his advisers.

"Well, they are right.

"But why do we need nine hundred and fifty missiles then?" Because it's the smallest number we can suggest on Capitol Hill. Otherwise they will kill us there.

The minister was referring to the powerful military-industrial corporations in Congress that lobbied for orders for the arms magnates.

The threatening growth of influence on political affairs in the state of military monopolies, closely associated with generals and congressmen representing the military-industrial circles, and the media controlled by them, began to frighten even major American politicians. Leaving the presidency in January 1961, D. Eisenhower, in his farewell message, drew attention to the fact that the influence of the military-industrial complex "economic, political and even spiritual is felt in every city, every state governor's residence, in every institution of the federal government." Pointing out the danger of such a policy, he emphasized that "in the activities of the government

we must beware of the spread of the unlimited influence of the military-industrial complex, whether it is carried out intentionally or spontaneously. The potential for a dangerous increase in the power of such a complex exists and will exist.”³ This warning from the Republican President sounded very relevant.

1. Strength test: Berlin and Cuba

In the early 60s, the most important goal of the American ruling class was the desire to maintain and, if possible, strengthen military superiority over the Soviet Union.

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Union and the countries of the socialist camp in the new, changed conditions, when the strategic invulnerability of the United States has irrevocably become a thing of the past. American hardliners on the USSR made every effort to prevent or at least push back any possibility of the Soviet Union achieving parity in strategic weapons. At the end of 1979, speaking at the London Institute for Strategic Studies, H. Kissinger frankly admitted: "Our strategic doctrine was based to a very large extent, and perhaps even exclusively on our superior strategic power. The Soviet Union never relied on superior strategic power" ⁴ . This recognition testifies to the fact that even in those years the statesmen who stood on America's captain's bridge knew that the achievements of scientific and technical thought in the USSR and the state of its armaments did not pose a serious threat to the United States.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon was looking for

"reliable" ways to destroy the Soviet state in the event of a nuclear war. The policy of the Soviet leadership, which in every possible way emphasized the enormous combat capabilities of Soviet missile weapons, also contributed to the fear-mongering of the increased capabilities of the USSR to deliver an effective retaliatory strike. At the same time, in the second half of the 1950s, the USSR consistently reduced the troops and forces of the general fleet. 63 divisions and brigades, part of the military schools were disbanded, 375 ships were mothballed. Whereas in 1955 the Soviet Armed Forces numbered 5,763,000 men, by 1959 they were reduced by 2,140,000 men, and in 1960 a new reduction of 1,200 men was planned . In the United States, this was seen as a growing threat of nuclear missile war. It was believed that the USSR, which, like Tsarist Russia, had always relied on its ground forces, was now striving to achieve superiority over ⁴¹⁰

US in strategic nuclear missiles. For Americans, accustomed for centuries to the fact that their territory is invulnerable to any enemy, such

the prospect looked very threatening. Moreover, Khrushchev did not skimp on advertising the Soviet nuclear missile power. In November 1959, for example, he declared: "We have now accumulated so many missiles, so many atomic and hydrogen warheads, that if we are attacked, we can wipe out all our potential adversaries from the face of the earth."

Such statements by the Russians frightened the American man in the street. Only a few people in the United States knew the true picture of the balance of nuclear missile forces, but, as mentioned above, they could not disclose this to the general public. Atomic bomb shelters began to be built in American cities, and atomic alarms were conducted in schools and universities. It was well known that missiles of that time, especially long-range missiles, had very low accuracy. This was offset by the power of the combat charge, which reached 10 megatons or more. Therefore, only large-area targets, and above all large metropolitan cities, could be the target for strikes by such missiles. In this regard, McNamara in 1961 put forward the concept of "hostage cities". It provided for the announcement of certain cities in the USA and the USSR, which, in the event of a nuclear war, would be subjected to missile strikes. This measure was conceived as a kind of guarantee agreed with the Soviet Union and designed to keep the USSR from a nuclear missile attack on the United States. In 1962, the US Secretary of Defense put forward a new concept - "counterforces". It envisaged, as mentioned above, by a sudden strike to destroy the main part of the Soviet means of delivering nuclear weapons and deprive the USSR of the possibility of a retaliatory strike, and then by the threat of nuclear missile bombardment of Soviet cities and the destruction of the population "try to end the war on favorable terms for themselves." The first goal was now not the military-industrial and hell 411

administrative and political centers, and the positions of the Soviet missiles, aviation airfields, air defense systems. Their destruction made cities defenseless.

Thus, the threat of strikes on cities and the mass destruction of civilians (which was the cornerstone of fascist views on the use of V-weapons in the 40s) was an integral part of Washington's new strategy. And although the stake on a sudden strike was covered with defensive phraseology, its frightening essence was so obvious that even the American theorists of nuclear war themselves recognized it. "The main difficulty with the idea of a counterforce strategy is," H. Kissinger wrote, "that it is almost impossible to reconcile it with taking up a position of strategic defense"⁶. "The strategy of counterforce," noted A. Waskow, "almost inevitably gives the advantage to the side that strikes first" ⁷. The assertion of the creators of the new strategy that it was directed mainly against the "military potential" of the enemy was also demagogic. Rockets of that time

with their still low hitting accuracy, they could not act accurately enough, reliably on compact targets, which were military installations. Thus, for example, the Paulis missiles, which were installed on the first submarines and launched from a submerged position, according to American experts, due to their low accuracy, were intended for strikes against large-area targets - cities. According to Pentagon calculations, the assets of the American nuclear attack forces that survived the retaliatory strike were to destroy 25 percent of the enemy's population and 70 percent of its industry in the second strike. D. Ellsberg, who was engaged in strategic planning at the Pentagon and drafted political directives for the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, remarks on this:

"Our plans included starting military operations around the globe, delivering a full-scale nuclear strike and no matter how it happened, if the US troops are any Russian troops

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the Soviet Union with all nuclear weapons at its disposal, Russia in our

And as quickly as possible, hitting all cities with military targets. In other words, V

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unleashing by the United States of a general nuclear war of the USSR ... Chiefs 325

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destruction "**. And European weapons, you can say O These V

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The Soviet Union was not an angel either, although Khrushchev's threats were not intended to intimidate America, but to impress upon it that it, America, should not interfere in the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union.

The crises in the socialist camp that took place in 1956 (and the unrest and unrest earlier and later) repeatedly testified not only to the mistakes of the authorities, but also to the provocative role of the Western powers that supported the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist uprisings in the countries of Eastern Europe. And it is natural that in the confrontation in the bipolar world it caused a response from the opposite side.

At the end of the 1950s, the German problem became one of the most acute issues in relations between the two military-political blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The personal qualities of the leaders - Eisenhower, Kennedy, and especially Khrushchev and Ulbricht, the head of the GDR, also played a significant role in this.

After the 1956 crises in the camp of the socialist community, the Soviet government and the leaders of the allied countries made every effort to strengthen the camp of socialism and increase the influence of the Soviet Union in the "third world". In Europe, the main political irritant was the status of West Berlin. At the center of the German Democratic

Republic (GDR) was controlled
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the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, West Berlin is a showcase for the prosperity of the West, an advertisement for the Western way of life, very seductive for the Germans of the GDR. In addition, West Berlin was the focus of NATO intelligence services. All this was extremely nervously perceived by both the government of the GDR and the leadership of the USSR. In this regard, the strengthening and retention of the GDR in the socialist community acquired paramount importance. All the more so as more and more signals were coming from the GDR that alarmed the Kremlin.

Thus, on February 24, 1958, the Soviet embassy in Germany sent a message "On the situation in West Berlin" to Moscow. It said:

"IN For a number of years West Berlin has served as the center of subversive activities of the Western powers against the German Democratic Republic. It is in Berlin ... that an open struggle is taking place between the capitalist socialist systems. West Berlin is used by the enemy to organize various kinds of political provocations and economic sabotage against the GDR, a kind of propaganda showcase for the Western world. The German friends are faced with the task of neutralizing the activities ... by strengthening their own influence in this city.

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The embassy proceeded from the assumption that "the Berlin question can be solved independently of the settlement of the German problem as a whole by the gradual economic and political conquest of West Berlin"¹⁰. The embassy believed that despite the Potsdam agreements and other negotiations, the Berlin problem was considered by the West in isolation from all-European and all-German affairs. An important fact that required the adoption of some radical measures was the increasing number of East Germans fleeing to West Berlin, with their movement to the countries of the capitalist world, most often to the FRG. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yu. Andropov on August 21, 1958, in a report to members of the Central Committee of the Party said:

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"Behind Recently, the departure of the GDR to West Germany has significantly intensified. The number 1000 teachers, 518 from of intelligentsia transitions compared to last year increased Fifty percent. doctors, 796 technical intelligentsia and specialists left the republic in the first six months of this year. As on be seen from the reason for the departure of the intelligentsia, many organizations often treat knowledge from workers incorrectly. from

as well as a number of prominent scientists
and a number of German communications, the main
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The way out of this situation was seen in the fact that the USSR increased the assistance of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in strengthening the communist influence on the German intelligentsia. IN

As a result, it was decided to "eliminate the occupation status" of Berlin. Khrushchev made a statement about this in the form of an ultimatum to the Western powers on November 27 of the same year: to negotiate a peace treaty with Germany within 6 months, otherwise the management of the Soviet zone of occupation will be transferred to the GDR, with which a peace treaty will be concluded, and the status of West Berlin will be eliminated. The military representative in East Berlin, General Shalin, even before Khrushchev's speech on the German

question, informed the Central Committee of the CPSU on November 19, 1958: "There is an opinion that England and France, in the event of decisive actions by the governments of the USSR and the GDR, could agree to the withdrawal of troops from West Berlin, but The United States will oppose this . "

But the desired was clearly presented as reality. On December 14, 1958, in Paris, the foreign ministers of the three Western powers and the FRG reaffirmed "the determination of their governments to secure their positions and rights regarding Berlin." Two days later, the NATO Council on the Berlin issue, meeting urgently in the same place, stated:

"No state does not have the right to unilaterally break international agreements. The actions of the Soviet Union regarding Berlin, its methods destroy the trust between nations, which forms the basis of peace.

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The demands of the Soviet Union created a serious situation, which must be vigorously opposed ^{12.}

The key role in the further development of the crisis was played by the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and personally by Walter Ulbricht, who was afraid of "excessive rapprochement" between Moscow and the FRG. Soviet Ambassador M. Pervukhin, after a conversation with Ulbricht on December 5, 1958, reported to Moscow:

"IN. Ulbricht said that the GDR was will continue its political, so actively fighting against Bonn as an economic ^{By} line... Ulbricht stressed that the main national position, which could defeat Adenauer, ^{With}

is to show the revival of the German militarism of fascism, to expose the aggressive plans of German imperialism. This point will be further devoted to the policy of the GDR. ^{And} ^{By} ^V ^{13.} decisive in

In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, Ulbricht said that the present moment is a turning point in the issue of recognition of the GDR. "Until now, the population of West Germany believed that the GDR would one day be annexed to the FRG. Now this view is changing . In addition, Ulbricht told the Soviet ambassador that he "has documents in which NATO's aggressive plans are outlined, which provides for the possibility of advancing West German troops to the Oder." This Ulbricht pressure on Moscow, inciting fears both among the Soviet leadership and its own people, pursued the quite obvious goals of preserving the GDR

as a sovereign state, strengthening the internal position of the GDR and the SED. Meanwhile, the flight

to the West through Berlin intensified. "Last year, more than 90% of all refugees went through West Berlin, while in 1957 - less than 44%," the embassy reported. "The population of the GDR from 1950 to 1958 decreased by 997.5 thousand people"¹⁵. Increasingly, the inability of the East Berlin authorities to determine the true reasons for the deployment of

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failed events. On September 15, 1959, A. Neumann, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the SED Central Committee, told Counsellor-Envoy V.V. on the territory of the GDR to prevent this process. Neither East Berlin nor Moscow found politically flexible enough ways out of the emerging critical situation. A purely ideological conclusion was made: "to stop the imperialists" in Germany, Berlin. The idea of a wall in Berlin, which would prevent the flow of refugees, was hatched in the second half

of the 50s in East Berlin and in Moscow. But only at a meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Department of Internal Affairs on August 3-5, 1961, it was formalized. Ulbricht demanded radical solutions. Khrushchev hesitated. He wanted more flexible approaches, but combined with pressure on the West. He, as mentioned above, already presented an ultimatum to the Western powers on November 27, 1958: to leave West Berlin within 6 months in order to make it a free city, but in fact subordinate to the GDR. Khrushchev's conversation with Kennedy during their first meeting in Vienna in July 1961 is typical. Khrushchev declared: "The peace treaty with the GDR, with all the ensuing consequences, will be signed by December of this year." "If this is so, then a cold winter will come," was the answer of the President of the United States. The heads of the superpowers parted coldly. And the chance that the meeting in Vienna gave to normalize relations between the USSR and the USA to warm the political climate in the world was missed. Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy's firmness and will, believing that with a young president a policy of pressure was possible. He put the American president before a choice: either jointly sign an agreement recognizing the existence of two German states (GDR and FRG) "or the USSR will sign a separate agreement with the GDR no later than December 1961, after

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whereby the occupation rights of the Western powers in Berlin and free access to the city will cease, and communications with West Berlin will be controlled by the government of East Germany.

This approach alarmed Kennedy. Khrushchev resorted to

a bluff that had worked during the Suez Crisis, but now left out of Kennedy's character. Khrushchev, like the entire Politburo, was not going to enter into a confrontation with the United States, let alone get involved in a war with them over Germany. But his ostentatious assertiveness and determination, with which he wanted to force Kennedy to accept his conditions, had the opposite effect: Kennedy, upon his return, began to prepare for the adoption of military countermeasures.

Despite the negative attitude of the Americans to the change in the status of West Berlin and the conclusion of a peace treaty with two German states, Khrushchev did not back down from the idea of cutting off West Berlin from East Berlin with a reliable barrier. He believed that if "all entrances and exits" leading to the West were "closed", then East Germans would work better, the economy would improve and reach such a level that, with social guarantees for workers in the GDR, it would even become attractive to West Germans. However, it was necessary to somehow warn the United States and Britain, France and the FRG

about the intentions of the Warsaw Pact in relation to West Berlin. On August 7, Khrushchev spoke on Moscow television. Regarding the question of Berlin, he said that there was no thought of a blockade of the western part of the city, but said that the planned reduction of the armed forces would be canceled, and moreover, an additional conscription of reservists into the army and the redeployment of a number of divisions from the interior of the country to the western borders were planned. It was a warning. On the night of August 12-13, 1961, the infamous wall was erected between East and West Berlin. The Kremlin anxiously awaited the reaction of the United States. But nothing bad happened. On August 13, several American jeeps toured the East Ber

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line. They were let through without hindrance, although during the trip they were accompanied by cars of the security services of the USSR and the GDR. Soon the assessment of the events by the American president became known. He said that "the Ulbricht regime, in all likelihood, has the legal right to close its borders, and no one can imagine that we should go to war over this . "

It must be said that only very few people knew about this statement by Kennedy. As for official Washington, its reaction was stormy. US Vice President L. Johnson arrived in West Berlin. He stated that the protection of the inhabitants of the city is a matter of "sacred honor" by the people of the United States. The garrison of American troops in the city was increased by 1,500 men. The general in command of the American forces in Germany and Dean Acheson, the former head of the State Department, demanded the use of force. In the United States, tactical aviation units were put on high alert, more than 75,000 reservists were called up for the army. Similar measures were taken in England. The Berlin crisis reached its peak on 28 October. On this day, the Americans planned an action to destroy

parts of the wall at one of the checkpoints. For its implementation, several jeeps with infantry and journalists, bulldozers and several tanks were involved. The attracted forces were lined up in battle formation: jeeps were in front, followed by bulldozers, which were supposed to destroy the barriers, and ten tanks closed the column. It was believed that the German border guards would not dare to shoot at the column of the army, the winner in World War II. However, the Soviet command learned in advance about the impending operation. It was decided to take countermeasures. On the night before the action, a tank regiment and a rifle battalion were hidden in the alleys adjacent to the checkpoint. Early in the morning, three jeeps approached the checkpoint at the Brandenburg Gate, bulldozers rumbled behind them, covered by tanks with Zak 419

dug hatches and uncovered guns. The jeeps were allowed into East Berlin without hindrance. But when the bulldozers approached the checkpoint, Soviet tanks came out of the adjacent lanes and began to turn around towards the bulldozers. The roar of the engines was repeatedly amplified by speakers placed on the roofs of buildings. The bulldozers stopped short of the checkpoint. Soviet tanks stood in their own half of the street. Behind them were visible vehicles with infantry. Jeeps entering East Berlin were surrounded by the GDR police. They turned around and headed back. Nobody hindered them. Bulldozers and tanks from both sides were facing each other. The engines were off. The confrontation continued until evening. With the onset of darkness, the Soviet units were ordered to retreat to the same lanes where they had concentrated in the morning. 20 minutes after the roar of the engines on the east side of the checkpoint had died down, the American column turned around and moved deep into West Berlin. The incident is over. After him, tensions in Berlin began to subside, but Soviet-American relations continued to deteriorate.

This was facilitated not only by the Berlin crisis. The struggle for the "Third World" continued in very sharp forms, and the competition between the superpowers in the field of nuclear missile weapons was gaining momentum. The adoption in the United States of the "flexible response" strategy in the same year of 1961 and the high rate of commissioning of strategic missiles, both land and sea, were painfully perceived by the leadership of the Soviet Union. Cuba was another bone of contention. After the victory of the revolution in Cuba in 1959, the anti-imperialist, anti-American regime of F. Castro, established on the island, brought the Cuban government closer to the Kremlin and provided it with comprehensive assistance from the USSR. This caused growing irritation in Washington, where the construction of socialism proclaimed by F. Castro in Cuba and its rapprochement with the USSR was regarded as a threat to US national interests. In April 1961, the Cuban

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Russian emigrants who settled in the United States, with the help of the Pentagon, tried to organize an intervention in Cuba, but were defeated by Castro's revolutionary troops. After the failure of the armed invasion of Cuba, the United States organized an economic blockade of Cuba, conducted large-scale exercises nearby, and in every possible way demonstrated a military threat to the "Island of Freedom". Speaking at the XXII Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, Khrushchev stated that "in the context of the aggravation of the international situation" the Soviet "was

forced to suspend the reduction of the armed forces planned for 1961, increase defense spending, postpone the transfer of soldiers and sailors to the reserve, resume testing of new, more powerful weapons. Just in 1961, as already mentioned, the government USSR, after a three-year break, resumed nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya: launches of strategic missiles with nuclear charges were carried out.

The aggravation of relations between the superpowers, the failure of the Vienna meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy, after which Khrushchev increased political and propaganda pressure on the United States, and Kennedy, perceiving Khrushchev's declarations as a real threat and the USSR's readiness to go to a global war, led both leaders to decisive action. The United States began to rapidly deploy the medium-range missiles "Thor" and "Jupiter" in a number of European countries (England, Italy, Turkey). This seriously changed the ratio of nuclear missile strategic forces

between opposing blocks. The deployment of the Thor and Jupiter missiles (range - 3,500 km) on the bases of Europe gave Washington a number of advantages in the event of a general nuclear war. Before the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, the USA and the USSR, having intercontinental missiles on their territories, were in an equal position (the flight time of an ICBM to enemy territory was 30 minutes, the warning time of a missile launch was 15 minutes). This meant that there would be a counter-strike, since each 421

of the parties, in the event that it is subjected to a missile attack, has the opportunity to launch its missiles at enemy targets before its missiles reach the designated targets. There was a principle: "you die first, and I die second." Now, with the advent of the Thor and Jupiter missiles in Europe, the situation was changing. American missiles, starting from England, Italy, Turkey, could hit

targets on the territory of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries in 10-12 minutes, i.e. before they could be detected by the radio systems of these countries. Thus, the factor of surprise increased. In addition, by hitting selected targets on enemy territory from shorter distances, the Americans could hit them with greater accuracy. And finally, dispersing their forces of the first strike

across the territories of several countries, the United States had the opportunity to divert part of the Soviet retaliatory missiles to European countries where their medium-range missiles were located, and reduce losses for the United States.

For the USSR, against which the Tor and Jupiter missiles were aimed, this type of weapon posed a strategic threat. The Americans changed the balance of first strike forces in their favor. Appropriate response measures were needed. But what? Attacks on Alaska from Soviet territory did not solve the problem. The USSR naval missile nuclear submarines were not yet ready for commissioning, especially on an adequate scale to counter the American nuclear missile threat. It was necessary to find a foothold from which Soviet medium-range R-12 and R-14 missiles could pose an equal threat to the United States and thereby restore the status quo of the parties in the ability of nuclear missiles to inflict "unacceptable damage to a potential enemy" in the opposite direction. - retaliatory strike. And here Cuba came to the fore. It was from here that it was possible to threaten with medium-range missiles (R-12 - range 2000 km, R-14 - 4000 km) a significant part of the territory of the United States, especially its eastern regions with many mega

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policies and developed industry. But for this it was necessary to preserve the Republic of Cuba, politically oriented towards the USSR, to protect it from the threat of liquidation of the regime of F. Castro by the United States. And the threat persisted. After the failure of the attempt to land in Cuba the émigré opponents of Castro, backed by Washington, the economic blockade of the "Island of Freedom" continued, there was a constant danger of a new invasion by émigré formations in the United States or directly by American troops.

Therefore, these questions were constantly hovering in the Kremlin offices at the beginning of 1962. At the center of this whole problem was the question of the immediate deployment of nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba, in agreement with the leadership of that country. This was done then in the name of strengthening the defense capability of the "Island of Freedom". Indeed, the Soviet military presence in Cuba, especially the deployment of a missile group there, was possible only if the Castro regime was preserved. Here is how A. A. Gromyko, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, described the development of events:

"On May 20, 1962, N. S. Bulgaria, Khrushchev was returning to Moscow on a from
where he was, accompanied him With friendly visit. I
V trip And that's why I flew With him back V volume

the same plane. When we've been around for a while in flight

Khrushchev would suddenly turn to to me:
— I wanted no talk to you in private. And I important question. I
one near Not realized that it would be really very O something
important. Khrushchev Not loved "narrow" conversations on

political topics and rarely held them. me? I decided About what He will him
he had some new idea, which he needed matured or matures with
to share with his duty of foreign affairs ... The situation that has now
person dealing By developed around Cuba, Khrushchev
— said, is dangerous. To save her as an independent —

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states need to place some of our nuclear missiles there. Only this can save the country. Washington Playa
Giron. What do you think He expected an answer. The question was unexpected

Not will last year's invasion failure stop this account? on

And difficult.

I
said: Operation Playa Giron, of course, was an aggressive, US-organized action against
Cuba. But I

is familiar with situation in United States, where he spent Including
eight years. was there, as And ambassador. I must frankly say, the United is absolutely sure
that the delivery on you know, Cuba, our nuclear missiles will
cause a political explosion in the this I And This
States. In should be taken into account And then suddenly said:

— he nuclear war us Not needed, and we fight not we are going.
I was silent. and Khrushchev, after some thought Finally

conversation said: - Question importation of Soviet missiles on Cuba I I will put V
coming days He is soon pa meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
and did" 20.

Gromyko writes "soon," although the meeting of the Presidium of the
Central Committee took place immediately after Khrushchev's arrival, on
May 20. Khrushchev told his comrades-in-arms the essence of the issue, but
suggested that this should not be decided immediately, but that they should
meet in a week. However, they gathered earlier - on May 24. This was
framed as a meeting of the Defense Council jointly with the Presidium of the
Central Committee. By this time, a group of employees of the General Staff
under the leadership of Generals S.P. Ivanov and A.I. Gribkova prepared a
plan for a military operation to assist the Republic of Cuba under the code
name
Anadyr. Before familiarizing the members of the Presidium of the Central
Committee with the prepared plan, Khrushchev asked: "Well, what did you
think, comrades?" O. Kuusinen took the floor. He said: "Comrade Khrushchev,
I thought. If you make such a proposal and think that such a decision should
be made, I believe you and vote with you. Let's do it." Mikoyan

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expressed doubt, calling it a dangerous move. Nevertheless, the decision
was made²¹. But two days

before that, A. Alekseev (a KGB resident in Cuba) had been
summoned to Moscow. In a conversation with him, Khrushchev said: "We
are appointing you as ambassador to Cuba. Your appointment is due to
the fact that we have decided to deploy missiles with nuclear warheads in
Cuba. Only this can protect Cuba from a direct American invasion. Do
you think Castro will agree To such a step?"²². Alekseev expressed
doubt, because

the Soviet military presence in Cuba would be used by the Americans to completely isolate the island. This, he believed, would deal a blow to Castro's policy of strengthening Cuba's solidarity with Latin American countries. (By the way, the appointment of Alekseev as ambassador was due to the fact that he had excellent relations with F. Castro, which Ambassador S. Kudryavtsev could not boast of.)

Therefore, at a meeting of the Military Council on May 24, Khrushchev spoke about the appointment of Alekseev and his doubts. At the same time, he stated that "a bold step is required to save the Cuban revolution." He further said: "Since in this region of the world the balance of power is not in our favor (if only in this region: the total ratio in nuclear missiles was 5,000 missiles needed and deployed: 300 in favor of the United States. - quietly, with precaution, to put Americans face we are forced to put up with A.O.)... a fait accompli." And he added: "After all, American missiles deployed near our borders in Turkey."²³ As the participants and documents of the events testify, F. Castro took the Soviet proposals positively. he said, "and in order to make it, I need to consult with my closest associates. But if such a decision is necessary for the socialist camp, I think we will give our consent to the deployment of Soviet missiles on our island. Let us be the first victims in a fight with the American imperialism"²⁴ .

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In Moscow, they did not think to bring matters to a nuclear war. Khrushchev believed that the Americans, who deployed their missiles in Europe, having a military base at Guantanamo, directly in Cuba, should come to terms with the fact that Soviet military bases would appear on the same island. This response to their missiles in Italy, and especially in Turkey, they, according to Khrushchev, should have been perceived as a retaliatory move by the USSR in order to restore the balance that existed before the deployment of "Thor" and "Jupiter" in Europe. Of course, this was not about the threat of a missile attack on the United States, but about the fact that the Americans would understand from their own experience what feelings the peoples of the USSR experience when they are under the threat of being hit by American missiles located around the Soviet Union. But the Kremlin did not take into account one important psychological factor. The United States and NATO decided to deploy

American medium-range missiles as early as 1957. Adopted openly at the NATO session. The entire course of preparations for their deployment was not a secret to the world community. There was a broad protest movement of the European peoples, the deployment of missiles was covered in the press. And the Soviet Union did this secretly, secretly from the world community, which later cost the Soviet Union dearly in the moral and psychological aspect, undermined its prestige in the world.

In the meantime, at the end of May, a delegation went to Cuba consisting of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Sh.

Rashidov, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces S. Biryuzov, Secretary of the Defense Council S. Ivanov. The delegation had to carefully study the possibilities of the forthcoming deployment of missile units, identify the optimal conditions for their covert deployment, provide camouflage, and think over how to avoid leakage of classified information. This was the task primarily of the military - Biryuzov and Ivanov. However, Rashidov was in a hurry to Moscow in order to report on F. Castro's consent to accept the Soviet proposal as soon as possible. Time for a detailed reconnaissance of the local

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However, he did not give the conditions for the deployment of missile units, their positions to Biryuzov and Ivanov. Therefore, a deep analysis and reasonable proposals for the placement of missile positions and their camouflage did not work out. Subsequently, this haste cost the Soviet missile units in Cuba dearly. Upon arrival in Moscow, the delegation reported its views: it is possible to start the Anadyr operation. Defense Minister R. Malinovsky decided

to create in Cuba a group of Soviet troops as part of a missile division (R-12 and R-14 missiles and nuclear warheads for them). The missile group was to be covered from the air by Il-28 tactical bombers, parts of MIG-21 fighter-interceptors, S-75 anti-aircraft missiles, and from the sea by Kometa coastal defense missiles, Luna tactical missile systems and high-speed boats armed with missiles P-1525 .

In August, Che Guevara arrived in Moscow to finalize an agreement on the supply of Soviet missiles to Cuba. Castro proposed immediately publishing the text of the treaty, believing that this would raise the prestige of Cuba as a sovereign state that had concluded an agreement with another sovereign state, the USSR, on the basis of international law. But in Moscow it was considered naive. Khrushchev said that the Americans would find a thousand ways to prevent Soviet missiles from reaching Cuba. Therefore, only the unannounced, secret delivery of Soviet missiles to the "Island of Freedom" is real. The Cubans agreed . At the same time, the question arose of how to covertly deliver this entire grouping of such a large group several thousand

kilometers away to Cuba. It was necessary to radically change the entire transportation plan of the Soviet Ministry of the Navy, to charter a lot of foreign ships, and to conduct business in such a way that the owners and their crews did not know about the content and final destination of the cargo on board. The ultimate goals of moving units at the initial stage were not reported even to high-ranking officers. The ships left various ports of the European part of the country. Since for missile defense

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From the air attacking positions, the means of combating the air enemy were required, the air defense units were among the first to be sent.

They left Nikolaev. Air Marshal Sudets, who at that time was Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, who arrived at the port, handed over on the day of departure on July 12 to the senior commander in charge of the air defense unit on the large-capacity vessel "Khabarovsk", a package sealed with the signatures of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Navy, with the instruction: "Open after Gibraltar. For everyone, your ship is a ship carrying agricultural specialists." Thus began the transfer of Soviet

troops to Cuba. The transportation of personnel and equipment was carried out by sea on passenger and dry cargo ships of the merchant fleet from the ports of the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas (Kronstadt, Liepaja, Baltiysk, Sevastopol, Feodosia, Nikolaev, Poti, Murmansk). Vessels came for unloading in 11 ports of Cuba. The first transport with equipment and people that arrived on the island on July 26 was the ship "Maria Ulyanova". Behind him, on July 27-31, another 9 ships arrived. Transports with weapons and specialists continued to arrive. A total of 35 transports were planned. From September 9 to October 22, 24 ships managed to arrive. In September, the Soviet 51st Missile Division began to form in Cuba (commander Major General I. Statsenko). Unloading was carried out only at night, in conditions of complete blackout of ships and ports. All approaches to the unloading sites were guarded by Soviet units, and from the sea - by patrol boats. Rocket equipment was also delivered to areas of permanent deployment only at night. The personnel involved in these operations wore Cuban military uniforms. By October 22, units of the missile forces, air force, air defense, and motorized rifle units were deployed on the island. The grouping of Soviet troops in Cuba was headed by General of the Army I. A. Pliev. In total, 40 thousand soldiers and officers were deployed on the island, as well as Il-28 bombers, Luna tactical missiles, interceptor fighters

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chiki, anti-aircraft missiles and other air defense systems. The main striking force was 42 R-12 strategic missiles with a range of up to 2000 km and 36 nuclear warheads for them²⁸.

These missiles, capable of hitting targets on US territory up to the Washington-Dallas line, posed a strategic threat to the US equal to that posed to the USSR by the American medium-range missiles Tor and Jupiter deployed in Europe. The appearance of Soviet missiles in Cuba created an opportunity to start negotiations on the withdrawal of American missiles from Europe on a reciprocal basis. But first, it was necessary to covertly deploy missile units.

Necessary measures were taken to camouflage the missile sites and secure the storage of missiles and warheads. They were kept separately: missiles - in sheltered areas, warheads - in caves at a distance of a kilometer from the missile positions in special vans. It took 3 hours to attach the head to the rocket, and to bring it completely

assembled missile on alert - 15 minutes. However, the strategic missiles were never put on alert during their entire stay in Cuba.

Naturally, despite the camouflage measures, it was not possible to hide the transfer of such a scale of military equipment and military contingents. The Americans received their first signal from West German intelligence: data on the movement of ships with weapons through the Baltic straits. They used the space system, the Samos satellites, at full capacity. Aerial photography of Cuban territory began to conduct high-altitude U-2. Unfortunately, the fact that, having delivered their first official missiles to Cuba, representatives of the relevant international organizations did not make an official statement about this played a significant role in unleashing the crisis. It was the secrecy of this action that caused it to be especially resolutely rejected by the

Kennedy administration. As noted on the Soviet-ame 429
Soviet

V

At the Rican symposium on the Caribbean crisis held in Moscow in 1989, one of the American participants, "the sharpness of our reaction was due, in part, to the fact that we were deceived, that it was a deliberate and deliberate deception." Another recalled that American missiles were placed openly in Turkey, and the American and world public knew about them. It was the secrecy of the step taken by Moscow that worked in America in favor of the "hawks" to justify and strengthen the image of an enemy that is ready to do anything to defeat the United States, the main obstacle to its historical goal - world communist

domination. It was Soviet secrecy that largely determined the ultimatum of the American line in overcoming the crisis. Our silence was not justified. But, on the other hand, it was, as it were, a response to the actions of the United States during the U-2 reconnaissance operations in 1956-1960. Then, to all the notes of protest from the USSR regarding spy flights, the Americans either declared that they were not involved in this, or completely ignored the Soviet protests! Violation of the norms of international law, of course, in no way justifies either side. But then, in 1962, the United States took advantage of this. An anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign was unleashed in the American press. However, it was preceded by a latent phase. The fact is that from August 27, the top leadership of the United States began to receive daily events taking place in Cuba. On September 2, the US government orders its armed forces to "return" fire on Cuban ships and aircraft in neutral waters "if necessary" and at the same time informs the Organization of American States that "serious events will occur in the Caribbean in the near future if Castro will not come to their senses"²⁹. On the same days, the State Department speaks with

intelligence

intelligence

relatively

stating that the emergence of "organized military

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armed forces in Cuba from any country in the Soviet bloc or from Russian military bases" would have serious consequences³⁰.

On September 13, the American Congress authorizes the President to mobilize 150,000 reservists into the regular army for a year in connection with his appeal of September 7 about the need for this measure to protect West Berlin. But, in fact, this resolution refers not so much to the Berlin crisis as to the events in Cuba. In any case, on September 26, another congressional resolution states that "the United States intends ... to prevent the creation or use in Cuba of a military potential from outside that poses a threat to the security of the United States; together with the Organization of American States and freedom-loving Cubans, support the aspiration of the Cuban people for self-determination" ³¹.

Military measures are also being taken. By September 19, preparations for the annual NATO Folex 62 maneuvers were completed. These exercises are aimed at practicing combat operations in the conditions of an exchange of parties with massive nuclear strikes. Under this pretext, on October 1, the United States Atlantic Command was instructed to concentrate forces and means by October 20 to implement Operational Plan 312-62. On October 3, increased air patrols of US coastal waters begin. The task is to detect Soviet submarines, and also - and this is the main thing - to deploy an operational connection

US Navy to implement a naval blockade of Cuba. The strengthening of US military measures in the Atlantic is growing every day. On October 6, the Commander of the US Naval Forces in the Atlantic Ocean receives an order to be on standby for the implementation of Operational Plans 314-62 and 316-62³². In the Caribbean Sea, exercises are planned for October to work out tasks related to the amphibious landing operation. All this against the backdrop of last year's intervention in Cuba and the economic blockade of the "Island of Freedom" looks very ominous. ⁴³¹

The military measures of Washington and the hype in the US press did not go unnoticed in the USSR. The Kremlin saw that the Americans were experiencing some kind of anxiety, but believed that they were unlikely to guess Moscow's plan. In early September, Khrushchev, in a

conversation with the US Secretary of the Interior, said: "But you are sending missiles and nuclear warheads to Japan. Why is this being done? This is directed against us. You are threatening Fidel Castro, and we are giving him modern defense equipment. know how to handle this technique, and we send our specialists to them for training " ³³. On September 11, 1962, the Soviet Union appealed to the US government with a call "to show prudence, not to lose self-control and soberly assess what its actions could lead to, if it unleashes a war"³⁴.
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TASS statement on the same day reported: "The Soviet government considers it its duty to exercise vigilance in the current situation and instruct the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union to take all measures to ensure that our Armed Forces are brought to the highest combat readiness" 35 . The Warsaw Pact countries are also taking a number of actions that demonstrate

the bloc's military readiness. In the first ten days of October, a military exercise is held on the territory of Poland and the GDR under the leadership of the Polish Minister of Defense. It is attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Department of Internal Affairs A. A. Grechko. At the same time, the exercise of Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak troops is being carried out on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The breath of a great war is already felt in the world.

2. On the brink of nuclear war

Meanwhile, the events of the developing crisis are growing. October 14 U-2, piloted by Major Richard Heiser, photographs suspicious objects near Havana. Developed the next day, pictures

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show that a large area near San Cristobal is covered with camouflage tents, which was not the case when photographing the same area on August 29. In addition, the photographs show the rocket tankers, trailers, located without any disguise, and under the awnings, the configurations of the launch installations are guessed. There can be no doubt: Cuba has ground-to-ground ballistic missiles.

On October 16, all this was reported to the president. Kennedy was amazed. Previous intelligence reports on this issue gave rise to doubts, but Soviet representatives assured both the US State Department and the UN that there were no offensive missile weapons in Cuba. And now he had irrefutable evidence in front of him: photographs of Soviet missiles.

At 11.45 the same day, John F. Kennedy gathered the closest advisers and specialists. They began to compare the available data: trailers, a cleared area, rutted roads leading to it - everything confirmed the information of the scouts. Yes, there are Soviet missiles in Cuba that can hit targets in the United States. The question arose: what to do? On the one hand, a sovereign state (USSR) is building a military base on the territory of another sovereign state. It seems to be their business. But what should be the US response? All those present agreed that it was vital to stop this activity of the USSR and Cuba. But how? Opinions were divided. Professional military representatives of the OKNSh spoke in favor of a forceful solution: to launch air strikes, and then land American troops on Cuba. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara proposed establishing a naval blockade as a first step. He was supported by the president's brother, minister

Justice Robert Kennedy. But a naval

blockade in conditions when dozens of Soviet ships were heading to Cuba is also risky. What will be the reaction of the USSR to the delay and search (or inspection) of its ships? Counteraction by the Soviet Union in Europe, in particular on the German question, is also possible. ending

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no other decision was made then. But every day there is new evidence.

On the incoming photographic documents, the contours of the starting positions were clearly visible - either 16 or 32 (if they are paired). The available information, which was very inaccurate, was supplemented by reports from the American agent in the USSR, Oleg Penkovsky. He informed Washington that at least 50 ICBMs, not counting medium-range missiles in Cuba, were on alert in the territory of the Soviet Union. (Actually, there were 20 R-16 missile systems and 6 R-7 missiles in combat readiness in the USSR) 36 . In this complex situation, fraught with the most serious consequences, President Kennedy decided to invite Soviet Ambassador A. Gromyko to a talk. The audience took place on 18 October. Here is how A. Gromyko recalled it:

"In general, the conversation is V was politically tense. Of course, we banged our fists. The necessary correctness was observed. By table.

Most of the time turned out to be devoted to discussing other important international issues. Cuban Conversation Question

V I put By on his initiative to the president, And outlined the position of the USSR, emphasizing that the unrestrained anti-Cuban campaign waged by the American side, attempts to block Cuba's trade with other direct aggression against this country her

With states, appeals can lead to dire To consequences for all of humanity. In turn, Kennedy said: - The current regime would be better if there was another government. The statement sounded sharp. I

paid attention looking for some on Cuba Not fit USA, And would expressions that could

on then, What He at all Not would somehow

smooth out That the impression made by the sharp formulation Then A, V address of the new Cuba.

I asked a question: in — fact, he believes on what is the basis of the American leadership that the Cubans should decide their internal

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Washington? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people and not to the US. It is not a matter of power of internal affairs. Any claims we hear about the President's Cuba posing a threat to US security are unfounded. It is enough just to compare the size and resources of the baby, as the have no right to interfere with whole of these two countries - the giant and from

And other officials, in the sense that

groundlessness of accusations Cuba address.
Referring to position of Cuba, which has repeatedly stated that she does not intend to impose her order on anyone and that she firmly stands for the internal affairs of each other non-intervention of states in each other, seeks to settle all disputes by the US government through negotiations. The solution of the vast majority of international problems is the result of negotiations I noted:
— between

states. The American President thus made it clear that what if at The US has any claims to the Soviet Union, by means. In To Cuba or the same time That their needs to be allowed peaceful

from name of the Soviet leadership I declared

Kennedy: In conditions when the United States is taking hostile actions against Cuba, against states that have good relations with it, respect it, support it in its difficult hour, help, independence and will play a spectator when the USSR is a great power and outside is a threat. The Soviet Union will simply Cuba with Cuba, had plans to attack Cuba that there was the question of a peace area. My administration, argued
Not threat

— and he doesn't

V connections whether With

or in connection with the situation in some other

V Kennedy's answer, no, the Soviet

Union can also proceed from
does not exist.

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Then I referred to aggressive action against Cuba on Playa

Chiron. - After all, this is the USA organized it — I said. — This is a product their

politicians. - Actions V Playa Giron was a mistake — acknowledged
the president. — I hold back those circles that are to admit action,
supporters of the invasion, I would strive for war. I deny some Not
that he, he said further, —

that the Cuban question has become really serious. It is not known how all this may end.

He began to talk at length about Soviet "offensive O hosted on Cuba weapons." I used the word "rockets". I can't explain why the President did this. But somehow He Not it made my situation easier. I thereby he in

Same Not it seemed necessary to speak directly O
missiles."

During this conversation, Kennedy had photographs of Soviet missile launch pads on his desk. But he did not show them to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, although he (not knowing about this fact) was ready to answer. The President went on to say that Soviet offensive weapons stationed in Cuba were a threat to the United States. He announced to the ambassador that the United States was establishing a naval blockade around Cuba. Gromyko replied:

"The Soviet Union urges the government to allow any steps, the US President personally, détente, the principles of Cuba of the UN Charter ... Soviet assistance is directed to the defense capability and the development of a peaceful economy. Training by Soviet specialists of Cubans in the use of weapons intended for defense, solely to strengthen

cannot be regarded as a threat to anyone. The USSR responded to Cuba's call for help because this call is intended to eliminate the slight danger looming over Cuba ... The Soviet Union delivered a number of missiles of a defensive nature. Nobody

and never they are not will threaten

At the end of the conversation, Kennedy outlined the US position;
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"First," he said, — USA does not have and Cuba. Not will see to undertake an armed invasion I officially declare that the action on Secondly, Playa Giron constituted a mistake. Thirdly, the Soviet "offensive on represented, "With all this in mind 38 weapons, of course, must be removed from Cuba. The relevant issues can be settled"

Although Kennedy quite clearly stated the position of his government, there was no immediate reaction from Moscow to his arguments. Khrushchev still hoped to stall for time so that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were put on alert, and then start negotiations with Washington, putting forward his own conditions. Soviet diplomats in the United States found themselves in a difficult position. Most of them, including the recently appointed ambassador A. F. Dobrynin, simply did not know anything about the Anadyr

operation. In the meantime, pictures of Soviet missiles in Cuba appeared in American newspapers, but Soviet diplomats were forced to deny, reject and even refute such publications, "proving" to the Americans that these were not missiles at all or not at all in Cuba, that this was a falsification and a provocation.

The denial of the delivery of Soviet missiles to Cuba, when the secret of the Anadyr operation had already been largely disclosed, meant a loss of confidence in our representatives on the part of the Americans, which, in turn, caused considerable state damage to our country. At one of the meetings of the Security Council, employees of the US representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, brought into the hall and placed billboards with

revealing photographs. E. Stevenson asked the Soviet representative V. A. Zorin: "Mr. Ambassador, tell me if there are Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, tell me, without waiting for a translation: yes or no?" Zorin replied: "I'm not in an American court, Mr. Stevenson." In the Soviet newspapers in those days they wrote: "V. A. Zorin exposed employees
437 extracted from a pile of rubbish

U.S. State Department allegations of the so-called "establishment of Soviet missile bases" in Cuba" ³⁹.

On October 17 and 19, US air reconnaissance received new photographs that showed that the installation of missile positions in Cuba was in full swing. As it turned out later, indeed, by October 10, the Soviet missile division on the island already had 10 combat-ready missiles, and by October 20 - 2040 . Such was the situation by the time President Kennedy, speaking on the radio on Monday,

October 22, officially announced the imposition of a naval blockade of Cuba, or, as he preferred to put it evasively, "quarantine." Large US naval forces—183 ships—were drawn into the Caribbean Sea. The commanders were instructed to search the ships en route with cargo to Cuba. This was already a violation of international law.

But the naval blockade did not end there. Immediately after the President's speech, the Pentagon began preparing troops for the invasion of Cuba. In its first echelon, it was supposed to land 17,000 American soldiers and officers on the island, including 14,000 from the airborne troops. They were to be supported by 750 combat aircraft, including 430 tactical fighters and up to 140 ships. The amphibious landing operation (codenamed "Mongoose") was to take part in the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, the 1st and 2nd infantry, the 1st armored division and the 2nd marine division. The 4th, 5th Infantry and 2nd Armored Divisions were in reserve. This grouping consisted of 600 tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces, and 12 Honest John unguided tactical missiles⁴¹ . Immediately after Kennedy's speech (and the author of this book listened to his speech while being part of a combat crew called on alert at the Central Command Post of the country's air defense forces), the number of strategic bombardies constantly on duty in the air increased sharply.

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movers B-52 with nuclear bombs on board. If at the usual time their patrols under the Chrome Dome program did not exceed 18-20 aircraft, then with the announcement by the President of the naval blockade of patrolling bombers, it increased to 80-100 aircraft. This in itself was dangerous, as it increased the possibility of an unauthorized, accidental

release of nuclear bombs. Such cases, as already mentioned, took place in the 50s, and the last known by that time occurred 5 years before the events described.

It happened on May 22, 1957 near the city of Albuquerque (New Mexico). A B-36 strategic bomber was completing its flight from Biggs Base, Texas, preparing to land at Kirtland Air Force Base. One of the crew members, the navigator, was in the bomb hatch, where, using a special device, he tried to fix the front

landing the hydrogen bomb on board. Suddenly the plane shook, and the navigator, having lost his balance, grabbed the first object that came to hand. It turned out to be the handle of the mechanism used for bombing. A bomb with a capacity of over 10 megatons fell down. It was only by pure chance that a nuclear explosion did not occur, and Albuquerque, along with nearby settlements, did not suffer the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki⁴². So, the naval blockade, the preparations for the amphibious operation against Cuba, the strengthening of the strategic aviation grouping, which was at the highest level of combat readiness, all indicated that the crisis was entering a dangerous stage, fraught with a world nuclear war. It was already a run to Armageddon - the end of the

world. President Kennedy did not limit himself to an appeal to the American people to establish a "quarantine on all types of offensive weapons transported to Cuba." In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he reminded that, as in the Berlin question, he had once stated bluntly that if events around Cuba took a certain direction, the United States would do everything necessary to protect

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their safety and their employees. Nevertheless, the rapid deployment of medium-range missiles in Cuba and other offensive weapons has occurred. "I must tell you," the president wrote, "that the United States is determined to eliminate the threat to the security of our hemisphere." Kennedy reported that the measures he was taking were only the "necessary minimum" and expressed the hope that the Soviet government would refrain from any action that could only deepen this dangerous crisis. The Kremlin did not expect such harshness. The erection of the wall in Berlin and the incident with an attempt to break through to East Berlin by American units in October 1961 did not seem to give reason to expect such a sharp reaction from Washington. Khrushchev's improvisations about what to consider an "offensive weapon" began, which in the growing crisis situation

did not look convincing enough and greatly undermined the prestige of the USSR and Khrushchev personally in the eyes of the world community. In addition, another episode occurred at this time, which, although accidental, could have a significant impact on the course of events. On October 22, Colonel of the Soviet Army Oleg Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. Officially, he worked in the Committee for Science and Technology, but at the same time he was the Chief Officer of the General Staff Directorate. He had access to the most important military and state secrets of the USSR, was in confidence

intelligence

relations

with

several

high-ranking

military leaders. By the beginning of the Cuban crisis, Penkovsky already felt that he was in the field of view of Soviet counterintelligence, and the ring was inexorably shrinking. He is nothing

knew about the Anadyr operation, but had two signals from the CIA in case of emergency: one - in case of a threat of arrest, the other - about the preparation of a sudden strike of Soviet nuclear missiles on the United States. And on the day of his arrest, at the last minute, he sends the agreed signal to the CIA, but not about an imminent arrest, but about a prepared preventive nuclear strike by Soviet intercontinental missiles against the United States.

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Fortunately, the CIA officers who had worked with Penkovsky for several years on that day, October 22, considered this warning to be erroneous and reported to Director McCone only about the fact of the arrest of a valuable agent, but kept silent about the nature of his signal. And they did the right thing, because in that extremely tense situation, when the US strategic forces were put on the highest alert, the signal about the start of the war by the Soviet Union could lead to unpredictable consequences.

On October 24, Khrushchev was handed a new message from Kennedy. The President expressed the hope that Soviet ships would comply with the conditions of "quarantine". The answer came to Washington on the same day and was very threatening. Khrushchev regarded the American action "as an act of aggression, pushing humanity to the brink of a global nuclear missile war," and reported that the Soviet government could not instruct the captains of its ships to obey the orders of the American Navy blockading the island of Cuba. "We will not only watch the piracy of American ships at sea," the Soviet leader stressed, "we will be forced, on our part, to take the necessary measures to protect our rights. For this, we have everything necessary" 44 . Such an exchange of messages did not bode well, and in the meantime, Soviet ships were approaching the "quarantine" line, where American ships were on duty. What will the meeting be like? This question worried both Washington and Moscow. President Kennedy asked the secretary of defense to convey to Admiral Andersen, commander of the "quarantine" forces, his order: "open fire only with the permission of the president." McNamara contacted the admiral. It turned out that he was going to act in accordance with the naval regulations: a warning shot ahead of the course, and in case of disobedience, fire to kill. The minister was horrified: after all, it was possible to start a third world war! He sternly conveyed to the admiral the President's order: fire only after receiving confirmation from the White House.

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On October 24, tensions escalated. Two Soviet ships - "Komiles" and "Gagarin" approached the positions of American warships. America watched this scene on TV. We in Moscow at the Central Command Post of the country's air defense forces also saw on the tablet how the rapprochement was taking place. The countdown went on units of kilometers: five, four, three. The nerves of everyone who watched this picture on both sides of the ocean were on edge.

But at this time (this was visible on the tablet), the Soviet ships stopped, and then, turning around, lay down on the opposite course. And here's what happened. When there were a few kilometers left to the meeting point, the captains of Gagarin and Komiles received a cipher message from Moscow. She ordered not to cross the "quarantine" line, but to move to a safe distance, lie down in a drift and wait for further orders. The White House breathed a sigh of relief. "There will be no detention or search,"

Kennedy said. The next 14 Soviet bulk carriers also turned back. But the tankers kept going. The Bucharest tanker was the first to approach the ill-fated line. An identification ritual took place, but the tanker was let through, albeit accompanied by a destroyer. The following tankers followed in the same order. But in the following days, Soviet ships did not approach the "quarantine" line in order to avoid incidents⁴⁵. It seemed that the issue of "quarantine" was resolved without excesses, but the tension did not subside. Now it has moved from the sea to the air. Reports appeared in the American press about the possibility of massive air strikes on missile sites under construction in Cuba. The Soviet embassy in Washington reported to Moscow that bombing of Soviet military installations on the island was very likely. An amphibious landing is also not ruled out. In another letter from the American president to Khrushchev, dated October 25, Kennedy reproached the Soviet premier for the fact that the weapons that the Russians call defensive, which arrived from the USSR to Cuba, are in fact "offensive" - the 442 missile

mi. He urged Moscow to return to the "previous situation", i.e. remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. The American press continued to escalate the alarming situation, more and more voices were heard calling for air strikes on missile positions in Cuba.

Alarmed by the threatening development of events, F. Castro suggested that Khrushchev make a statement that the USSR would use nuclear weapons if the United States did not stop bombing Cuba. The growing threatening situation was perceived in Moscow with increasing anxiety. Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy on October 26. He denied the "offensive" nature of the weapons directed at Cuba, asserting that these weapons were sent to F. Castro at his request for the defense of the island. "The Soviet leadership is not going to attack the USA," he wrote, "a war between the USSR and the USA would be suicidal. Let's normalize relations." He proposed a compromise: the Soviet side announces that the ships going to Cuba will not carry out any military supplies; the American side undertakes that the United States will not intervene in Cuba and will not support forces that have such an intention⁴⁶. Negotiations began through the usual diplomatic channels, but

intelligence officers were also involved, as well as persons "close to the top leadership of the United States and the USSR. There was an exchange of messages between the White House and the Kremlin. All this took place in an extremely tense atmosphere. Some incidents at that time seemed to inevitably cause a war. The fact is that American Air Force planes made daily reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Soviet anti-aircraft missile units, which had high combat capabilities to hit air targets, were ordered not to open fire on the Americans. The latter, having learned about this, decided to use the situation. Ever since the incident with Powers of the US military was very interested in the Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft missile. It was known from aerial reconnaissance that

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missiles of this type were brought to Cuba. Attempts to capture the S-75 through the operation of special units were not successful. Then they decided to conduct an air operation. One of the cargo helicopters was equipped with a special device with which it was possible to hook a missile lying on the ground on the fly and deliver it by air to the Guantanamo base. Trained in Florida on metal pipes. But the Soviet anti-aircraft gunners found out about the plans of the Americans and prudently tied their missiles with ropes. It was not possible for a helicopter to lift them⁴⁷. The climax of the crisis came on 27 October. On this day, several significant events took place both on the diplomatic and military fronts. By this

time, more and more information about a possible American invasion of Cuba was accumulating in Moscow. F. Castro wrote about the readiness of the Cuban people to fight the interventionists under the slogan: "Motherland or death." He ordered Cuban troops to shoot down American planes that violated Cuban airspace. This development worried the Kremlin. Khrushchev's plans did not include getting involved in a war with the Americans. Therefore, it was necessary to hurry to settle the conflict by political measures. Fearing the worst, Khrushchev, without waiting for Kennedy's response to his letter of October 26, on Saturday, the 27th, sent a new message to the US President in clear text over the radio. This, of course, was an unprecedented violation of diplomatic rules in relations between heads of state, but the most important thing was the gain in time: it was necessary to forestall the Americans, to keep them from invading Cuba. Khrushchev informed the American president of the USSR's readiness to remove "those weapons from Cuba that you consider offensive" (i.e., R-12 missiles), but demanded a publicly announced commitment from the United States to refrain from attacking Cuba and "withdraw similar American weapons from Turkey". So for the first time in the open media there was a proposal to remove American

missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

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The US President, who was already struggling to contain the pressure of the "hawks" demanding the bombing of Soviet missile facilities and the invasion of the island, was extremely reluctant to publicly link the Caribbean crisis with the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey (although he was internally ready for this, since the appearance of submarine nuclear missile carriers with Polaris missiles have already made obsolete and expensive missiles like Thor and Jupiter unnecessary). In this regard, in a response, also in a public message, he kept silent about missiles in Turkey, but proposed to resolve the crisis on the following conditions: the USSR removes missiles and other "offensive" weapons from Cuba, and the United States cancels the "quarantine" and gives assurances that Cuba will not be attacked either by the United States or by other countries of the Western Hemisphere⁴⁸. But what about the Soviet proposal for missiles in Turkey? Secret diplomacy kicked in. On the evening of October 27, the president's brother, Minister of Justice Robert Kennedy, invited the Soviet ambassador to his place for a confidential conversation. He said the president was having a hard time keeping the military from insisting on bombing and invading Cuba. He repeated the President's proposal to Khrushchev, but also passed over in silence the issue of the missile withdrawal from Turkey. In response

to Dobrynin's question about this, R. Kennedy said that there were no insurmountable obstacles, but the president could not talk about this publicly, since the deployment of American missiles in Europe, including in Turkey, was framed as a NATO decision. The President is ready to tacitly agree on the curtailment of missile bases in Turkey in 4-5 months. R. Kennedy warned the ambassador that the conversation is confidential and only a few people know about it. The president, according to his brother, asked that Khrushchev be given this urgently and asked him to give an answer as soon as possible, preferably within 24 hours⁴⁹. On the day when these difficult confidential negotiations were going on, events occurred that further aggravated the situation. As already mentioned, F. Castro, heads

What

this

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commander of the Cuban armed forces, ordered his air defense forces to open fire on US aircraft violating Cuban airspace from October 27, and announced this in an official government statement. However, Cuban air defense systems could not shoot down high-altitude targets, and therefore the U-2 aircraft, operating at an altitude of twenty or more kilometers, were out of reach for Cuban anti-aircraft gunners. The U-2 crews found out about this and continued reconnaissance flights over Cuba. On October 27, when the crisis reached its climax, the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were again in the spotlight. It was known in Moscow that the Pentagon was demanding decisive action from the president. The troops, air force and navy were already in full readiness for the invasion of Cuba. In Washington, the situation was also

heated to the limit, as evidenced by a secret conversation between A. Dobrynin and R. Kennedy. And in such

a situation, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara receives a report: at 11.20 (Washington time) a U-2 aircraft, flown by Major C. Maultby, violated the border of the USSR and is over Chukotka. When the minister found out about this, Air Force General D. Berginal, who was present in the room, recalled, he "turned completely white and shouted: "This means war with the Soviet Union! The President must immediately contact Moscow. And he left the office in extreme excitement. The President took it more calmly. He only said the phrase that later became famous: "There will always be a son of a bitch who can ruin the whole thing" 50 . And here's what happened. Charles Maultby flew a U-2 from Aielson Air Force Base (Alaska) to the North Pole.

His task was to take air samples to determine whether there had been recent nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. During the flight, due to a malfunction of navigation equipment, the aircraft deviated from the course and ended up over Chukotka. It was discovered by Soviet radars. Two fighter planes took off towards him. But he already realized the mistake and asked for help at his airfield. To him

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two F-102 interceptors flew to the rescue. Since these were duty fighters, they had air-to-air missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Their task was to bring Maultby to their airfield. Thus, there were already three American aircraft in the airspace of the

USSR, and two Soviet fighters were going towards them. And this is at the peak of the Caribbean crisis. In addition, Maultby had been in the air for 10 hours, and he was running out of fuel. He did not have the right to land on the Soviet airfield, since the plane was literally stuffed with secret equipment for various purposes. This means that in the event of a meeting, a battle was coming and, possibly, with the use of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the guidance did not take place. Soviet fighters returned to their base. U-2 and F-102 went to Alaska. In Moscow, this episode was regarded realistically: most likely, the U-2 got lost. But the ordeal of that day did not end there. Literally 2 hours later, a Soviet anti-aircraft missile shot down Rudolf Anderson's U-2 over Cuba, who was photographing missile positions. The pilot

died. Here is how this episode is described by Lieutenant General L. Garbuz, Deputy for Combat Training I.A. Plieva: "The decision was made to destroy the aircraft, Lieutenant General Grechko, commander of the Air Defense Forces Group." Both generals were at the command post of the group of troops, they had to be guided by Pliev's order: "open fire only in case of a clear attack." But how is this to be understood? For 30 minutes, while the scout U-2 was flying over Cuba, they, like deputy their subordinate commanders, were tormented by doubts whether to consider this flight a "clear attack" or not. Repeatedly

they called Pliev, but he was somewhere in the army. Meanwhile, R. Anderson, having completed the task, left the airspace of the island. What to do? Garbuz, having received information that all the positions of the missilemen were "exposed", and the plane was leaving, began to insist: "We must act, Stepan Naumovich." Shooting down a plane in that tense situation means taking responsibility. Grechko calls again and again

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blowing, but the tube is silent. And then the order was given: shoot down. Division Major I. Gerchenov coped with the task. Speaking in official language, the decision to suppress is "an operational-strategic need to prevent the US leadership from receiving consolidated intelligence on the missile group." This, of flight determined course, was a very risky decision, but in the circumstances of that day it was understandable. Why did the Soviet generals decide to do this? Because the point of the order that the S-75 "Desna" complexes "open fire only in the event of a clear attack" was formulated rather vaguely. Hence the hesitation in decision making. Here is how Major Nikolai Serovoy, who headed the reduced combat crew at the command post of the 27th Air Defense Division, supplements the story of General Garbuz: "In the evening, the commander of the division, Colonel Georgy Voronkov, contacted me by phone. military personnel wore civilian clothes and addressed each other by name and patronymic.- Encryption received-tomorrow at dawn the war. The United States officially warned our government about its decision to strike at Cuba. Put parts of the division on alert, but covertly. I'm going to the command point (KP)". A few minutes later, the direction officers reported that the units were ready for combat operations - all air defense systems were turned on. Soon, Colonel Voronkov arrived at the command post with officers of the full combat crew. "According to N. Serovoy, it was Voronkov, and not Grechko gave the order to shoot down the U-2.

A.O.),

Army General Pliev took the report on the destruction of the reconnaissance aircraft in general calmly. He only gave the order to speed up the collection of data and prepare a cipher message for the Minister of Defense. Based on it, Malinovsky will send an official report to Khrushchev on October 28 at 10.45. Here is his text:

"Owls. secret. To Comrade Khrushchev N.S. I report. 10/27/1962 U-2 at 16,000 altitude aircraft the territory of Cuban m V 17 Moscow hours

time invaded with the aim of
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photographing the combat formations of troops 1 21 hours on the route and during, Ciego de Avila, Preston. Camaguey, minutes passed through Manzanillo, San Luis, Guantanamo,

in order to prevent the entry of photographic documents into V USA V
On 18.20 Moscow time, this aircraft was shot down by two anti-aircraft missiles of the 507th Zenrap at an altitude of 21,000m. Plane near Antilla. Searches organized. On that day there were 8 violations by US aircraft fell into the

space of Cuba. 10.45m.51

R. Malinovsky.

28 October 1962

Soon, "You have outlined a telegram: ways of settling" came to the group of troops in Cuba from Moscow. The risk was indeed enormous. When the U-2 was shot down, the Pentagon leadership suggested that President John F. Kennedy immediately strike at

Cuba, but he did not agree. The degree of risk was also understood in the Soviet Union. That is why Moscow reproached the anti-aircraft gunners: after all, this incident occurred at a time when the Soviet Union was faced with the most acute question of how to prevent the outbreak of a global nuclear missile conflict, to find the best ways to resolve the crisis as soon as possible. They were waiting for an answer to Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy. And suddenly two such news. What does it mean? The flight over Chukotka now looked like the last reconnaissance flight before the attack, and the downed U-2 over Cuba could only strengthen the Americans in the belief that the USSR was also ready to start a nuclear war. Both in the White House and in the Kremlin, the mood was close to

panic. Khrushchev, upon learning of Anderson's death, lashed out at Defense Minister R. Malinovsky: "In whose army does the general serve - Soviet or Cuban?"⁵² He forbade opening fire on American intelligence officers, and also ordered that no one be allowed near our missiles in Cuba. The tension has reached its limit. But the voice of reason still prevailed. The Soviet side showed proper self-control, restraint and a sense of responsibility, readiness for mutually acceptable compromises and

matin in the highest interests of maintaining peace on Earth. This was also noted by the American side. Soviet restraint and the desire to prevent an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict were also evidenced by the daily reports of CIA chief John McCone to the US top leadership. Thus, in the CIA documents for October 24, 25 and 27, at the very peak of the crisis, it was noted that the measures taken by the USSR to increase the combat readiness of its Armed Forces were not defiant and provocative.

At the same time, Washington was quite sober in assessing the military power of the Soviet Union and the potential for a retaliatory missile strike, and as the crisis deepened, they increasingly considered its extremely dangerous consequences for the United States itself. President Kennedy, during one of the meetings, said: "I think that the risk for us is increasing. Yes, I think so. What difference does it make? into the air. I think that this is just a question ... In the end, this is as much a political struggle as a military one"⁵³. This was a step towards realism, towards an understanding of objective reality. For the American leadership, it was completely clear

— A.O.)

frightening impasse of power politics. The prospect of thermonuclear war made many in the Washington administration shudder. Despite the fact that the Americans had a significant superiority in missiles, they could not use their nuclear power to achieve their goals without the risk of receiving a counter nuclear missile strike in response. The test of the Soviet "superbomb" on Novaya Zemlya in 1961 testified to the possible force of such a strike. In those anxious days, when it seemed that war was about to break out, both sides had the wisdom and courage to make mutual concessions. On October 28, the Soviet government informed Washington that it was prepared to dismantle Soviet missiles in Cuba and evacuate them in exchange for the US government canceling plans to invade Cuba. With regard to the Soviet mandatory

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In order to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey, R. Kennedy and A. Dobrynin reached an agreement that this would not be reflected in open official statements and publications. Khrushchev agreed with this, although in a confidential message to the president he emphasized that the agreement between the US and the USSR on Cuba was reached taking into account John F. Kennedy's consent to resolving the issue of American missile bases in Turkey .

The fact that Khrushchev did not demand from President Kennedy that he give not a confidential, but a public commitment to the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles was a gross political mistake of the Soviet leader. The Western media proclaimed the United States the winner in a most dangerous crisis. Since no one knew about the secret agreement regarding American missiles in Turkey, and Soviet missiles from Cuba began to be exported and the whole world knew about it, this looked like a humiliation of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev personally. In those days, the commander of a group of Soviet troops in Cuba received an order from

Moscow to cancel combat readiness and curtail missile units. On October 30, UN Secretary General W. Tan met in Cuba with the commander of the missile division, Major General I. D. Statsenko. He informed W. Tan about the progress of dismantling the missiles and the timing of their export to the Soviet Union. Further negotiations between the Soviet and American leaders, as well as negotiations within the framework of the UN, provided an opportunity to break the

deadly impasse. On November 20, the US government lifted its "quarantine". The United States declared as a pledge that Cuba would not be attacked or invaded, not only by the United States, but also by other states of the Western Hemisphere. Soviet missiles were taken out of Cuba. However, the lengthy negotiations that followed did not lead to the signing of any official joint document. American rejection side

attempted to document its commitment not to attack Cuba, taken during negotiations in October 1962, although it did not violate it in subsequent years. The United States has ensured that not only R-12 missiles, but also Il-28 bombers are included in the category of "offensive" weapons to be evacuated from Cuba. The removal of Soviet missiles and bombers took place under the visual control of American aircraft, which flew around the ships coming from Cuba. The crisis formally ended on January 7, 1963, when the representatives of the USSR and the USA, who participated in the negotiations, addressed a joint letter to the UN Secretary General. It stated that, although both governments failed to solve all the problems, both sides consider the degree of agreement reached between them sufficient to remove the question of the Caribbean crisis from the agenda of the UN Security Council⁵⁶. With regard to US missile bases in Turkey, the White House kept its promise. Already on October 29, 1962, McNamara ordered the liquidation of Jupiter rocket installations until April 1, 1963. Later that year, all US medium-range missiles were removed from Europe. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a product of the Cold War and the growing rivalry between the two superpowers for influence in the world. In this global confrontation, any local or regional conflict could lead to a general war. And in the realities of those years, this could lead to a third world war with the use of nuclear weapons as the decisive weapon of victory. And it was the Caribbean crisis that showed that a nuclear missile war would not bring victory to either side: there could

be no winner in it. Many years later, in 1989, a tripartite symposium (USSR, USA, Republic of Cuba) was held in Moscow on the Caribbean crisis. R. McNamara, one of the directors of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Mankind, who participated in the symposium since 1988, recalled the days of the crisis:

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"In the evening²⁷ of October, the president²⁷ from The White House from came out. It was a bright autumn evening. And I'll thought, "Perhaps." I never again see such a beautiful Saturday night I must tell you that this feeling reflected the level of crisis, the level of tension at the time. ...Here,

What exactly V Moscow, we learned on Saturday from Cuban representatives, on the evening of V 27 that in two or October they were convinced, Monday the 29th, either three days, or on October 30, an American air V on Tuesday attack will be carried out on Cuba on And ground invasion begins on their countries. They also said that they were determined to fight to the last man or to the last bullet, the Soviet And What soldiers who were there, forty thousand people, were also ready to fight for the last one. estimated Cuban losses would be 100 up their V to manpower amounted thousand

Human. But

think about the possible for a minute, even if they are right themselves it would V evaluation losses, which itself is terrible, would you think about how it ended up? Of course not! all of course, the Soviet Union responded with military steps somewhere in the world, the United States responded to the Soviet military response. And measures would escalate? steps continued I believe that just such has become situations. lessons from the Caribbean crisis. crisis management what kind of dangerous, difficult and unpredictable" who knows, before military

V this is the danger in

In this one of

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At the same time, the Caribbean crisis not only showed the complete unacceptability of a general nuclear war, but also played a large role in the further development of Soviet-American relations. He convincingly highlighted the danger of a direct military clash between two great powers, which was averted - on the brink of war - by the awareness on both sides of the catastrophic consequences of such a clash. It is precisely because of this that the main emphasis was placed on a political solution to the conflict, which (as A.F. Dob emphasized in his memoirs

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Rynin) was helped to no small extent by direct, highly confidential contact between Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy through their proxies. Only after a conversation between Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin did it become clear that war could be avoided.

The missile crisis, as it is called in the United States, contributed to the understanding by the leaders of the United States and the USSR of the need, firstly, for a constant direct channel of communication between them, the so-called "hot line", and secondly, the signing of a number of agreements aimed at easing international tension. After October 1962, there were no more dangerous situations like the Berlin (1961) or Caribbean crisis, when the two superpowers would have been involved in a direct confrontation. But there were also negative consequences. The Soviet ruling circles, especially the military, took the evacuation of Soviet missiles from Cuba under American control extremely painfully. This was regarded as a humiliation of the national dignity of the Soviet state. The military-industrial complex and law enforcement agencies

of the USSR began to seek the adoption of a new program to build up nuclear missile weapons, trying to equalize them with the United States. The Caribbean Crisis marked the apogee of the armed confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It became clear that the hopes of any of the opposing sides to win in a global nuclear war are illusory, that it threatens to destroy the winner, following the vanquished. But the untwisted flywheels of the military-industrial complexes of both sides, the desire of Washington and Moscow to be able to exercise forceful pressure on the political

the enemy led to the fact that the arms race did not stop, but continued at an increasing pace. The United States annually commissioned new missile-carrying nuclear submarines, Minuteman solid-propellant ICBMs, maintained first-generation Titan-2 heavy liquid-propellant missiles, and strategic bombers

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B-52. The Soviet Union, which back in 1959 created a new type of armed forces - the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), launched the first submarine missile carriers, sought to keep up with the United States. A new stage in the arms race has unfolded. Its distinguishing feature from the 50s was that although the quantitative accumulation of strategic weapons continued, now the goal was different - not to win the war with these weapons, but to intimidate the enemy with superiority in strength, to make him believe that he

weaker, and thus deprive him of the temptation to deliver the first nuclear strike on the opposing side.

Thus, nuclear missile weapons no longer became a "weapon of victory", but a means of deterring the enemy. Thus, in the 1960s, the struggle for a balance of power, the prevention of superiority in them by the opposing one, became a priority goal. A struggle for strategic parity unfolded. 3. From intimidation to deterrence When it became clear that the

Caribbean crisis could end with a compromise between the parties, the world famous scientist, the great Briton Bertrand Russell wrote to Khrushchev on October 28, 1962: "I want to express my sincere gratitude to you for the greatest caution that you have shown in times of severe crisis. Russell's letter reflected the general mood then prevailing in the world. Indeed, the Caribbean crisis was regarded by the world community as an extremely dangerous precedent: the emergence of even a seemingly local conflict between nuclear powers, when the situation was aggravated and threats to use the latest weapons, almost ended in a global nuclear war. He showed that a new alignment of forces was taking shape in the international arena, that this process had assumed an irreversible character, that strategic

rockets have become not military, but political weapons of a special kind. After 1962, the US and the Soviet Union stopped resorting to mutual threats to use nuclear weapons and began to avoid creating conflict situations in their relations. It became clear to the leadership of both superpowers that the situation in the world urgently required real measures to reduce the danger of a general nuclear war. Direct uninterrupted communication was established between the heads of government of the USSR and the USA in case of a crisis. The world community welcomed with satisfaction the Treaty on the Ban on Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, concluded in 1963 between the United States,

USSR and England. There were also other signs of mutual understanding between East and West, a decrease in the tension in their relations. In those days, it seemed

that the hot breath of an imminent nuclear war, which was barely avoided, would have a sobering effect on politicians and strategists, opening the way to ending the further arms race. But that did not happen. Militaristic thinking was not outdated and continued to dominate politics. It came to the fore in Southeast Asia. The United States started the Vietnam War with the so-called "Tonkin Incident" in August 1964. The war, where the US and the USSR provided assistance to the opposing sides, and the US troops directly participated in the hostilities, largely blocked the possibility of dialogue between them and us. The United States viewed the Vietnam War as a form of subversion of world communism against the countries of the West. The Soviet leadership did not show readiness to revise its political worldview either. The Soviet leadership reacted negatively to US intervention in the Vietnam Civil War, which had been fought between the pro-communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the pro-American Republic of Vietnam (RV) since 1960. American participation

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Russian troops on the side of the RV was a gross violation of international law. This war lasted 15 years. It ended with the victory of the communist forces in 1975 and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on July 2, 1976. The US Army, Air Force, and Navy participated in this war until January 1973. The Vietnam War went down in history as a "dirty war", it gave rise to the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" in American society, which was

expressed in the growth of anti-war sentiment. This was of growing concern to the US government. Washington's desire to impose its terms of a truce on the leaders of the DRV, and later on the pro-communist Republic of South Vietnam (RSV), which was formed in the south of the country in opposition to the Saigon regime, ended in failure.

During the negotiations between the belligerents, relations between Moscow and Washington were an important military-political factor. On the one hand, the

USSR helped the DRV with weapons and military equipment, had the opportunity to test new types of weapons during the battles, and gained access to the latest models of American weapons taken by the North Vietnamese as trophies. All this strengthened the ties between the USSR and the DRV, which was especially important during the years of tense Soviet-American relations. The US intervention in Vietnam restored world public opinion against the aggressor, and the huge costs of

the war weakened the military-economic potential of the United States. In addition, the failures of the US-Saigon actions in Vietnam weakened the moral and psychological stamina of US soldiers and officers, gave rise to an active anti-war movement in the country and numerous refusals to serve in the US armed forces. But, on the other hand, the USSR was also interested in a speedy end

to the war, since the failures of the United States increasingly created the danger of their use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. And it was fraught with world missiles

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but a nuclear war, which neither of the superpowers wanted - here their interests coincided.

The US government, convinced already in the first years of the futility for its country of a further escalation of the Vietnam War, was looking for a way out of it. But it was necessary to "save face". By all their actions, the Vietnamese people showed readiness for an uncompromising struggle, regardless of losses, showed an unshakable will to win, and the leadership of the DRV, the only state entity in Vietnam (except for the US ally, the Saigon regime), with which it was possible to negotiate, did not show readiness to them, demanding that the United States first stop bombing targets on the territory of the DRV. It was then that the United States turned to the USSR to act as an intermediary and help the warring parties achieve

reasonable compromise. Washington believed that the country, which supplies a huge amount of weapons to Vietnam, has real leverage on it⁵¹. But the White House was wrong: while supplying 75-80 percent of aid to the DRV, the Soviet Union did not have any significant political influence on the leadership of the DRV. This was due to the influence of Beijing on Hanoi, which at that time, despite the serious disagreement between the PRC and the DRV, was decisive. And therefore the USSR, whose arms supplies to Vietnam largely depended on communications passing through China, did not have much influence on the DRV, although it could have counted on it. Nevertheless, the government of the USSR, realizing the threat posed by the Vietnam War, went to meet the United States. American emissaries (J. Fitzgerald, M. Mezfield, A. Harriman) sought to persuade Moscow to persuade Hanoi to sit down at the negotiating table, and also to allow representatives of the Red Cross to see American prisoners in Vietnam. The meeting of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin with the US President L. Johnson in Glassboro (USA) in June 1967 was devoted to these issues.

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However, only after lengthy negotiations between Soviet representatives and US and DRV statesmen was it possible to organize preliminary American-Vietnamese meetings, which took place in May 1968, and from January 1969 official quadripartite (USA, RV, DRV, RSE) began

Vietnam negotiations. The Soviet Union played a very important role in the negotiations in Paris all the time, although it was not a participant in them. An important outcome of the negotiations was the agreement of the parties to end the war in Vietnam, signed on January 27, 1973. It was achieved largely thanks to the efforts of Moscow. The USSR and the USA, the people of Vietnam put a lot of effort into putting an end to the war in Southeast Asia and ensuring peace and stability in this region. But peace in Vietnam was restored only in the mid-70s, when the international situation on the planet changed

significantly compared to the 60s. At that time, the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, when, it would seem, relations between the West and the East were just beginning to improve and there was hope for an easing of international tension, caused serious damage to the stabilization of the existence of the world community. However, Vietnam was only one of the factors in the strengthening of militaristic thinking at that time. There were others. Relations between the USSR and the PRC sharply worsened

and worsened. This was not immediately understood across the ocean. And the US intervention in the Vietnam War was supported at first by American society. It was believed that there, in Vietnam, the American guys would fight against the forces of "world communism", because they believed that the USSR and China were behind the DRV. But when it became clear that the two socialist giants were opposing each other, and that the United States was, in fact, at war with a small, underdeveloped country, and that it was also suffering heavy losses, American society came out against this war. Official Washington considered the USSR and the PRC to be its main adversaries - after all, China was about to

zhenn was to become a nuclear power - and sought by all means to maintain and strengthen its status as the strongest nuclear power in the world. And although the Caribbean crisis showed that nuclear weapons cannot be a "weapon of victory", that only compromise, mutual concessions, understanding of each other's interests and the global interests of all mankind are an effective means of resolving conflicts in our time, the Cold War stereotypes have once again triumphed. America again rushed into the struggle to maintain and build up its nuclear superiority. The Soviet Union had no choice but to continue to seek military-strategic parity. As a result, the arms race received a new impetus. In 1963-1964, 4 missile bases were put into operation in the USA, each of which had a wing of Minuteman missiles (150-200 missiles). The missiles were dispersed in concrete shafts 30 meters deep. The launch preparation time was 30 seconds. Heavy ICBMs "Titan-2"60 entered service. Unlike the first-generation ICBMs, which were launched from the ground, the new missiles could take off directly from the silos. Full swing

the construction of nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles was also carried out. One nuclear-powered missile carrier was launched into the water every month. And if the Eisenhower government planned to build 45 nuclear missile carriers by 1970, now the program provided for the commissioning of 41 boats by 1964⁶¹. Even according to Pentagon experts, such a nuclear arsenal was five times higher than the ammunition that McNamara's department considered sufficient for the "guaranteed destruction" of objects planned on the territory of the USSR. McNamara himself admitted that "with the forces that we propose to support, we will even have a surplus of nuclear power beyond our needs" ⁶². The revision of the "first strike" strategy also affected plans for the use of medium-range missiles from advanced bases, primarily in Western Europe. Obsolete thunderstorm

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The heavy missiles "Tor" and "Jupiter", deployed in open, unprotected positions, requiring lengthy preparation for launch, were withdrawn from service in 1963 and withdrawn from the European countries where they were deployed. They were supposed to be replaced by nuclear submarines with medium-range missiles "Polaris" patrolling in the coastal waters of Europe. Unlike ICBMs, which took about 30 minutes to reach targets, Polaris, launched from distances closer to the Soviet Union, could reach its territory faster and hit the intended targets. "After 1963, when the United States deliberately removed its Thor and Jupiter missiles from the continent, NATO did not deploy any intermediate-range missiles," the New York Times wrote in 1983. "NATO relied on intercontinental missiles deployed in North America, on missile submarines in European waters, on a range of aircraft capable of bringing down nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union from Western Europe, and on French and British nuclear forces." ⁶³ The mention of French and British nuclear forces here is not accidental. In the early 1960s, Britain and France already had their own nuclear weapons. England, having first tested a hydrogen bomb on Christmas Island in 1957 and seeing in the "nuclear factor" the basis of the power of its armed forces, built and by 1963 had put into service 180 strategic jet bombers of the "Volcano" and "Victor" types (range, respectively 9,000 and 11,000 km), armed with nuclear bombs and Blue Steel cruise missiles to destroy ground targets (range 160 km). France, having begun independent creation of nuclear weapons in 1955, tested an atomic bomb in the Sahara in 1960 and then formed "French national strike forces" in the form of Mirage IV strategic bombers capable of carrying atomic "weapons" (by 1968 - 62 bombers) .

In the future, France planned to equip its strategic aviation with missiles of its own production and build 5 nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles. The first boat, La Redoutable, was launched on 6 1967. To increase the scope of military preparations, the United States and its NATO allies created a psychological environment for ever new breakthroughs in the production and improvement of weapons,

declaring that the Soviet Union was leading the arms race. It was a falsification, which was later recognized by leading American scientists and politicians. So, G. York in the book "Race to Oblivion" (1971) wrote:

"We have taken unilateral action again, I responsibility unnecessarily accelerated the arms race again and again ... which I share for some of them and the details ... Our unilateral decisions determine the know detailed pace and scale of most concrete steps

And V race strategic weapons. In developing earlier than the In many cases, we started and easily reached Russians, the long-term advantages of weapons " large and number of deployed species

By

64 .

A participant in American nuclear programs, the well-known American scientist J. Kistjakovsky stated: "I am convinced that the US, not the USSR, is spurring the arms race"⁶⁵ . This truth was recognized by the rulers of the United States and other countries in the 1960s. However, even their superiority

in the forces and means of nuclear war did not become a deterrent in the armaments continued by the countries of the North Atlantic bloc. On the contrary, it continued with increasing force. Between 1962 and 1965, NATO nations increased their military budgets by an average of 30 percent . The race leading role was played by the United States, whose military budget grew every year. If in the 1964/65 financial year, US military spending amounted to 51.9 billion dollars, then in 1967/68 they increased to 76.5, and the next year to 79.8 billion.

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dollars. The military-industrial complex grew more and more. The number of Pentagon's primary contractors alone has reached almost 20 thousand corporations, and taking into account subcontractors - about 45-60 thousand. Entire branches of industry focused solely on

on

serving the US military. 80 percent of the products of the aircraft industry, 60 percent of shipbuilding, and 35 percent of electrical engineering went to military needs. A number of the largest firms were closely connected with military orders. Thus, for example, 97 percent of the production of the Thiokol firm went to the production of rocket fuel, 57 percent to United Aircraft, etc.⁶⁷ . As a result of the combined efforts of the US military-industrial complex and the Pentagon, a huge arsenal of strategic offensive weapons has been created. USA in 1967

completed the creation of a strategic triad. It included 1054 launchers of Minuteman-1, Minuteman-2, Titan 2 ICBMs, 656 Polaris A-2 and Polaris A-3 missiles on 41 nuclear submarines, as well as 615 heavy bombers B-52s armed with the Hound Dog supersonic cruise missile and B-58 medium bombers. The total number of strategic carriers was 2325. And in the USSR at that time there were just over 600 carriers of nuclear weapons, including only 2 nuclear submarines (32 launchers)⁶⁸.

All this allowed the new US Secretary of Defense Clifford to declare in 1968: "Today we have a significant military superiority over the Soviet Union, and I will do everything in my power to maintain such superiority in the future." The main place in the new round of the arms race was occupied by programs for the further improvement of missile systems.

complexes.

At this time, in the mid-1960s, the attention of the US leadership was attracted by new military programs - ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, equipped with individual targeting heads, and an anti-missile defense system.

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Shocked at the end of the 1950s by the appearance in the USSR of nuclear missile weapons, which deprived the United States of invulnerability, the US military department longed for a new superweapon, one that the Soviet Union did not have. This task was intended to be solved through a technological breakthrough in order to maintain and increase the superiority in strategic weapons and break away as far as possible from the opponent. By developing multiply charged missile warheads, which the USSR did not have at that time, American strategists hoped to significantly increase the US's ability to destroy targets on the territory of the USSR, the number of which was constantly increasing in the plans of the Pentagon. Back in 1968, the Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Poseidon naval missiles were tested for the first time. The latter were intended to replace the Polaris. These types of missiles were equipped with MIRV warheads (multiple-charged multiple reentry vehicles) - each missile could hit from 3 (Minuteman-3) to 10-14 (Poseidon) different targets.

At the same time, in order to increase the inaccessibility of US territory for a retaliatory missile strike, the second component of the "wonder weapon" was being developed - the anti-missile defense system (ABM). Since the 1950s, US Army research organizations have been working on the Nike-Zeus missile defense system (1959-1963). However, during the development, major shortcomings of this system were revealed. Its main drawback was that the Zeus interceptor missile had insufficient speed (four times less than an ICBM). It had to be launched in advance, and the interception was made high above the atmosphere. Therefore, the American missile defense system could be overcome

using relatively simple means of breakthrough. The second drawback of it was that the detection, tracking and recognition radars of the system had mechanically rotating antennas. They did not allow tracking many targets at the same time and could be "overwhelmed" by a massive missile attack.

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That's why V 1963-1965 was an improved Nike-X established missile system. Unlike Nike-Zeus, the new version of missile defense included a different type of radar in the project - with a phased array. In them, the direction of the beam was set not by mechanical rotation of the antenna, but by a change in the electromagnetic field, which made it possible to track a large number of targets simultaneously. To intercept warheads in dense layers of the atmosphere, a smaller anti-missile with an increased initial acceleration, the Sprint, was developed. The explosion of its nuclear warhead with a yield of about 10 kilotons was supposed to hit ICBMs at an altitude of 40 kilometers with a shock wave and neutron radiation. For long-range, above-atmospheric interception, the Spartan anti-missile, a modification of Zeus, was intended with a warhead yield of up to 10 megatons, which could disable an enemy offensive missile with X-ray and thermal radiation at a distance of up to 10 kilometers from the epicenter. However, the Achilles' heel of the missile defense system being created was radars, which could be disabled or "blinded" by above-atmospheric nuclear explosions⁷⁰. Interest in missile defense and multiple reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile systems has increased also because it directly concerned multibillion-dollar orders for such

the largest military monopolies, such as International Telephone and Telegraph, Western Electric, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, General Electric and Boeing. Congress for the most part supported the programs of the armed forces, and primarily Nike-X, since a very narrow circle of people was still aware of the development of repeating warheads. Many in the Capitol actively campaigned for funding for missile defense. They saw Nike-X as essential to maintaining US "nuclear superiority" and because the Pentagon believed it could shield cities in the event of a nuclear war and greatly reduce damage to the United States.

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This question was put on a practical basis in the mid-1960s. The military department was provided with projects of various options for the country's anti-missile defense systems. They also included:

"fine" protection of populated centers ("protection of an area or territory") from an accidental or small missile attack, consisting of 2,000 anti-missiles with a total design cost of up to 10 billion dollars;

"dense" protection of the territory from a massive missile attack from 4,000 anti-missiles with a total cost of \$20 billion;

"protection of the facility" ("point protection"), that is, the cover of ICBM launch complexes, is much less complicated and expensive⁷¹. At the end of the 60s, when work

began on the creation of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles "Minuteman-3" and "Poseidon", the construction of the Sentinel anti-missile defense system began (as Nike-X began to be called from November 1967). The new missile defense system, consisting of 12 complexes, was supposed to have 600-1000 anti-missiles⁷². These were attempts to begin the creation of a missile defense of the US territory. However, in early 1969, the deployment of the Sentinel system was suspended. The name of the system was changed to "Safeguard", and instead of deploying a missile defense system to cover the territory, it was planned in the first phase of the program to build an anti-missile defense to protect part of the US missile forces from a Soviet nuclear attack on American ICBM launch complexes. "Safeguard" was no longer intended to protect settlements from a potential enemy retaliatory strike, but to reduce the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles, that is, to increase the capabilities of the American nuclear

missile "retribution strike" capabilities. For this, the missile defense systems were supposed to be moved from positions around American cities to the starting positions of the Minuteman intercontinental missiles. In the first phase, it was planned to deploy 2 missile defense systems (out of 12,

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scheduled for construction) to cover the ICBM bases (Montana) and Grand Forks (North Dakota). The second phase of the program provided for the expansion of missile defense to other ICBM bases, and later on to US cities. Thus, the emphasis was not on the protection of the civilian population, as previously declared, but on increasing the invulnerability of missile bases - offensive weapons. But the paradox was that the main technical components

the Safeguard systems remained the same as those of the Sentinel system, although the requirements for missile defense of protected small objects, which were ICBM silos, were completely different⁷³. Thus, despite the harsh lessons of the

beginning of the decade (the Caribbean crisis), despite the fact that many in the United States realized that it was not the USSR that was spurring the arms race, but the United States, despite the emerging opportunities for mitigation

international tension (Treaty on the Prohibition of Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water of 1963, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, etc.), the United States preferred to prolong the insane arms race, hoping to maintain military superiority with new types of superweapons.

Under these conditions, faced with the fact of a rapid build-up of US military power, the Soviet Union was forced to strengthen its defense capability in order to eliminate the American strategic advantage. It was a necessary response to the growing threat from across the ocean. The regularity and fairness of this answer was recognized by many authoritative American scientists and politicians. "No one expected," wrote Princeton University professor Stephen Cohen, "that the Soviet Union would forever put up with its military lag, which was observed in the 60s; the inevitable elimination of this lag has always been the main prerequisite and necessary need for detente." Cyrus Vance, former U.S. Secretary of State, noted: "It was inevitable that the Soviet Union would build capacity, for example

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but equal to our potential." Robert McNamara's memoirs of the military-strategic situation of the 60s are a very remarkable revelation: "If I were the Soviet Minister of Defense, I would be damned concerned about the inequality of forces. And I would be concerned that the United States is trying to create a first strike capability. "He refers to a 1962 US Air Force Command report. The document said: "The Air Force supports such a build-up of forces that will provide the United States with the ability to launch a first strike "If the air force thought so," McNamara emphasized, "can you imagine what the Soviets thought? What kind of reaction would you expect? They reacted as follows: they significantly expanded their program of strategic nuclear weapons ... So, you got the phenomenon: action - counteraction. "74 Indeed, the entire history of the post-war arms race indicates that the United States was the leader in it in the first post-war years. evidenced by the statement of veteran American diplomacy J. Kennan:

"Let's Not let's cast a shadow on clear day, dumping everything We
responsibility on our opponents. every must remember
Americans, who initiated the further on turn of the road were that it was we, the
development of such a. O.) We weapons. device, we increased the degree of destructiveness
by creating hydrogen first created And tested such
were the first to create a repeating warhead, we rejected any proposals to abandon the principle we
are alone

V

— from first use of nuclear weapons And
of thousands of God used this weapon against others, forgive us people, against tens
defenseless civilians" 75 .

Until the 1970s, the USSR was constantly in a "race for the leader." During the entire post-war period, the Soviet country came up with specific proposals for the reduction of armaments, but, being forced to take retaliatory measures, 468

as a rule, found adequate solutions to the American challenge. It was not easy, but it was dictated by severe necessity. As a result, parity was achieved in the ratio of US and Soviet strategic arms in the early 1970s. This was also recognized in the West. In September 1970, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies announced that the USSR was approaching nuclear parity with the United States. On February 25, 1971, Americans heard on the radio President R. Nixon's address: "Today neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a clear nuclear advantage"⁷⁶.

In October of the same year, in preparation for the Soviet-American summit, he said at a press conference:

"If there is a new world war, if there is a war between I think not superpowers, we can also recognize that then nobody wins.

no major power can gain a decisive advantage over another ... It is for this reason that the moment has now come to settle our differences, taking into account our differences, to settle their By opinions, recognizing that they are still very deep, recognizing present moment no alternative With however that in

there is no negotiation" ⁷¹.

Already in Moscow in May 1972, Nixon stressed that "in the nuclear age ... there is no such thing as security through the predominance of force"

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CONCLUSION

The recognition of the real dangers in the nuclear age led the leaders of the superpowers in the early 1970s to revise their policies, to turn from the Cold War to detente, and to cooperate with states with different social systems. The successes of the peace-loving policy were won in the bitter struggle waged by all the progressive forces of mankind since the end of World War II.

The military-strategic parity between the US and the USSR has become a fairly reliable guarantee of peace. The strategic balance in the conditions of the high level of nuclear potentials of both sides created a guaranteed opportunity for any of them, if it became a victim of nuclear aggression, to save enough funds to deliver a retaliatory strike capable of destroying the aggressor. This situation meant that if an aggressor unleashed a nuclear war, there could be no winner in it, and nuclear aggression was tantamount to suicide. At the same time, strategic equality created certain objective incentives for ending the arms race and reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. It opened the possibility, in the presence of good will on both sides, to gradually lower the level

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nuclear confrontation with the constant preservation of equality - with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. Finally, strategic equality was an important prerequisite for the stability of the international situation and the weakening of political confrontation.

Thus, the equality of the strategic forces of the parties became, as it seemed, a guarantee of peace. Outwardly, everything looked as if the USSR and the USA had equalized their forces in the field of aerospace attack and missile defense. But quantitative equality did not yet mean equilibrium. There was no equality of opportunity. The United States and its allies had unilateral advantages in military, economic and technological potential over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The fact is that the Soviet Union was increasingly losing dynamism in the economy. "For almost four five-year plans," it was

noted at the February (1988) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "we did not have an increase in the absolute growth of the national income" ¹. The possibility of purchasing advanced technologies in Western countries for the production of products that meet international quality standards (except for the military-industrial complex) was not realized. But all this affected later, in the 80s, and then, in the early 70s, the military-strategic

parity was the great achievement of the Soviet Union. This immediately affected the military-political situation in the world. It was during these years that the relations of the countries of the socialist community with the major states of Western Europe—England, France, the FRG, Italy, and other capitalist states—were strengthened and further developed. In August 1970, the Soviet-West German treaty was concluded, according to which the parties assumed obligations to respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe, to resolve their disputes by peaceful means ,

refrain from the threat and use of force. Was admitted to the UN by the GDR. Its agreement with the FRG (1971) confirmed the inviolability of the western borders of the GDR. Poland and Czechoslovakia signed agreements with the FRG (Poland in 1970, Czechoslovakia in 1973). In September 1971, a quadripartite (USSR, USA, England and France) agreement on West Berlin was signed. Negotiations began on the limitation of strategic arms, on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

As a result of negotiations between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT), which began in November 1969, in Moscow in May 1972, two important agreements were signed between the USSR and the USA: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Missile Defense Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the USA on certain measures in the field of offensive weapons (in the world press, this agreement received an abbreviated name - CSM-1). Under the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which is of an indefinite nature, the Soviet Union and the United States assumed a number of obligations based on the objective

relationship between defensive and offensive strategic weapons. In signing the Treaty, both sides noted that "effective measures to limit missile defense systems would be a significant factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would lead to a reduction in the danger of a war with the use of nuclear weapons." A

missile defense system, as defined by the Treaty, is a system for combating strategic ballistic missiles or their elements on flight trajectories, currently consisting of interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers and missile defense radars (ABM radars).

refurbishment, conservation. Article I

fixes the obligation of the parties "not to deploy missile defense systems on the territory of their country and not to create the basis for such a defense." Each of

the parties was allowed (Article III) to deploy missile defense systems in only two areas: a) within one area with

a radius of 150 kilometers with the center located in the capital of this party; b) within one area with a radius of 150 kilometers,

in which silo launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are located. In each area, a limited number of components of missile defense systems (anti-missiles, anti-missile launchers and missile

defense radars) are provided. Each side is allowed to have no more than 100 interceptor missiles in one area. In 1974, the USSR and the USA signed a protocol to the Treaty, according to which the number of areas for deploying missile defense systems of each side was reduced to one.

According to Article V, the parties undertake "not to create, test or deploy sea, air, space or mobile ground-based missile defense systems or components." The USSR and the USA undertook not to transfer to other states and not

to place outside their national territory missile defense systems or their components limited by the Treaty (Article IX). The fulfillment of contractual obligations must be controlled by national technical means, in compliance with the generally recognized norms of international law. It is also important to note that Article XI contains the obligation of the USSR and the USA "to continue active negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, and Article XIII provides that the parties must "consider, as necessary, possible proposals 476

to further enhance the viability of this Treaty..." The indefinite Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), signed on May 26, 1972, entered into force on October 3 of the same year.

Another agreement (SALT-1), concluded for a period of 5 years, imposed certain quantitative and qualitative restrictions on stationary launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), launchers of ballistic missiles on submarines (SLBMs) and submarines themselves with ballistic missiles.

However, the widespread recognition on an international scale of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems caused increasing opposition from certain forces in the United States. Strategic parity with the Soviet Union did not suit some US political and military circles. "The Americans," wrote the well-known journalist J. Chase, "have always been in search of invulnerability.

American leaders—whether by doctrine ... or by military systems, or simply by reliance on geography—have worked tirelessly to achieve a level of security that is absolute.”² When military-strategic parity became a fact, it was regarded in Washington, of course, as approximate equality in quantitative parameters. But what was the approximate equality in terms of the number of means of delivering nuclear weapons to strike targets, as well as in ground forces in Europe? If the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries had superiority in tanks, then NATO countries had an advantage in anti-tank means and in aviation. Both sides could inflict "unacceptable damage" on each other in the event of a nuclear war. There was an "equality of fear" based on mutually assured destruction. But such equality did not yet mean equality of opportunity. And this will still affect in the future. However, then, in the early 70s, this was a significant achievement of the Soviet Union. He became 477

a full-fledged superpower, and nuclear missile weapons have turned from a "weapon of victory" in a war of nuclear powers into a political weapon of a special kind - a weapon to deter a global nuclear catastrophe.

It was a world-historic victory for Soviet weapons, Soviet military-technical thought, and Soviet politics in the 20th century. If the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the defeat of fascism in World War II, then, having achieved military-strategic parity with the United States, it made a decisive contribution to creating an environment of equal security for the parties in the current bipolar world. A process of dialogue has begun between the superpowers and their allies on the control of

armaments, their limitation, and in the future - and reduction.

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Alexander Semenovich ORLOV

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